Date: Fri, 22 Mar 1996 22:22:27 -0600
From: bdbryant@mail.utexas.edu (Bobby D. Bryant)
Subject: Re: Stacking
Steven said:
>This doesn't address my fundamental objection. The attack is already
>strong in Europa. Why do we need to make it stronger?
1) I tend to agree with those who said the attack is sometimes not strong
enough, as in France '40 or USSR '41. (And notice that at least one of these
cases *already* has an artificial surprize rule intended to boost the
attacker's performance.) If the attack happens to be too strong in some
places/periods while too weak in these, the system needs adjustment whether
we change stacking rules or not.
2) If I remember correctly, Jim's original post acknowledged that a change
in stacking would likely require other changes to the system, but he
insisted that we not use an arbitrarily low stacking limit to
cover-up/compensate-for other flaws in the system. If we want to claim
Europa as a simulation, set the stacking limit to simulate reality, and
adjust other rules/parameters to conform as well.
- Bobby.
Subject: Re: Stacking
Date: Sat, 23 Mar 1996 00:28:12 -0500 (EST)
From: "Arius V Kaufmann" <akaufma2@osf1.gmu.edu>
> cover-up/compensate-for other flaws in the system. If we want to claim
> Europa as a simulation, set the stacking limit to simulate reality, and
> adjust other rules/parameters to conform as well.
>
> - Bobby.
This is a problem plagueing game designers for decades. Do you start
with realistic basics, and conform the rules to try to match history (and get
an absurdly complex game, CNA for instance) or do you start with the game
mechanics and then try to add rules such as surprise to simulate history (and
end up with people saying things like Stalingrad can't happen in this system,
or tying their hands in a frustating menner by making silly rules).
I, myself, prefer the first approach, since the second has been done
(with some games more successful than others). I'd like to try a game using
4-4-3 stacking, and see what happens. (Maybe at this year's Origins).
Arius
Date: Fri, 22 Mar 1996 22:04:59 -0800
From: Stephen Graham <graham@maxwell.ee.washington.edu>
Subject: Re: Stacking
>>This doesn't address my fundamental objection. The attack is already
>>strong in Europa. Why do we need to make it stronger?
>
>1) I tend to agree with those who said the attack is sometimes not strong
>enough, as in France '40 or USSR '41.
Note that I don't agree that the attack is too weak in 1940 and 1941.
Europa models this period better than it does later periods. The
difficulty with France is that it's hard to force players to repeat the
mistakes of history. I've seen it done by uncertain and passive
players. But competent players know too much to collapse as the French
did.
As for Russia in 1941, well, many German players are too cautious.
---
Stephen Graham
graham@ee.washington.edu
graham@cs.washington.edu uw-beaver!june!graham
Date: Sat, 23 Mar 1996 13:12:43 +0100
From: cloister@dircon.co.uk (Perry de Havilland)
Subject: Re: What about a news group?
Bill Stone wrote:
>>Newsgroup?
>
>"Nuts."
To which I say:
Amen!
I already haunt several newsgroups and whilst they are okay, I dislike the
spams from Get Rich Quick hustlers and posts from pea-brained idiots better
served by visiting alt.tasteless.
Sure, the volume of mail from this forum is large...but the quality is
good. You do not HAVE to read all the incoming mail: if the subject index
looks uninteresting to you...Delete it unread and move on!
I have learned some interesting things in the last few weeks in this forum
and I would hate for a format change to drive some very interesting people
away.
Regards
Perry ...-
Date: Sat, 23 Mar 1996 14:06:42 +0100
From: cloister@dircon.co.uk (Perry de Havilland)
Subject: Stacking & Historical Disperal
Steve Graham wrote:
>
>Note that I don't agree that the attack is too weak in 1940 and 1941.
>Europa models this period better than it does later periods. The
>difficulty with France is that it's hard to force players to repeat the
>mistakes of history. I've seen it done by uncertain & passive
>players. But competent players know too much to collapse as the >French did.
>
>As for Russia in 1941, well, many German players are too cautious.
I agree. If you *simulate-play* as opposed to *wargame-play* FoF (i.e.
take both sides and simulate what happened), FoF can indeed turn out
historically (given slight allowances for the inevitable minor distortion
due to 2 week turns). I am a bit less sanguine re. Russia, but only a bit.
As for the surprise rules being artificial, I disagree strongly.
Do not confuse the so-called idiot rules with rules simulating surprise.
The FoF idiot rules are to simulate Gamelin (who WAS an idiot) and the
historical thrust of the specific campaign that resulted from his (and
others) decisions. These rules, whilst not without merit, are indeed
artificial constraints: they are designed to show the effects of the
historical command decisions at the start of that campaign.
Surprise rules, on the other hand, simulate a quantifiable phenomena. For
an interesting study of this, I would ref. you to *Numbers, Prediction &
War* by T. N. Dupuy (Hero Books, 1985).
At the start of a campaign, surprise is often THE critical factor.
Also, the Dupuy book is a useful source for the effects of dispersal on
casualty rates (i.e. what us Europa-oid call 'stacking'). As I said in an
earlier post to this forum, I think stacking beyond a certain 'normal'
limit should be allowed, but should have casualty- vulnerability
implications.
Here is some information re. historical dispersal patterns from the Dupuy book:
Napoleonic American WWI WWII 1973
war civil war
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Area occupied by
deployed 100,000
strong force(km2) 20.12 25.75 247.5 3100 4000
Depth (km) 2.5 3.0 12 60 67
Width (km) 8.0 8.33 20.8 50 60
Dispersal factor 20 25 250 3000 4000
These factors are a useful starting point regarding any discussion of
Europa stacking limits and what they mean.
Dupuy goes into considerable length in *Numbers, Prediction & War* (and
also in his more recent *Attrition* (Hero Books, 1990)) producing
quantified analyses of WWII (and other) warfare. Examining his equations
(not something for the faint hearted) shows that the dispersal variable is
quite important in contributing to casualty rates.
One of the most interesting conclusions Dupuy came to was that the reason
for the lower daily loss rates in WWII vs. WWI was that although weapons
were more lethal in WWII, the increase in dispersal more than compensated.
It makes sense if you think about it.
My whole point here is that not many of the comments I have read re.
stacking are considering the casualty implications.
Incidentally, it does seem sensible, as Jeff White suggested earlier, to
impose an MP penalty entering (& leaving, I would suggest) an
'over'-stacked hex, due to traffic problems and also imposing some advance
after combat limits for the same reason.
Regards
Perry ...-
From: pardue@hilda.mast.QueensU.CA (Keith Pardue)
Subject: Spanish Civil War
Date: Sat, 23 Mar 1996 10:42:28 -0500 (EST)
Hi,
I'm going to start a game of the Spanish Civil War in
a few weeks after our semester end. (I'll bet that all of you
at universities in the States are jealous that our semester
ends so early in Canada. In this wonderful country, classes
end before the winter does; it just snowed again last night.)
I want to ask some advice from those of you who have
played this game.
(1) Which advanced/optional rules do you think are good? I tend
to go for all "historical" advanced and optional rules. But,
I get the impression that the effect of coastal defense batteries
on ground combat is already taken care of by the various artillery
units in the same hexes as coastal defense with a movement rating
of zero.
(2) What rules do you use for off map boxes? Are there any hitches
with using the rules in the WWII rulebook to cover this?
(3) Any advice on strategy for either side? I will share all of this
with my opponent. After setting it up once, the strategic options
weren't clear to me, as they are in most Europa games.
(4) Any advice on the logistics of playing the game? There is alot
to keep track of!
Best Wishes,
Keith Pardue
Kingston, Ontario, Canada.
Date: Sat, 23 Mar 1996 08:36:56 -0800
From: bstone@sub.sonic.net (Bill Stone)
Subject: Dupuy (was Stacking & Historical Disper)
Perry mentioned a couple of Dupuy's books. His work is controversial but
worth looking into for wargamers even if you end up disagreeing with much
of what he says.
I hope I'm not out of line by pointing out that I constructed the website
for Dupuy's son (who continues to market the books of his late father and
grandfather):
http://www.sonic.net/~bstone/nova
Mixed in with the more general military books are lots of very interesting,
detailed studies of WWII topics which are very applicable to Europa.
(No, I don't get royalties.)
----------------------------
Bill Stone
Santa Rosa, CA
bstone@sonic.net
World War II Web Site:
http://www.sonic.net/~bstone
----------------------------
Date: Sat, 23 Mar 1996 08:50:18 -0800
From: bstone@sub.sonic.net (Bill Stone)
Subject: Re: Spanish Civil War
Keith Pardue signaled:
>
>I'm going to start a game of the Spanish Civil War in
>a few weeks...<SNIP>...I want to ask some advice from those of you who have
>played this game.
>
Keith,
I played For Whom the Bell Tolls fairly recently and would offer my advice,
but I know for a fact that Jim "The Hero of Madrid" Arnold, Ray "Kick
Stone's Butt" Kanarr, and Jeff "I Co-Designed the Damn Thing" (a/k/a
"Gamelin Was Right!") Millefoglie -- all of whom participated in my
comeuppance -- are on this List, so I will defer to them. In particular, we
need to flush out the lurking Mr. Millefoglie that he might grace us with
his acidic pen (or keyboard).
----------------------------
Bill Stone
Santa Rosa, CA
bstone@sonic.net
World War II Web Site:
http://www.sonic.net/~bstone
----------------------------
Date: Sat, 23 Mar 1996 12:38:44 -0500 (EST)
From: Stephen Balbach <stephen@clark.net>
Subject: RE: What about a news group?
On 22 Mar 1996, Merrill, Robert C wrote:
> Steve Balbach has suggested that the Lysator mailing list move to an "alt"
> newsgroup, because they are easier to create than the "rec" newgroup
> suggested by David Holmes.
"move" is the operative word - mailing lists and newsgroups are
seperate entities, apples and oranges, no reason you cant have both, if
there is an interest from those with Usenet access. Searching a recent
list of 15000 newgroups, there are 281 groups with the word "games" in
them. And probably just as many mailing lists for games too.
---
Stephen Balbach "Driving the Internet to Work"
VP, ClarkNet due to the high volume of mail I receive please quote
info@clark.net the full original message in your reply.
From: viktor@mgr.hjf.org (Viktor Kaufmann)
Subject: Re: What about a news group?
Date: Sat, 23 Mar 1996 13:25:54 -0500 (EST)
I am 100% opposed to moving this list to a newsgroup. Newsgroups have
significantly more noise than do mailing lists. Although I have
access to newsgroups, I have found that when there is a corresponding
mailing list, the quality of posts is superior on the mailing list, so
I don't bother much with newsgroups.
This same topic has just been debated on two other mailing lists I
receive, advanced-sl (ASL) and consim-l, and in each case it was
decided not to do this. Some of the important points from those
debates are:
1) Not all people have access to newsgroups.
2) Not all people who have access to newsgroups have access to all
newsgroups (for example, I've never seen alt.games.europa listed).
3) The noise is significantly worse on a newsgroup.
Also, 20-40 messages a day is not really high volume. It is entirely
reasonable.
Viktor
From: WWAR2@aol.com
Date: Sat, 23 Mar 1996 14:53:53 -0500
Subject: unsubscribe
unsubscribe europa@lysator.liu.se
From: m.royer3@genie.com
Date: Sat, 23 Mar 96 20:24:00 UTC 0000
Subject: Crated air units
Reply: Item #2298641 from NASU002.USAP@IAC.ORG.NZ@INET#on 96/03/23 at 07:17
Regarding shipping crated air units, I quite agree. I've long been bothered by
the inability to do this. I remember having fighters stuck in Malta out of
transfer range to North Africa, where I needed them much more.
Historically, how long does it take to crate and uncrate aircraft? Maybe a
simple game mechanic requiring the air unit to be inop. for some period before
and/or after the transport could work.
-Mark R.
Subject: Re: What about a news group?
Date: Sat, 23 Mar 1996 16:02:45 -0500 (EST)
From: "Arius V Kaufmann" <akaufma2@osf1.gmu.edu>
> 1) Not all people have access to newsgroups.
> 2) Not all people who have access to newsgroups have access to all
> newsgroups (for example, I've never seen alt.games.europa listed).
> 3) The noise is significantly worse on a newsgroup.
>
> Also, 20-40 messages a day is not really high volume. It is entirely
> reasonable.
>
> Viktor
All the above are valid points. Anyone who reads mailing lists and
their equivalent newsgroups will note the same problems as the above. Check
out rec.games.board, for instance. Consim-l may be far from noise-free, but
rec.games.board is far worse. I don't even read it.
Another interesting point is that newsgroups are point-and-click for
many people, and this leads to alot of newbies who have no idea what's going
on and post the same moronic messages and respond to six month old threads
which were non-related anyway. Sure, you get SOME newbies on mail lists, but
few and far between. Imagine seeing a message on rec.games.board.europa
saying, "Test, please ignore" several times a day. I don't think I've ever
seen this on a mailing list.
Anyone want this soapbox?
Arius
Date: Sat, 23 Mar 1996 13:53:17 -0800
From: bstone@sub.sonic.net (Bill Stone)
Subject: Re: Crated air units
>
>blah
>posts about difficulty transferring air units from Africa to the UK
>posts about crating aircraft and shipping by sea
>blah
>
Short-legged aircraft were regularly crated and shipped overseas from the
theater where they were manufactured. That seems to be handled inherently
in the SF air replacement/reinforcement rules.
What about *used* aircraft in an overseas theater? How often did it occur
that planes were manufactured, crated, shipped to a theater, assembled,
flown around and dinged up, then re-crated and shipped onward for use in
another theater? Much as we might want to forward our *used* planes from
one overseas theater by sea to another, what kind of historical precedent
is there?
I'm not much of an air-guy. Can someone suggest some reading I can do on this?
----------------------------
Bill Stone
Santa Rosa, CA
bstone@sonic.net
World War II Web Site:
http://www.sonic.net/~bstone
----------------------------
Date: Sat, 23 Mar 1996 18:26:23 -0500
From: Nicholas Forte <nforte@osf1.gmu.edu>
Subject: French Tanks from USA
I've read several sources that mentioned French plans to build several thousand
Somua S.35 tanks in either the US or Canada. These books don't give any details
however. The footnote in one book says that 10,000 tanks were to be built in
the US but doesn't say over what period or if the contracts had been finalized.
Does anyone out there know how far these plans got before the collapse of
France? or the details of the production plans?
Nick Forte
Reston, VA
Date: Sat, 23 Mar 1996 17:31:30 -0600
From: conrad alan b <abcclibr@ux1.cso.uiuc.edu>
Subject: Re: Crated air units
On Fri, 22 Mar 1996, James B. Byrne wrote:
> The only aircraft that were crated were those that didn't have
> the legs to make air transfers. Even Mitchells and Lightnings
> were generally flown in theater rather than shipped. I doubt
> that a Lancaster or any other 4 engine a/c was ever crated
>
True enough for many American aircraft in the Med theater. Although
my suspicion is that the masive numbers of P-47s going to England later were
shipped. And in GE Britain has to be able to get a/c to Egypt. They are
not flown.
Nevertheless there is more to an air unit than the planes. The
ground element: personel, trucks, tools etc., is a huge undertaking, and
they are never flown.
Alan Conrad
Date: 23 Mar 96 19:52:00 EST
From: Alan Philson <100626.2267@compuserve.com>
Subject: Re: Crated air units
>From reading a wide variety of accounts of RAF squadrons the following would
seem to be the norm up to 1942.
Most Single engined aircraft (hurricanes P40s) were crated and shipped to
Takoradi where they were assembled and staged across Africa to Egypt, .. Some
hurricanes were flown off carriers in the Med and staged via Malta. Groundcrew
usually came via the convoy route round the Cape.
Wellingtons and Halifaxs flew from the UK via Malta, Squadrons of Blenheims,
Beauforts, Beaufighters flew to Gibralter and violated Spanish airspace en route
then staged through Malta, their replacement aircraft came via Takoradi, some of
the essential groundcrew members flew as passengers the others being shipped as
above. Note that those transferring via Gibralter normally did so in six
aircraft flights because of the very limited parking space available at North
Front airstrip on Gib. The extended airfield was not completed until Summer
1942.
After the fall of Italian East Africa when the Red Sea was no longer a war zone
crated aircraft were shipped from the US to Suez in US ships.
Alan Philson
Date: 23 Mar 96 19:52:29 EST
From: Alan Philson <100626.2267@compuserve.com>
Subject: Re: More crated aircraft
Mark Royer asked how long to crate and uncrate aircraft.
The former I dont know but for uncrating and making operationally ready I will
quote the example of the first batch of 51 crated Hurricanes to arrive in
Singapore. It took 4 days to make 21 Hurricanes ready, if that is the norm then
a single engine fighter counter would take about a 7-8 days, if crating took a
similar period then one Europa turn would be spent on these tasks. However
trying to make a rule on this raises a whole new can of worms. The unit that
would assemble the aircraft in the RAF would be the MU (Maintenance Unit), these
units are already busy behind the scenes in Europa carrying out repairs to
aircraft to maintain the counters at full strength and uncrating new units as
per the OB, if you then burden them with additional air units to unpack there
must be a limit to what they can cope with. I would think this would be very
hard to quantify.
Alan Philson
From: epinnel@ibm.net
Date: Sat, 23 Mar 96 21:45:12 +0000
Subject: Re: What about a news group?
*EARTH CALLING EUROPA MAILING LIST - THERE IS ALREADY A USENET GROUP FOR EUROPA CALLED alt.games.europa.*
Eric Pinnell
(President, CyberSim Inc.)
From: "David H. Thornley" <thornley@cs.umn.edu>
Subject: Re: Stacking
Date: Sat, 23 Mar 1996 21:56:54 -0600 (CST)
> > In Second Front, any attack that gives you a 50-50 chance to take the hex
> > is a good attack for the Allies. As people have pointed out, replacement
> > points are not generally a problem for the Americans. Particularly in
> > Italy, fight an attritional battle. The Allies can take more casualties
> > than the Germans.
>
Which is, as far as I can tell, historical. Western Allied strategy was
based on the nice, safe, concept that if the two sides slugged it out
toe to toe the Germans would run out of toes much faster. One of Eisen-
hower's desires in France was to do as much attritional fighting as
possible before his supply lines got too long. It worked pretty well,
on the whole.
> Okay, here's my slant:
>
> 1) The 4-4-3 stack is a super stack.
> 2) Super stacks can only be made during combat, ie you can't overrun
> with a super stack.
> 3) It takes a corp marker. One corp marker per super stack. You could
> then have an OB (isn't there one already?) for the corps.
> 4) Only a maxi stack (3-3-2) may advance after combat.
> 5) It costs a resource point per super stack attacking, to simulate
> the logisitcal problems.
> 6) Units must spend two MP's to enter a super stack.
>
> How's that?
>
Alternatively, you might require pre-planning. Possibly require the corps
marker to be there at the start of the turn. It would be a tip-off, but
it's difficult to do serious massing and not tip off the enemy.
>
> You might also want to limit super stacking to time and nationality.
> I was going to say the Russians can't, but then I suspect most of their
> attacks were super stacked later in the war.
>
According to Glantz and House, _When_Titans_Clash_, the Red Army went
in for very small attack frontages whenever they could, starting in 1942.
They couldn't always get them, of course, due to a simple lack of forces
or a lack of advanced planning, but they'd try.
David H. Thornley, known to the Wise as thornley@cs.umn.edu O-
Disclaimer: These are not the opinions of the University of Minnesota,
its Regents, faculty, staff, students, or squirrels.
Datclaimer: Well, maybe the squirrels. They're pretty smart.
From: "David H. Thornley" <thornley@cs.umn.edu>
Subject: Re: (ADMIN) What about a news group?
Date: Sat, 23 Mar 1996 22:05:20 -0600 (CST)
>
>
> > Has this list now become so active that we need a news group
> > (rec.games.board.europa or something) on the Usenet News?
>
> Good idea. rec groups are harder to create since you need a vote and a
> minimum number of replies. The best method is to start with an alt group,
> establish presidence and then vote on a rec heirarchy group with an
> established reader base. There are a number of FAQ's on procedures for
> starting a Big Seven soc,comp,misc,etc.. group
> (ftp.uu.net/usenet/news.answers)
>
There's reasons to avoid an alt group (and somebody has claimed that
there is one already). Typically, alt groups do not have nearly the
propagation of a rec group, and that is not likely to change. I haven't
followed news.groups for some months, but the attitude last
I checked seemed to be that an alt group should not be used as a
steppingstone to a Big Seven (or is it Eight now?) group.
Therefore, I'd recommend that somebody go for a rec group. Collect
some stats on this list; that should be enough evidence that rec.
games.board.europa is not a frivolous request. I believe it is
still considered kosher to put a Call For Votes on a mailing list,
provided it is announced ahead of time that it will go there, although
this was being debated and may have changed.
If somebody is going to create a Europa group, I'd rather see them
go through the additional hassle and do it right. (No, I'm not
volunteering for at least the rest of the year.)
David H. Thornley, known to the Wise as thornley@cs.umn.edu O-
Disclaimer: These are not the opinions of the University of Minnesota,
its Regents, faculty, staff, students, or squirrels.
Datclaimer: Well, maybe the squirrels. They're pretty smart.
Date: 23 Mar 96 23:57:18 EST
From: Jim Arnold <74133.1765@compuserve.com>
Subject: Stacking
Stephen Graham writes,
> Note that I don't agree that the attack is too weak in 1940 and 1941.
I'd like to hear about your experiences with FOF . In 15 days (one Europa turn)
the Dutch surrendered, the Germans captured Sedan, Brussels, Antwerp, St.
Quentin, Cambrai, Abbeville, Amiens, and Arras, and invested Boulogne and
Calais. What idiocy by a French player could allow the German player to
duplicate such an achievement? As in Poland and the USSR, higher stacking limits
could only improve the model, at least until the prolonged offensives later in
the war (another issue, I think).
I agree with Perry de Havilland that the "surprise turn" is worthwhile, all the
more so because of the extensive planning and logistical preparations it
reflects.
Jim
From: "David H. Thornley" <thornley@cs.umn.edu>
Subject: Re: (WWII) no neo-nazis! :)
Date: Sat, 23 Mar 1996 23:13:24 -0600 (CST)
>
>
> From: "David H. Thornley" <thornley@cs.umn.edu>
>
> <>need to micromanage. So, why did Hitler decide he wanted
> <>to micro- manage the war? If we find that he distrusted
> <>his generals for good reason, it follows that he was not
> <>the chief problem in the German high command.
>
> I don't believe he distrusted "his" Generals for good
> reason, considering that he distrusted Manstein, Guderian,
> Hoth, Kliest, et al. He distrusted <all> of his Generals,
> the good, the bad, the Conservatives and the Nazis. It
> doesn't follow that his distrust was based on anything
> rational, and I don't believe it was based on anything
> rational. You may disagree.
>
I disagree because I see actual reason to distrust his generals:
they were busy losing the war for him. They were busily going
ahead and doing things to make the defeat as easy and as far in
the future as possible. Hitler believed that defeat was unacceptable,
no matter how well-done or far in the future. His generals were
doing nothing to avert defeat, and were trying to cushion and delay
it. It is true, but irrelevant, that the situation was a direct result
of Hitler's decisions, and that Hitler's actions were extremely
unlikely to do anything other than to hasten defeat.
As an analogy, suppose that your son suffers from an illness that
is projected to be fatal within a few years; the doctors you take
him to say that they can do nothing to prevent his death. It doesn't
matter if the doctors are right and it doesn't matter if the illness
is a direct result of your previous actions; if you follow your
doctor's advice, your son will die unless a miracle happens. Is it
therefore irrational to go to a quack in some third-world country?
It isn't likely to do any good, but what real harm can it do?
> <>My historical perspective is that people are usually
> <>trying to do something that isn't actually evil (although
> <>the consequences may be blood-curdling) and usually have
> <>reasons for what they're doing. Consequently, when I find
> <>reasons that seem to explain somebody's actions, I tend to
> <>believe those reasons.
>
> In the case of Hitler, I have to disagree. His military
> actions were on a par with the gassing of the Jews; devoid
> of rationality, foolish in the extreme and ultimately self
> defeating. Just my opinion.
>
It seems to me that his military actions can be seen as having a
consistent rationale, and therefore I tend to believe that rationale.
Under it, his military actions seem to be somewhat rational, foolish,
and mostly irrelevant to victory or defeat.
> <>(I also tend to believe explanations as to why people
> <>weren't as evil as usually believed, although in Hitler's
> <>case I haven't found any.)
>
> There you go.
>
Huh? If you mean that I should accept the possibility that Hitler was
a raving looney (rather than a raving megalomaniac, which he was), I
don't see that as a problem. I also don't see it as an argument.
As far as I can tell, Hitler was profoundly evil, possessed of normally
good political instincts, a very bad military strategist, and made
military decisions in a rational manner, considering the previous
caveats.
> Any implication you are drawing is purely your own. I
> compared the book you cited to "Irving-ism" and since you
> didn't write the book, I obviously wasn't referring to you
> at all.
First statement: I haven't read any Irving, but I've seen him
favorably quoted by idiots who think the Nazis killed two, maybe
three hundred thousand Jews tops. I am very likely being unjust
to the man. I do believe that there is a difference between trying
to deny reality and trying to come up with a new slant to understand
it.
>
>[Much omitted]
OK, no hard feelings, OK? There's no neo-Nazis on this mailing
list (shut up, Fritz!).
> <>As far as the winter of '42 goes, what chance did Germany
> <>have of winning the war if the gains of the summer and
> <>fall offensive were given back?
>
> They had no chance of winning the war anyway, outside of
> Hitler's fantasy land dreams. He lost the war when he
> invaded the USSR, he speeded up the process when he
> declared war on the US.
>
The war may not have been lost as late as August '41 or so, to be
picky (and, of course, IMHO). On the other hand, the fact that the
Germans had certainly lost the war by December 10 does not mean that
giving up all hope was the right thing to do. Moreover, since the
war was lost, it follows that being a reasonable commander was to
accept defeat. Weinberg suggests, and I mostly concur, that the German
generals were mostly intelligent and reasonable men, and therefore they
were primarily trying to lose as slowly as possible. The only hope of
victory lay in being unreasonable, and Hitler was utterly uninterested
in losing at all. (It seems possible that Hitler was expecting to
be defeated. According to Weinberg, again, the mass murder campaign
took priority over military operations. This is the correct rational
action of an inconceivably evil man facing probable defeat.)
> <>I think that Hitler's actions from the winter of '42 on
> <>were partly desperation, and partly belief that the army
> <>would have to be able to carry out what he ordered if
> <>Germany were to win.
>
> I think Hitler's actions from winter 41/42 on were
> completely divorced from reality! He made no rational plans
> and executed none. He put operational straight-jackets on
> the commanders, like Kliest and Manstein, who could have
> bought him time and stalemate enough to seek political
> solutions to the problem of being in an unwinable situation.
The German generals were capable of fighting in a competent manner
and delaying defeat. Whether this is what Hitler should have asked
for is another question. He was, apparently, not interested in
finding political solutions (and it isn't obvious that there were any).
He was certainly uninterested in being defeated, no matter how long
and glorious the struggle. This *is* the reality of the situation.
No matter how free a hand Kleist and von Manstein and Guderian got,
the Reich was going to lose.
> To "win", Hitler needed to let his best commanders fight
> the war the way they knew how; simply drawing lines on a map
> and saying "They shall not pass." is not leadership.
>
It's miserable leadership and incompetent strategy. But, if Hitler
had let his best commanders fight the war the way they knew how, Germany
was going to lose. There was simply no military victory in the situation,
and (Hitler may well have believed) no political wiggle room to transform
a military defeat into something acceptable. If Hitler realized this,
then he may well have realized that he had to do something, even if it
was wrong.
>[Army Group Courland left behind, possibly (according to Weinberg)
> to guard training areas for the new U-boats.]
>
> Starving a few thousand people in England or shutting
> down its industries is not going to have any impact on the
>[snip]
> need be. So a hundred or so Walther U-Boats were of no
> consequence to the war; just important for a fool grasping
> at straws....
>
To repeat, what better chance did Hitler have of winning the war?
The Red Army was quite capable of crushing Germany, and so were the
Western Allies. On the other hand, *if* the Walther boats worked,
and *if* they were able to establish a good blockade, then maybe
the complete dependence of the mighty Western armies on shipping
could be exploited. *If* the Western Allies could be completely
knocked out of the war fast, just maybe something could be done about
the Red Army. It's a long series of unlikely events, but, frankly,
I don't see that Hitler had a better option. If there is no
acceptable rational action in a situation, then no action whatsoever
is evidence of irrationality.
> <>IMHO, the fact that Hitler had the ultimate command
> <>authority has very little to do with the outcome of WWII,
> <>as he did not in fact exercise it significantly before the
> <>war had been lost under the leadership of the German
> <>generals. By the time he issued the first of the
> <>controversial commands, in Winter of 1941, Germany was
> <>losing. Every order Hitler made from then on was a more
> <>or less inept attempt to change the situation so that
> <>Germany might win. Therefore, I think that Hitler's
> <>responsibility is due to his political leadership, that he
> <>led the nation into a war that it was not prepared to win,
> <>and that his military skills are irrelevant.
>
> Who stopped the Panzers at Dunkirk?
Hitler, weighing what two sets of people told him. The Army said one
thing, although with divided counsel (if I remember correctly, lots
of the General Staff were uncomfortable with the tenuous situation of
the Panzers), and the Air Force said another very definitely. Hitler's
decision did not work well, and giving the Panzers the go-ahead might
have worked a lot better. (It might have worked worse, for that matter.)
This isn't as clearly a bad decision as dozens made by all sides all
during the war.
> Who decided to attack the USSR?
Hitler, acting as political leader.
> Who detached the Panzers from the advance
> on Leningrad? Who ordered the Kiev encirclement battle?
Hitler, of course. Did the German general staff have better suggestions?
The general idea of the Kiev-style Kesselschlacht does not seem to have
been initiated by Hitler.
> Who cut back military production in 41? Who declared war on
> the US?
Hitler, acting as political leader. Hitler was just as reluctant as
President Johnson to ask for some level of civilian sacrifice to run a
war. He also thought (according to Weinberg) that Japan could defeat
the U.S. In that he was certainly not acting less rationally than the
Japanese high command (not that this is intended as any sort of
compliment).
> Who ordered that the Me 262 had to be a bomber?
Hitler. Now, to ask another question that I haven't seen asked: Was
the need for (say) a 600mph fighter that couldn't dogfight greater than
the need for a 550mph bomber? In terms of Second Front, would it be
more useful for the Germans to kill one air unit of his/her choice per
turn, at any time during the turn, or would it be more useful to be
able to place three tactical bombing factors per turn without Allied
fighter intervention? I'm not convinced that this particular decision
was a bad one.
> Who said the He 177A had to be able to dive bomb?
Hitler. This was a dumb decision, all right.
Now, here's one of mine:
Who ordered that Pz III tanks be equipped with the high-velocity 50mm
gun after the fall of France, and who was content with the medium-velocity
gun?
> His military decisions were much worse than his
> political ones, IMO. Hitler has a lot going for him as a
> politician, he just has nothing going for him as a war time
> Generalissimo.
Agreed. However, as I see things, Hitler's political decisions got
Germany into a position where good generalship could not save things.
> But these are opinions, and you can't argue opinions. I
> accept that we disagree on these points. What more can be
> said?
Huh? What else can we argue? Here's a fact to argue about: Germany
lost. Seems like a dull argument to me. I'm presenting what I
consider to be a very interesting set of opinions.
David H. Thornley, known to the Wise as thornley@cs.umn.edu O-
Disclaimer: These are not the opinions of the University of Minnesota,
its Regents, faculty, staff, students, or squirrels.
Datclaimer: Well, maybe the squirrels. They're pretty smart.
From: "David H. Thornley" <thornley@cs.umn.edu>
Subject: Re: howdy (WWII)
Date: Sat, 23 Mar 1996 23:55:14 -0600 (CST)
>
> On 3/21/96, David Thornley wrote:
>
> >As far as the winter of '42 goes, what chance did Germany
> >have of winning the war if the gains of the summer and fall
> >offensive were given back? That campaign had not hurt
> >the Red Army disproportionately, and the Soviets were just
> >going to be back in '43 in greater numbers.
>
> But that's exactly the point, some of which you mention earlier: the
> 1942 Summer campaign goes off into the never-never land of the
> Caucasus, in search of god knows what economic objectives, for [at
> best] fuzzy-thinking reasons, and ends up crashing on the shores of
> Stalingrad. All on Hitler's orders.
>
Well, those of us without omniscience can see what the economic
objectives are, and the Caucasus is not never-never land. I tend
to agree on the fuzzy thought, although I don't see what other thought
would be successful.
Think of the possibilities of the campaign had succeeded. The areas
the German Army was attempting to overrun contained industry and resources
vital to the Soviet war effort. If the German lines could be based on
the Caspian, rather than the Black Sea, this could be accomplished
without lengthening those lines completely unacceptably. If a line
could be established on the Volga, anchored (more or less) at Stalingrad,
and then continuing to the Don, well, this line might possibly be vaguely
defensible considering the new Soviet oil shortage. The fact that it
would also block off 25-30% of Western lend-lease would also be useful.
This is the sort of result the Germans needed to have a good shot at
victory. The fact that it was practically unattainable is not completely
relevant. If you're facing defeat, it's perfectly rational to go for
long shots.
> The campaign is initially so successful because [among other reasons]
> Stavka [Stalin] can't believe that there won't be a second attempt to
> crush the Soviet army before Moscow. In essence, he can't believe
> that the German High Command [Hitler] will do something this stupid:
> you stick your right arm [flank] way out into a meatgrinder, and you
> pull back a bloody stump when 6th Armee gets puree'd.
>
On the other hand, attacking where the enemy isn't is often considered
a good idea. The Red Army was ready for a renewed push by Army Group
Center. I'm not sure that such a push would have gone anywhere. Even
if Moscow had been taken, and even if Japan had entered the war (I've
been told that Japan might well have declared war on the Soviet Union
if Moscow had fallen, even in the summer of '42), would that have been
enough?
> A much more reasonable course of action [meaning one more likely to
> bring about a stalemate, and lead to a favorable negotiated
> settlement], is to hang tough and fortify the Don or even Dnepr lines
> in the South, force the Soviets into a meatgrinder in front of Moscow,
> and reduce Leningrad [through assault or, better yet, advancing far
> enough along the Ladoga shore for the siege to be complete] for the
> morale effects on the Soviet people.
>
This highlights the big difference in our thinking, the point that (as
I see it) everybody's overlooking: what is a "reasonable course of
action"? You see it as one likely to bring about a stalemate. The
German generals saw it as one that would bring defeat as late as possible.
The Weinberg hypothesis is that Hitler saw it as a course of action that
might just bring about victory. Hitler faced the combined forces of the
Soviet Union, the United States, and the British Empire. He had tried
to force the British into peace by a variety of means, and it apparently
wasn't going to happen. The United States was beyond Germany's ability
to coerce. The Soviet Union had to be defeated. What sort of settlement
could Hitler expect? Under the circumstances, lasting peace was extremely
unlikely. The Germans had committed many atrocities, and Stalin was
unlikely to simply accept some negotiated border and forego any thoughts
of revenge. If the Germans had negotiated something like status quo
ante and perpetual peace, I believe Stalin would have treated it as an
armistice with territorial gain, and would have re-opened the war at
an opportune time, with the Western Allies still developing an
unstoppable bombing offensive and accumulating a formidable army.
In hindsight, I don't see how the Third Reich was going to survive
without defeating the Soviet Union. I'm certainly willing to listen
to other opinions, but I haven't been convinced yet. Assuming that,
the best chance of defeating the Soviet Union was to be as far into
its vitals as possible.
> them as much heart and fighting spirit as the continued holding out
> of a besieged Leningrad? Well, that works both ways, and the loss of
> Leningrad would have been shocking to the Soviet people.
>
Could be. I'm not convinced that it would have had any sort of decisive
effect, and I'm very doubtful that Hitler could have reasoned that it
would. Besides, conquering Leningrad would not have destroyed much of
the Red Army, and would not have deprived the Soviets of much economic
power. The net effect would be a slight shortening of the German lines,
a link-up with the Finns, the destruction of some Soviet forces that
were not a major threat, and the loss of what production Leningrad's
factories were still able to muster. Doesn't sound decisive to me.
> >If Stalingrad had to be left to the Soviets, where were the
> >Germans going to anchor the Volga line? I think that
> >Hitler's actions from the winter of '42 on were partly
> >desperation, and partly belief that the army would have to
> >be able to carry out what he ordered if Germany were to
> >win.
>
> What Volga line?
>
> The issue is, if the Germans can't beat the c--p out of the Soviet
> army enough to bring them to the negotiating table by the end of
> 1942, THEY CAN'T WIN, NO WAY, NO HOW! GAME OVER, MAN! And going toe
> to toe with Joe Steel over Stalingrad isn't going to cut it, when he
> can lose 5 for Uncle Adolf's 1, and still come out ahead.
>
Almost. The issue is that if the Germans can't defeat the Soviets,
they lose. The negotiating table is a red herring; in order to get
even a temporary peace, Hitler would have to cough up gains comparable
to what the Red Army could seize anyway. I don't think that a treaty
would have saved Germany, any more than the peace treaty after
Pylos saved Athens in the Peloponesian war (sp?). Therefore, if the
Germans can't win, they lose. They aren't very likely to win, and
therefore the best hope of survival for the Third Reich is to try
the unexpected and the long shots.
> The fact that Hitler couldn't see this, before the launching of the
> 1942 campaign, and before Stalingrad became a debacle [which it does
> long before the November Soviet offensive, in terms of German losses
> in and around the city], speaks volumes about his abilities, as all
> you need to do is look at the 1939 population and production figures
> for Germany and the USSR that were available.
>
This seems important in the initial decision to declare war. Once the
invasion started, the military potential of the sides became moot,
except to emphasize that the Germans had to win and win very, very, big.
> Ultimately, Hitler combined the political and military leadership in
> his own person [making OKW completely subject to his leadership and
> direction, so there was not an independent General Staff running the
> war], and approved those operations that were carried out [including
> the 1942 summer offensive and the combat around Stalingrad], and so
> must bear the responsibility for both defeats.
>
Of course, but it was the decisions of a political nature that set up
the situation. Hitler is normally seen as a political genius, but he
maneuvered the Third Reich into a war with the three greatest powers
in the world (except for Germany) simultaneously. Once this had been
accomplished, it didn't matter that Hitler was incompetent at strategy.
Heck, it didn't help France that Napoleon was possibly the greatest
general of all time, and Napoleon had the same amount of power Hitler
had. Hitler's military ability was not only miniscule, it was
irrelevant to the outcome of the war.
David H. Thornley, known to the Wise as thornley@cs.umn.edu O-
Disclaimer: These are not the opinions of the University of Minnesota,
its Regents, faculty, staff, students, or squirrels.
Datclaimer: Well, maybe the squirrels. They're pretty smart.
Date: Sun, 24 Mar 1996 00:07:53 -0600
From: bdbryant@mail.utexas.edu (Bobby D. Bryant)
Subject: Re: Guru's rulings on garrisons.
Concerning Rich's answers to someone's garrison questions -
>From an exchange posted on 18 Mar:
>>However, this causes some additional problems. Consider the
>>following (very hypotetical, but it COULD happen)
>>situation. A province has a sizeable garrison and an
>>important city at the border of the province. Enemy units
>>start their turn in a non adjacent province, drives thru a
>>lightly defended small province and enters the important
>>city. Is there no way for the garrison to defend this
>>important city?
>
> RCV: If the player has taken the chance of leaving the
> city totally unoccupied, or overrunable, then they are
> out of luck. Moral: Don't leave "important" cities
> without some sort of defense...
>From a followup exchange posted on 22 Mar:
><>I still think the rules for defenseless garrisons are
><>stupid, though.
>
> Perhaps if you think of them less as "Garrisons" and
>more as a bunch of overage security types and impressed
>local policemen, that will help. :) Remember, these are
>*not* military, defensive garrisons; those are represented
>by the units you control. If you leave a city empty, don't
>expect the local security detachment to forgo burning the
>local crops to fight it out with "real" soldiers...
I confess I'm surprized at this ruling. Look at the handful of units -- some
of which are withdrawn almost immediately -- available to the Germans in the
'44 SF setup to garrison the coast of Germany, which includes six permanent
fortifications, seven ports on the mainland (of which five are "great" or
"major") and an eighth port connected to the mainland by rail, and four
major city hexes within three hexes of the coast. Even considering the
overlap between the items listed, there are no less than 12 hexes that I
cannot imagine leaving ungarrisoned. Did the Germans trust their navy,
airforce, mines, and coastal defenses so much?
Sure, the rules will let you pull divisions from France to garrison Germany.
But if the historical OB shows them in France, who was garrisoning the
German coast, historically?
- Bobby.
Date: Sun, 24 Mar 1996 01:36:04 -0500
From: Nicholas Forte <nforte@osf1.gmu.edu>
Subject: Re: Stacking
On 23 Mar 96 23:57:18 EST 74133.1765@compuserve.com (Jim Arnold) wrote:
>I'd like to hear about your experiences with FOF . In 15 days (one Europa turn)
>the Dutch surrendered, the Germans captured Sedan, Brussels, Antwerp, St.
>Quentin, Cambrai, Abbeville, Amiens, and Arras, and invested Boulogne and
>Calais. What idiocy by a French player could allow the German player to
>duplicate such an achievement?
It was the idiocy of General Gamelin that allowed the Germans to achieve it in
the historic case. If a German player can't duplicate it against a competent
French player, it doesn't show that attack in Europa is too weak, but rather
that Gamelin was indeed an idiot.
Regards,
Nick Forte
Date: Sun, 24 Mar 1996 00:42:19 -0600
From: bdbryant@mail.utexas.edu (Bobby D. Bryant)
Subject: Re: Stacking
[Steve:]
>>>This doesn't address my fundamental objection. The attack is already
>>>strong in Europa. Why do we need to make it stronger?
>>
[Me:]
>>1) I tend to agree with those who said the attack is sometimes not strong
>>enough, as in France '40 or USSR '41.
>
[Steve:]
>Note that I don't agree that the attack is too weak in 1940 and 1941.
>Europa models this period better than it does later periods. The
>difficulty with France is that it's hard to force players to repeat the
>mistakes of history. I've seen it done by uncertain and passive
>players. But competent players know too much to collapse as the French
>did.
>
>As for Russia in 1941, well, many German players are too cautious.
Jim addressed France in '40, and I would like to raise the same challenge
with respect to the USSR in '41: what sort of progress have you seen AGC
make toward Minsk and Smolensk during Barbarossa, vs. the historical pace of
events?
I'm reluctant to blame too much on player caution, *especially* during those
first few turns of the FE/SE. (And if it does turn out that players are
universally too cautious, does that tell us they face a problem their
historical counterparts didn't?)
For the longer haul, how often do you see Lenningrad strangled, Moscow
threatened frontally, and Rostov captured, all in the same game? For that
matter, how often does the Soviet counterattack send the Axis reeling on a
historical scale? I just can't agree that the attack is generally too effective.
[Jim added this to his reply to Steve's last post above:]
>I agree with Perry de Havilland that the "surprise turn" is worthwhile,
>all the more so because of the extensive planning and logistical
>preparations it reflects.
I agree to the extent that armies sometimes operate more effectively than
others, whether by surprize or by logistics. But for Europa or any
substantial subset of campaigns linked together, we need a mechanism that
lets players generate these circumstances by their play.
- Bobby.
Date: Sat, 23 Mar 1996 23:11:47 -0800
From: graham@ee.washington.edu (Stephen Graham)
Subject: Re: Stacking
At 11:57 PM 3/23/96, Jim Arnold wrote:
>Stephen Graham writes,
>
>> Note that I don't agree that the attack is too weak in 1940 and 1941.
>
>I'd like to hear about your experiences with FOF . In 15 days (one Europa turn)
>the Dutch surrendered, the Germans captured Sedan, Brussels, Antwerp, St.
>Quentin, Cambrai, Abbeville, Amiens, and Arras, and invested Boulogne and
>Calais. What idiocy by a French player could allow the German player to
>duplicate such an achievement?
Complete lack of counter-attack, or attempts to build a cohesive defensive
line covering the entire German penetration.
The one time I did historically well in Fall of France, I terminated the
game May II. I realized that I could go where I wanted. So I stopped the
game and initiated remedial Europa school.
I no longer remember exactly what I accomplished as it's been eight years or
so.
I don't dispute that competent French play results in slow German advances.
The games I played more recently bear that out. That's not necessarily
the fault of the game mechanics.
Stephen Graham
graham@ee.washington.edu
graham@cs.washington.edu
Date: Sat, 23 Mar 1996 23:11:43 -0800
From: graham@ee.washington.edu (Stephen Graham)
Subject: Re: What about a news group?
At 1:45 PM 3/23/96, epinnel@ibm.net wrote:
> *EARTH CALLING EUROPA MAILING LIST - THERE IS ALREADY A USENET GROUP
>FOR EUROPA CALLED alt.games.europa.*
It's propagation is horrible. My site, University of Washington, doesn't carry
it, despite a very liberal attitude towards alt groups.
It doesn't help that someone rmgroup'd it within a few hours of the newgroup.
Stephen Graham
graham@ee.washington.edu
graham@cs.washington.edu
Date: Sun, 24 Mar 1996 01:28:58 -0600
From: bdbryant@mail.utexas.edu (Bobby D. Bryant)
Subject: Re: Stacking
Jim said, and Nick replied:
>>I'd like to hear about your experiences with FOF . In 15 days (one Europa
turn)
>>the Dutch surrendered, the Germans captured Sedan, Brussels, Antwerp, St.
>>Quentin, Cambrai, Abbeville, Amiens, and Arras, and invested Boulogne and
>>Calais. What idiocy by a French player could allow the German player to
>>duplicate such an achievement?
>
>It was the idiocy of General Gamelin that allowed the Germans to achieve it in
>the historic case. If a German player can't duplicate it against a competent
>French player, it doesn't show that attack in Europa is too weak, but rather
>that Gamelin was indeed an idiot.
I notice that it is 16 MPs from Germany to Abbeville via Sedan (on the SF
maps). This includes driving down a road in the ZOC of any units in the
Maginot line, and going through any hex you please as though unoccupied.
(You can avoid the Maginot ZOC costs by driving through the woods, but that
will add several MPs in itself. [Was there a special rule supressing ZOCs
during the first turn?]) Without the surprize turn it would be a challenge
for the Germans to drive to Abbeville even if the Allies didn't move or
attack at all.
Conclusion? In spite of a host of special rules and restrictions on the
Allies -- including some that Gamelin has no control over -- it will take a
bigger idiot than him to allow the attack to progress according to the
historical schedule.
- Bobby.
Date: Sat, 23 Mar 1996 23:33:51 -0800
From: graham@ee.washington.edu (Stephen Graham)
Subject: Re: Stacking
At 12:42 AM 3/24/96, Bobby D. Bryant wrote:
>>As for Russia in 1941, well, many German players are too cautious.
>
>Jim addressed France in '40, and I would like to raise the same challenge
>with respect to the USSR in '41: what sort of progress have you seen AGC
>make toward Minsk and Smolensk during Barbarossa, vs. the historical pace of
>events?
I've seen Minsk taken June II regular turn, and Smolensk in either July II or
August I. Please bear in mind that I haven't played FiTE on a regular basis
since 1993. My memory of specific events has faded; what I remember is general
outlines.
>I'm reluctant to blame too much on player caution, *especially* during those
>first few turns of the FE/SE. (And if it does turn out that players are
>universally too cautious, does that tell us they face a problem their
>historical counterparts didn't?)
Players are routinely unwilling to take casualties with the Germans. That
has a significant impact on progress.
>For the longer haul, how often do you see Lenningrad strangled, Moscow
>threatened frontally, and Rostov captured, all in the same game? For that
>matter, how often does the Soviet counterattack send the Axis reeling on a
>historical scale? I just can't agree that the attack is generally too
>effective.
It depends on the caliber of players. I've seen Leningrad and Rostov taken
and fighting in Moscow in 1941 more than once.
Again, this doesn't happen against experienced Soviet players (usually).
But they have an advantage Stalin didn't: they've done it more than once.
Even so, about half our games wound up as German victories after the
Soviets bled out in the summer of 1942.
Stephen Graham
graham@ee.washington.edu
graham@cs.washington.edu