Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 21:44:30 -0400
From: jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell)
Subject: Re: The Fall of France goes on
>...if the Free French of Second Front are blue, and the
>French of 1940 are the same blue, and the Vichy French are blue, how do I
>tell the Free French brigades from the Vichy French brigades when I
>invade Syria? Civil wars are hard enough, you need some way to tell the
>enemies apart.
The forces of the LEGITIMATE French government get the color blue. What we
call the "Vichy" French government was the French government -- the direct
continuation of the government that fought the Germans and negotiated the
armistice of 1940. (The "Vichy" part comes from the French town the
government relocated to, since Paris was in the German occupation zone.
Although Vichy itself had only 6-12,000 inhabitants (as I remember), it was
a summer resort area and could accomodate 80,000 people.)
When the German occupied Vichy France in Nov. 42 in violation of the
armistice, the Vichy government accepted this, loss legitimacy in the eyes
of most Frenchmen, and in effect became an Axis puppet government. Europa
uses this as the point where legitmacy transfer to the Free French.
How does this work in the color scheme?
9.39-6.40 French: "French" blue
6.40-11.42 Vichy French: "French" blue
6.40-11.42 Free French: very pale blue (distinguishable from all French
blue combos).
11.42+ French (ex Free French): "French" blue
11.42+ Axis French: various German colors (a la Second Front)
The useful thing of this scheme is that we need few pale-counters: there
aren's that many Free French units in 1940-42, and when French North Africa
goes over to the Allies, the Free French become legitimate and thus the
former Vichy units don't need to change colors.
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 22:00:22 -0400
From: jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell)
Subject: Re: Europa unit ratings
>I remember reading in a Patton biography about the 90th Inf XX (7-8 Europa).
>How it performed poorly, going through several commanders in a few months.
>But improved substantially after some time, enough to be highly rated
>by Patton. Any idea about upgrades?
Many US divisions went through the same process -- especially in Normandy.
Actually, the US upper brass in Europe was way too prone to remove
divisional commanders for new outfits undergoing their first combat. (I
guess it was on the theory that it was easier to fire the divisional
commander than the division -- a philosophy that still applies to many
sports teams vis-a-vis their coaches!) Despite all their training, US
divisions were still green when they went into combat, and had to gain
actual combat experience before they performed to SHAEF's satisfaction.
However, before you start proposing all sorts of rule or upgrade counters
to handle this, the same thing seems to be true of all forces -- green
formations typically need "shaking down" and often don't live up to
expectations until they gain some experience. The American experience is
better known because it was more documented and commented upon, but you can
see it with the Brits in the desert, the Germans in Poland, the French in
1940, etc. Since it's a transitory effect, doesn't affect all green units,
and is hardly separable from the normal variation in the CRT, Europa
ignores it as an explicit factor.
From: NASU002.USAP@iac.org.nz (Public Affairs Officer)
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 1996 15:59 GMT
Subject: French colors
Okay, the French Napoleonic blue is the color for the legitimate
French government, Vichy is ruled as the legitimate successor state to
Reynaud, and De Gaulle's merry band get their own color. That makes
sense.
So presumably when Operation Torch takes place, and the Vichy French
rally to Eisenhower, and the French army evolves, the pale blue Free
French troops disappear when they are converted into what became either
Gen. Koeltz's French 19th Corps or Marshal Juin's French Expeditionary
Corps.
According to Bill Shirer, Vichy was chosen as the scene for Petain
and Laval's operations because it was a summer resort town with large
hotels that could accommodate the French ministries. Since a war was on,
not too many people were going to resorts, except as refugees.
Incidentally, one of the many footnotes of the Vichy regime was that
its coins and stamps bore the phrases "Etat Francaise" vice "Republique
Francaise" as the Vichy government had eliminated the Third Republic. The
coins were of a lightweight metal alloy, which sort of summed up the
government, and bore the Vichy state's motto, "Travail, Famille, Patrie,"
which replaced the more inspiring "Liberte, Egalite, Fraternite," of the
Republic.
These mottos translate thusly:
"Work, Family, Fatherland."
"Liberty, Equality, Fraternity."
David H. Lippman
Public Affairs Officer
US Naval Antarctic Support Unit
Christchurch, New Zealand
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 1996 04:11:12 +0100
From: cloister@dircon.co.uk (Perry de Havilland)
Subject: Re. Wasserfall & IR technology
Thanks to David H. Lippman for the useful info. on Wasserfall SAM system.
The German essays into IR homing technology (most notable Spanner I (active
IR system) and Spanner II, III and IV (passive systems) were groundbreaking
technologies and well ahead of their time: so far ahead, in fact, they did
not really work (well they did, just not very well)!
For some fairly accessible information on Spanner, I would ref. you to the
*superb* 'History of the German Nightfighter Force' by Gebhard Aders, Crecy
Books, 1992.
Additional (and rather less accessible) information on Spanner can be found
in the various documents of the 'Control Commission for German: Air
Division' (such as 'Notes on Flak and Searchlight Radars (1946)'), amongst
others.
My point in mentioning all this is that I suspect the combination of having
the command guidance jammed by 100 Group Support Jammers plus IT Terminal
homing that would, in all likelihood, not really work, Wasserfall was not a
good place to put ones money in the *significant weapons* sweepstakes
James B. Byrne wrote earlier:
>I suppose so, if it were radio guided. On the other hand, a fleet of
>ships has
>a hell of a lot more surplus generating power than a WWII era medium or heavy
>bomber. Also a lot more space for the equipment.
Yet 100 Group (Bomber Support) played all sorts of highly successful EW
games with German air and ground radars, radio running commentaries and
navigational systems. Powerful barrage jamming is only one way to bugger
up a radio control system (look what happened to Fritz-X): More subtle
spoofers could also be used. The Germans demonstrated an uncharacteristic
sluggishness in responding the British EW initiatives and I have no reason
to think this would have been any different
>The Waserfall weapon would
>have been deployed on friendly territory.
So were most of the other systems being messed up by 100 Group (and by
jammers and spoofers back in the UK)
>Being truck launched it would not
>have been as susceptable to supression as the V1 sites.
True
>In a pinch it could
>have been visually steered into the large allied daylight bomber formations.
Only if the radio control link was usable, plus see my remarks re. the
terminal IR homer.
>I don't know if its probable effect can be dismissed out of hand. In
>combination
>with manned interceptor fighters it might have been a really nasty thing
>to deal
>with.
It probably would have had some value, but Differing opinions are what
makes posting fun!
Regards
Perry ...-
From: Roberth Lundin <rln@bull.se>
Subject: RE: Swedish ore.
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 1996 08:55:04 +-100
> Britain also ran the German blockade of the Skagerrak to import special
> steel products between 1941-44 at first using interned merchant shipping
> and later purpose built small fast ships. The regular diplomatic flights
> were also used to ship small quanties of these products. A book on this
> 'The Blockade Runners' was published several years ago, I cant
> remember the authors name.
Export of Ballbearings from Sweden in percent
----------------------------------------------------------------
Year Axis Europe Germany Axis Asia Allied Neutral
----------------------------------------------------------------
1940 23,8 26,1 20,0 21,8 8,3
1941 26,6 40,3 7,0 19,4 6,6
1942 26,9 52,0 0,5 10,6 10,0
1943 18,4 64,9 0,3 2,5 13,8
Intresting?
Robbox
Date: 21 Mar 96 05:07:46 EST
From: Alan Philson <100626.2267@compuserve.com>
Subject: re: Gas Warfare
Nerve gas, Mustard gas, kids stuff, The nice men in white coats developed a
strain of anthrax for dropping on German cities should the Germans start using
gas on British cities. It was tested on the Island of Gruinard off the Scottish
coast in 1942. All life on the island was extinguished and it remained in
quarantine for 50 years, even now scientists who go there wear bio suits while
telling everyone else that it is now safe. Work that one into GE
From: Rich Velay <richv@icebox.iceonline.com>
Subject: Juha FitE/SE
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 1996 05:31:39 PST
From: Juha Mikko Huttunen <jmhuttun@snakemail.hut.fi>
To:richv@icebox.iceonline.com
Subject: FitE/SE Date: Thu, 21 Mar 1996 03:55:36 PST
This is NOT a rules question, but I didn't know where else I
could send my questions. I would really appreciate if
someone answered even some of my questions. I have played
FitE/SE a couple of times to august 1942 now and would like
to get some advice. I have read from several TEM issues
about people complaining that soviets are too strong. Since
my two games with my friend have ended in a disaster for me
as the soviets I figure that I'm doing something wrong.
First of all there has been numerous articles about NODL's
and how they ruin the game. For me they did. All soviets
died. I wonder how can one manage to have NODL's for
several turns, cause my line was obliterated in just two
turns. I also read from TEM that in a usual game of FitE/SE
through Jun II to Sep II germans suffer losses of 50 points
per turn and soviets 150 plus the surprise attack. Just how
do those germans die? Not through their own attacks, at
least with my friend, who doesn't take casualties, except
for maybe one HX chance per turn. For me to attack and cause
casualties on him would be suicide. And because he doesn't
take casualties the Wehrmacht is in excellent shape when
winter comes and my winter offensive with my badly weakened
Red Army gets nothing done, just some minor damage, which is
fully repaired in time for his next summer offensive, which
so far has annihilated my army. Here's how our front line
went at the end of Aug II in our last game. Leningrad was
surronded and he had broken through the Valdai, then from
Moscow through Tula and the na huge gap in my line to
Stalingrad, because his freaking panzers had destroyed
everything except some surviving troops. He was in Saratov
but I had Stalingrad and had continuos and strong line that
followed the river to Rostov. And that's it. I surrendered.
We are both pretty much beginners in the Europa, although we
have much wargaming experience, mainly from computer games.
I would like some general information, like where should I
locate my MLR south of Moscow? And how can I delay his
invasion enough to conduct a decent scorched earth policy
without killing all my troops? How should I make my starting
deployment? All hints are greatly valued. I have found from
their articles in TEM that Trey Nelson and Victor Hauser are
very competent soviet players, and if possible (and if they
don't mind) I would love to change messages with either of
them. Forgive me the nature of this letter;it's definitely
not in yes/no format! But as I said, I didn't know any other
place to ask. I live in Finland, and TEM issues come here
about a year after they are published in the States, so they
don't provide me with fresh information, althoughh I read
everyone of them. Lots of thanks in advance and I'm waiting
for your Collector Series revision on FitE/SE. Thank you for
making such great games. Juha Huttunen
RichV@Icebox.Iceonline.com
Europa, tomorrow's games about yesterday, TODAY
From: Dave Kazmierczak <davekaz@starnetinc.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 1996 07:33:27 -0800
UNSUBSCRIBE
From: Rich Velay <richv@icebox.iceonline.com>
Subject: SF report
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 1996 05:43:36 PST
Hi everybody.
Just got finished the Mar II 44 turn in my current game of SF.
The Axis still defend south of Naples in Italy, no invasion of the west yet,
what with mud/mud. Clear seas this turn though...
Pulled a real nasty on the Allies. Since this was a clear seas turn
in the Med and the last turn before the AA +1 mod comes into affect, I put
every plane I had into the air for a massive anti-shipping strike.
I hit the Allied invasion armadas at Palermo and Messina. Good flak,
39+ at each, and fighter cover as well. But enough of the anti-shipping boys
snuck through at each place to get me 23 hits. That's 92 fat negative VPs for
me to add to my current total of 92, giving me -184 Vps. A nice little
cushion when Normandy time comes around....
No Axis ground attack this turn, just using my time to firm up the
port defenses. Still a chance for mud April I in D, so anything can happen.
The clear seas in the Atlantic is a worry, but the naval losses inflicted this
turn will take months to repair so I am not too worried.
What was that Disco song, "Sink the Navy, sink the navy" dah de de dah
late/R
RichV@Icebox.Iceonline.com
Europa, tomorrow's games about yesterday, TODAY
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 1996 06:29:56 -0800
From: Renaud.Gary@corona.navy.mil (Renaud.Gary)
Subject: A Modest Proposal for topics
In a few other lists, we've had moderate success with prefixing our titles
with keywords s/t people can tell them at a glance (and automated programs
can sort things out more easily).
We already have GURU for rules questions. How about:
ADMIN: Stuff for the list owner to take care of.
GRD: Stuff about the company (might not be appropriate?)
FITE/FWTBT, etc. Specific to a game
WWII,WWI, etc. Historical related to the game
REPLAY: Report from a game you played.
GE: The Holy Grail.
COMP: Computer aids (ADC, etc.) directly related to Europa.
OFF: Not really related to Europa.
If you put the keyword at the very front of the Subject (before Re or Fwd),
then I, for one, can write routines to nuke topics in which I'm not
interested.
What do y'all think?
A Renaud.Gary@Corona.Navy.Mil
This graphic is |\ CompuServe: 73627,1114
a LOT smaller | \ _,,,---,,__ Genie: G.Renaud1
than a PGP key /,`.-'`' -. ;-;,---__ W: 909-273-5378
block __|,4- ) )-,_. ,\ ( `'==--' H: 714-750-9243
`-----''(_/--' `-'\_)
DNRC Holder of Past Knowledge
I CAN'T speak for this administration; I tell the truth.
From: viktor@mgr.hjf.org (Viktor Kaufmann)
Subject: Re: A Modest Proposal for topics
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 1996 10:46:22 -0500 (EST)
If you put the code in front of the Re or Fwd, it hoses my mailer's
sorting routine. If people use the keywords you suggest, wouldn't it
be enough to allow you to search the entire string for the keywords?
Besides, you'd end up with "COMP Rd: COMP Re: COMP ...", as is
happening (or happened) to the ASL mailing list.
Viktor
From: pardue@hilda.mast.QueensU.CA (Keith Pardue)
Subject: WWII: Gas at Sevastopol
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 1996 11:07:59 -0500 (EST)
Hi,
Private mail about the (non)appropriateness of this post is
welcome. Note that I have in any case used Ray's suggested
convention to ward off uninterested readers.
A few days ago I made a post about the use and almost use
of poison gas in WWII. I mentioned that Manstein had used it at
the end of his campaign in Crimea, but I couldn't remember where
I had read this, thinking that it might have been in Seaton's book.
Yesterday, Ed wrote:
> On another note, re: gas warfare. I have the Times Atlas of WWII which
> states that gas was used to clear the tunnels and trenches in Sevastopol
> in the closing days of the siege (no reference cited), though I looked in
> Seaton and I didn't find it there.
>
> -Ed
>
So, I looked around last night in the books that I have read
and the only reference that I could find was in the Times Atlas of
WWII. This makes me a bit suspicious. On the one hand, Weinberg
would have mentioned it if he thought that the use of "toxic smoke"
at Sevastopol was well established. Also, although I think that
Keegan, the editor of the Times Atlas, is a thoughtful and vivid
writer, he doesn't give references in most of his books and, in
my not sufficiently humble opinion, he doesn't check his facts
well enough.
I did find some interesting information in Hinsley,
"British Intelligence in the Second World War," Volume 2, page
116 and following. Churchill had made a public declaration
on May 10, 1942 that Britain would retalitate in kind if Germany used
poison gas anywhere.
"Throughout the spring of 1942 rumours persisted about the enemy's
intention to resort to gas in Russia and, *although they were
unconfirmed by any reliable source,* Whitehall continued to be
seriously concerned ... that the Russians might ... claim that
Germany had used gas ... in order to bring about British retaliation."
Is it possible that there was a false rumour that Manstein
had used gas at Sevastopol? Rumours do have a way of finding
their way into history and are hard to extract. It does seem
likely that if Manstein did use gas, several months after
Churchill's declaration, that it was an independent action
not authorized by his superiors.
But, note that Hinsley's brief was to write a history of
what British intelligence knew, not a history of the Second World
War in general.
Also of interest:
"In fact the Germans had begun to produce Tabun, a new nerve gas more
lethal than any available to either side in the Second World War,
in April 1942. [Stuff about yet more lethal gasses produced by
Germany deleted.]...Allied intelligence failed 'to secure any definite
lead on the German work on their Tabun type gases' in or before the
Second World War. Although Allied intelligence frequently received
reports of new German chemical warfare agents 'with astounding properties',
these reports were rated low in reliability ... The Allies did not
receive confirmed intelligence of German work on nerve gases until the
first stocks of Tabun weapons had been captured in 1945."
I wonder how quick Churchill would have been to threaten
the use of WWI era gas if he realized just what the Germans had
in store. It's interesting to compare this to Weinberg's
assertion that the German's thought, falsely, that the US
was also producing nerve gas.
Best Wishes,
Keith Pardue
Kingston, Ontario, Canada
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 1996 09:18:36 -0800
From: zaius@teleport.com (Steve)
Subject: Re: Graziani
>Yes, he (Graziani) undoubtedly contributed to the Italian collapse --
>conceivably the
>Italians could have shored up and saved more troops or even held Tobruk had
>Graziani acted energetically in Dec. 1940....
I played the British in Western Desert. In a burst of overconfidence, I
left the Italians an opening on about the second turn and they embarrassed
me severely. The setback they dealt me allowed them to hold Tobruch until
the Hun came storming along and kicked my a** all the way to Cairo, which
he then took. Normally I'm a pretty capable player- win a few, lose a few,
but underestimating Italians in the hands of someone who really knows what
he's doing can lead to red face.
Steve P.
"Freedom is always against the law."
-J.R. "Bob" Dobbs
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 1996 09:19:15 -0800
From: zaius@teleport.com (Steve)
Subject: Peaceful USSR & Tank XX
>It seems to me that if they hadn't been attacked, the Russians...
>
>Since this is a low-probability scenario, maybe we shouldn't expect it to
>be as accurate as the historical ones. You can't research an OB that
>didn't exist, after all.
>
>Maybe just say they can (eventually) flip over all those Tank XX cadres and
>upgrade their 3-6s into 4-6s, or something. I mean, if you take the 1941
>army, fix those up, and deploy it rationally, it looks pretty fierce.
Interestingly enough, a Grand Europa OB has already been worked up, in an
old issue of ETO (October 1989, Issue #49- Soviet OB 1939-41 by Charles
Sharp)
There would be a requirement for some additional counters for some cavalry
units and some armoured formations, but not much else of any consequence.
The Russians were playing around with what armoured doctrine they wanted to
use in the early 40s. They went back and forth between the armour
supporting infantry idea and the armoured divisions idea.
There might not be much chance of them flipping over many tank cadres.
Charles Sharp wrote:
"The tank divisions were an aberration in the Soviet Army; they never had
the trained commanders, cadres, skills, or equipment to make them work, and
they certainly wouldn't have attempted it under the pressure of a surprise
attack. The ten tank divsiions or light Tank cadres (101-110) received Jul
II 41 were formed from the training schools.
There was little need throughout for 'millions' of additional counters.
Steve P.
"Freedom is always against the law."
-J.R. "Bob" Dobbs
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 1996 09:19:26 -0800
From: zaius@teleport.com (Steve)
Subject: Resource Pts in SF
>On a related issue, has anybody ever run out of resource points in this
>game? Keeping track of the amount of them for the Allies is a complete
>waste of time. As for the axis, I used all but a few construction units
>(some were repairing rail in France) in resource-spending activities, and I
>boosted my rail capacity almost every turn, and I just kept getting more
>and more of those RPs...
I have heard complaints about this in my own group, but when you think
about what they are used for, I think it comes out OK for all concerned.
(Concrete and barbed wire, antitank mines, things like that for forts and
airfields.)
Steve P.
"Freedom is always against the law."
-J.R. "Bob" Dobbs
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 1996 09:19:45 -0800
From: zaius@teleport.com (Steve)
Subject: USSR/Germany in GE
>Jason said:
>
>>I feel that Stalin would have attacked in 1942 no matter what the Germans
>>were up to. Reportedly he even admitted a plan to do so in a speech to
>>officer cadets. ...
>Bobby said:
>This might have been propaganda rather than plan: announcing it in a speech
>is not very good pre-invasion security. Or, if the announcement came after
>Barbarossa, all the more reason to view it as propaganda. (Note that I'm
>*not* dismissing it as "mere propaganda", but rather raising the question.)
I think the story is that he brought up the matter in a drunken discussion
with his General Staff in the wee hours; someone made a toast to Germany
and Stalin replied something to the effect of: "Don't get too sentimental
about the German because I have plans for them." It's an anecdote, and I'm
not sure if there's any real evidence that he even said it, or if he was
serious.
>If the phoney war stayed cool or evolved into a cold war, might Stalin not
>have seen some advantage in prolonging this state of affairs? He couldn't
>have felt much love for the Allies after their anti-Communist interventions
>in Russia/USSR during the late teens and early twenties. How much better to
>have your enemies at each others' throats rather than taking them on yourself!
>
>Among other things, the Japanese were still viewed as a serious threat to
>the USSR (witness all those reinforcements that show up after Japan goes to
>war with the USA). Stalin might have wanted to avoid the risk of a two-front
>war; the Japanese, so long as they had to allow for a war with the USSR,
>might not have undertaken war against the USA. In the event, Hitler broke
>the deadlock with Barbarossa, but if Hitler had been less ambitious the
>deadlock might have remained indefinitely.
Remember that Stalin applied seriously to *join* the Axis. There was no
love lost between the Bolsheviks and the West. Stalin was never under any
illusions about Churchill's admiration for him or anything like that. In
the postwar world, I think the Soviets had a very good point that they were
being encircled by hostile powers.
A good 'alternate' and ahistorical game of GE would pit Germany, Italy and
the USSR against the UK and France, with the US coming in at some point and
for some reason (probably with Japan as an ally!)
Anyway, it might be fun to have a secret and random determination for both
Germany and the Soviets telling them which year they must attack the other
no later than (1942, 43 or 44). Neither one will know which year the other
must launch its invasion by and will be under immense psychological
pressure to make the first move...just a thought.
Steve P.
"Freedom is always against the law."
-J.R. "Bob" Dobbs
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 1996 09:18:41 -0800
From: zaius@teleport.com (Steve)
Subject: Re: Graziani
Your defense of the Libyans and Ethiopians is powerful,
>and certainly they were on the side of the angels, and fought hard.
>Invaded people often fight well against their enemies, regardless of
>their strength of technology. The Ethiopians and Libyans did give Italy a
>bloody nose.
The Libyans were maybe on the side of the angels, and so were the Ethiopian
people, but Haille Selassie was not known for his benign and enlightened
rule.
Sellassie was deeply distressed when the Italians occupied his country, but
that was mainly because they had shot his 30 pet lions that roamed his
palace grounds.
Admittedly, he was a fairer ruler than many of those around him. For
example, as a yound provincial governor, he only took 50% of his peasant's
crops, while other governors were taking 90%.
Steve P.
"Freedom is always against the law."
-J.R. "Bob" Dobbs
From: Dave Kazmierczak <davekaz@starnetinc.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 1996 12:45:03 -0800
UNSUBSCRIBE
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 96 20:13:20 +0100
From: Johan Herber Z/XU <eraherr@lmera.ericsson.se>
Subject: Unsubscription mails
> UNSUBSCRIBE
For those wanting to unsubscribe, please don't write to the discussion
list. The correct address to use for subscribing and unsubscribing is:
europa-request@lysator.liu.se
Also note that the list administration is _not_ automated. If Mats is
not there to read the mail nothing happens... Have patience!
/Johan
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 1996 13:55:26 -0500
From: Ray Kanarr <RayK@smtp4.aw.com>
Subject: Europa has gas? [was: WWII: Gas at Sevastopol] (longish)
Hi Keith!
I've been working late all this week, so I haven't checked more in
depth into this myself. Please remember that Weinberg, as great a
reference source as it is, is after all a one volume history. Compare
with the tremendous number of volumes in the HMSO Brit Officials.
Anyhow, my original post did have something to do with Europa [I
think so, anyhow]. In trying to track down Soviet nondivs for the
Berlin '45 scenario, the higher you go the worse the info. I was very
surprised then, when I read in the new Le Tissier book about a [poison
gas] chemical bn attached to 1st Byelorussian Front for the Berlin
assault [Le Tissier, of course, does not give a citation for this
info. I have just sent him a letter via his publisher about it.], and
wondered if this was a standard attachment at Front level, or a
special assignment to 1st Byelo. As I haven't seen anything about it
in the OB material that Charles Sharp and I exchanged, I presume he
is unaware of this also.
I agree that its appropriate to be suspicious of some of the
assertions made in Keegan's books. His and James Lucas' books are
good starting points for investigation, but the lack of citation
makes it difficult to take anything therein at face value.
Its also possible that Manstein used WP smoke.
Finally: Germany had gas [as did most other combatants], and then
nerve agents. Are there Europa circumstances in which the
belligerents would have used these, and if so, how effective were
countermeasures [I've seen many 1944 photos of those neat corrugated
metal German gas mask containers, so there was obviously still
concern at that point that it might escalate to a gas war]?
Given that the battle for Berlin did not trigger a Nazi use of gas or
nerve agents [an absolutely AMAZING occurrence, IMO], would the battle
for Moscow have triggered a Soviet first use? Would the battle for
London have triggered a British first-use? Or can we just say that no
national governing body was stupid enough to trigger an all-out gas
war during WW II, so we can ignore it as an issue?
Ray
From: NASU002.USAP@iac.org.nz (Public Affairs Officer)
Date: Fri, 22 Mar 1996 08:20 GMT
Subject: More on gas
I was just reading this morning about the Phoney War, and one of the
factors that prevented the British and French from taking drastic action
was their leaders' fear of a reprise of WW1's intense use of poison gas.
Virtually all the leaders of Britain and France had served in WW1
and lost good friends and family members. The impact of poison gas was a
permanent feature in families...the wheezing, asthmatic, 40-year-old who
would periodically burst into spasms of coughing, ending with the
sheepish comment, "Gas, you know," or the blinded man selling matchbooks
on street corners. It was, like all of WW1, a subject of universal fear
and loathing in the Western democracies, which helped build the pacifist
sentiments that in turn made appeasement and late re-armament possible.
Neville Chamberlain, for example, had not served, but three of his
relatives were killed, and as a public servant, he'd had to select
draftees. The prospect of sending more young men to die in the trenches
terrified him.
At the same time, the theories of Giulio Douhet, that the bomber
would always get through, were quite popular reading among national
leaders and those who write position papers telling national leaders what
to do. Stanley Baldwin himself said "The bomber will always get through,"
and didn't spend money on Fighter Command.
The result was that Britain and France faced in 1940 the fear of
fleets of German bombers raining poison gas on their capitals and
industrial cities. There seemed no defense against this horror. The
British gloomily evacuated their children, issued gas masks, prepared 1
million cardboard coffins... and 1 million burial forms. Plans called for
dumping bodies by bulldozer into mass graves or even rivers.
The British hoped to avoid this horror by denying the Germans
excuses or reasons to retaliate. The RAF was ordered to confine its
bombing efforts to attacking German naval bases and dumping leaflets on
German cities, hoping this kind of light war would make the Germans
refrain from unleashing gas.
At one point, a British politician asked the Secretary of State for
Air, Sir Kingsley Wood, why the RAF was not bombing the Black Forest with
incendiaries, thus depriving the Germans of timber and keeping their
civil defense boys busy.
"Oh, no," retorted the inept Wood, "that's private property. You'll
be asking me to bomb the Ruhr next."
The Ruhr was private property, too.
David H. Lippman
Public Affairs Officer
US Naval Antarctic Support Unit
Christchurch, New Zealand
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 1996 15:28:40 -0400
From: jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell)
Subject: Re: USSR/Germany in GE
>>Among other things, the Japanese were still viewed as a serious threat to
>>the USSR (witness all those reinforcements that show up after Japan goes to
>>war with the USA)....
Actually, as I remember, the bulk of the Soviet Far Eastern troops that go
west have already left the Far East by the time Japan attacks the US.
Troops start going west almost immediately after the German invasion, and
most of them are either in the west or on trains heading west by about
October. The fact that the Germans don't contact some/many of them until
December 1941 is due to the fact that the train trip west takes up to
several weeks and that many of these troops formed Stalin's "secret"
reserve that was held back for the winter counteroffensive.
In the reality of the German invasion, Japan had to be more of an annoyance
than a threat to the USSR. If the Japanese attacked, they'd probably take
Sakhalin Islands, Vladivostok, and the part of the Trans-Siberian RR that
was adjacent to Manchuria, but then what? Sakhalin has some oil (and the
Soviets planned to destroy the wells in case of invasion), but there's not
much else out that way, so the USSR isn't suffering a grave economic loss.
The next worthwhile objective, Irkutsk and the other cities in the Lake
Baikal area, are about as far from Manchuria as Moscow was from Poland,
there's only one east-west RR, the terrain is moutainous and forested, and
the climate is Arctic-like in winter (although with little snow). Soviet
blocking forces would likely be all that's needed to hold off the Japanese
for an extended period, and even the loss of the Baikal region is not
crippling. The Japanese would have have to advance the same distance again
under similar conditions before they reached other worthwhile objectives in
Siberia. Given the Germans at the gates of Leningrad, Moscow, and Rostov,
you can expect the Soviets will gladly trade space for time almost
indefinitely in Siberia against the Japanese!
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 1996 16:00:22 -0400
From: jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell)
Subject: Re: Europa has gas? [was: WWII: Gas at Sevastopol] (longish)
>I've seen many 1944 photos of those neat corrugated
>metal German gas mask containers, so there was obviously still
>concern at that point that it might escalate to a gas war?
It is a matter of debate or opinion as to how many of those containers
actually still contained the gas masks by the end of the war! Soldiers are
notorious for chucking things they deem worthless, the containers would be
useful for carrying something really important, like extra food or letters
from home....
>Given that the battle for Berlin did not trigger a Nazi use of gas or
>nerve agents [an absolutely AMAZING occurrence, IMO], would the battle
>for Moscow have triggered a Soviet first use? Would the battle for
>London have triggered a British first-use? Or can we just say that no
>national governing body was stupid enough to trigger an all-out gas
>war during WW II, so we can ignore it as an issue?
The trouble with gas is that you get a first-time surprise bonus from using
it, but thereafter gas is more of a nuisance weapon than anything else. It
doesn't give you much of an advantage -- both sides use it, casualties tend
to be increased for both sides, but effective anti-gas measures limit what
it can do. This was the experience in WW1, and this was the expectation for
a potential 1980s Warsaw Pact-NATO clash (both sides almost certainly would
have used chemical weapons), so it's probably true for WW2, too. Given that
gas will give you only a temporary surprise followed by a long term
nuisance, you can see why the generals didn't regard it as a wonder weapon.
Also, using gas on the battlefield could lead to the other side using gas
against you civilian population, which would make even the most ruthless
WW2 regime take pause... and this leads me to my second point: what
defender is going to use gas to repel an assault against his home cities?
Using gas in a built-up area is going to harm thousands of your own
civilians. Worse, the locals will probably think the enemy launched a gas
attack and will panic -- and I can't see it being effective when the
British government reassured the inhabitants of greater London that the
Germans aren't using gas, the British are! (The British government probably
realized this, hence their plans to be able to use gas against German
beachheads if need be.)
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 1996 16:54:20 -0500
From: Ray Kanarr <RayK@smtp4.aw.com>
Subject: Re:More on gas
Dave,
Good post on the issues that led up to some of the decisions that led
up to and characterized the first part of WW II! Certainly good Europa
"What-if" fodder, and good examples of why Europa players do not
represent the governments of the belligerent powers.
Ray
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 1996 18:49:39 -0600
From: bdbryant@mail.utexas.edu (Bobby D. Bryant)
Subject: Re: Europa has gas? [was: WWII: Gas at Sevastopol] (longish)
John said:
>The trouble with gas is that you get a first-time surprise bonus from using
>it, but thereafter gas is more of a nuisance weapon than anything else. It
>doesn't give you much of an advantage -- both sides use it, casualties tend
>to be increased for both sides, but effective anti-gas measures limit what
>it can do.
I understand that there was also a tendancy for gas to backfire on the
users. (I vaguely remember an incident where someone broke a fitting or
something while preparing for an attack, before the men massed for the
assault had their masks on. WWI, as reported in Graves'
_Good-bye_to_All_That_ -- if I remember correctly.)
- Bobby.
From: "David H. Thornley" <thornley@cs.umn.edu>
Subject: Re: howdy (WWII)
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 1996 18:54:20 -0600 (CST)
Note: This is getting rather far from Europa per se, and contains
a few annoyed comments.
>
> Hi David:
>
Hi!
[much omitted, like most of the stuff we agree on]
>
> >>The hand of Dolph is never far away when looking at any
> >>German move....
>
> <>While that's an accurate strategic assessment in its
> <>historical context, to say that the hand of Uncle Adolf is
> <>inflexible under any conditions buys more into the German
> <>General Staff apologists than it does help create a
> <>simulation. [...]>
>
> Regardless of the source, Hitler looks pretty bad, and
> very limited, as a Military Generalissimo. Once he no
> longer controlled the pace and direction of events, he
> doesn't look very inspired to me, or even competent.
>
I think we can all agree on that. He was a lousy general. To
me, the most striking evidence of that is his insistence on basing
military campaigns around economic objectives to the exclusion of
almost all other considerations (including, "Will this economic
objective be actually useful to us?"). The more important question
is how much control he had over military matters (all the control
he wanted, on the German side, but how much did he want, and why?),
and how critical this was to the war.
After all, President Bush, as commander-in-chief, had the same
degree of control over the Gulf War as Hitler did over the Wehrmacht,
and I've never heard Bush praised as a military genius. What Bush
did was, in effect, order the military to win the war. Unlike
President Johnson, or Hitler for that matter, he did not feel the
need to micromanage. So, why did Hitler decide he wanted to micro-
manage the war?
If we find that he distrusted his generals for good reason, it follows
that he was not the chief problem in the German high command.
> >>Oh, I don't know. Uncle Dolph had a pretty limited
> >>repetoire of reactions to events from winter 41 on.
> >>"Defend to the last man", "Kill him", "Never give up",
> >>"Kill them" seems to pretty much cover the essentials.
>
> <>You're missing a couple of important ones: "OK", and "Do
> <>that!" I'm not about to defend Hitler's ability as a
> <>strategist, but he did listen to generals he trusted and
> <>would order the abandonment of large territories (Western
> <>France and the Southern Balkans come to mind) when
> <>convinced it was necessary. Generals like Model had a
> <>pretty free hand.
>
> Hitler wasn't convinced to leave western France, he had
> no army left there after the Mortain counter-attack and
> Falais! There was no choice involved. Same with the
>
There were a very few evacuations that Hitler accepted, but he
did accept a few (usually to avoid utter disaster, of course).
>
> <>Weinberg, in _A_World_At_Arms_, has a very interesting
> <>theory about Hitler and the generals. He says that Hitler
> <>intended to win the war, whereas after '41 and much of '42
> <>the generals were trying to lose gracefully. Hitler's
> <>decisions look much more rational when considering that.
> <> [...Stalingrad, Courland, et al...]
>
> Sounds like a David Irving theory. I could call this an
> apologist for Hitler. Anyway, There was no reason to stay
> at Stalingrad, no reason to stay on the Volga and no reason
> to stay in the Caucasus. Hitler refused to believe the
> intelligence he received, refused to alter his opinion about
> Sov capabilities and got his clock cleaned. An even
> marginally more competent leader would have shortened the
> lines, created reserves and retaken the initiative following
> the winter of 42-43.
My historical perspective is that people are usually trying to do
something that isn't actually evil (although the consequences may
be blood-curdling) and usually have reasons for what they're doing.
Consequently, when I find reasons that seem to explain somebody's
actions, I tend to believe those reasons. (I also tend to believe
explanations as to why people weren't as evil as usually believed,
although in Hitler's case I haven't found any.)
If I remember correctly, Irving is one of those "No, there never was
a real holocaust" fools, and I rather resent being compared to him.
I am not proposing any changes in the historical facts, but rather
in their interpretation. Nor does advancing reasons why somebody
might have done something qualify as apologism. If you have
arguments to counter mine, use them. But *don't* even imply that
I'm a neo-Nazi.
As far as the winter of '42 goes, what chance did Germany have of
winning the war if the gains of the summer and fall offensive were
given back? That campaign had not hurt the Red Army disproportionately,
and the Soviets were just going to be back in '43 in greater numbers.
If Germany couldn't hang on and base the southern front off the Caspian,
and running up the Volga to Stalingrad or some such city, what chance
did they have? If the German army couldn't afford to take and keep a
major city, hadn't it already lost? If Stalingrad had to be left to
the Soviets, where were the Germans going to anchor the Volga line?
I think that Hitler's actions from the winter of '42 on were partly
desperation, and partly belief that the army would have to be able to
carry out what he ordered if Germany were to win.
> Courland is another one of those places, along with the
> Hungarian oil fields, that always get brought up. I think
> its a dodge, myself. Getting an army group out of Courland
> to defend East Prussia and protect the Baltic that way is
> easily as good a move as tying up two Armies to protect sea
> lanes that there are no U-Boats to train in...
I don't understand. There were a large number of super subs
under construction about the time the German shipyards were overrun,
so the U-boats weren't imaginary. At the time, this was perhaps
Germany's most likely method of winning the war, running a hair ahead
of a comet splitting up and hitting the Soviet Union. Under those
circumstances, guarding the training areas makes sense, *provided*
you aren't concerned with the immediacy or consequences of defeat if
the trick doesn't work (and Hitler clearly wasn't).
If you've got a better reason (and I don't count "Hitler was a raving
looney"), please mention it.
> [Hitler was a very bad general.]
Has anybody disagreed with this statement? The question is not how
good he was, but rather how and why his incompetence manifested
itself.
> Besides, all of "Hitler's" successes were plans drawn up
> by others, with the sole exception of the stand and die
> order in winter 41-42; and even that is debatable as good
> strategy.
>
FWIW, Glantz and House (in _When_Titans_Clashed_) think that it could
easily have destroyed Army Group Center about two and a half years before
the historical destruction. They think that the only thing that saved
AGC was that Stalin and Stavka got carried away with their early success,
and tried to widen the attacks to defeat the entire German army.
> Well, I go with John Keegan, here. WW II was Hitler's
> war, to win or lose. He lost it. He controlled everything,
> he made the decisions (down to company level), he drew the
> lines on the maps, he uttered the Wagnerian oaths, etc, etc,
> ad nauseum. I don't know what responsibility for the
> national disaster you do ascribe to Hitler, but IMO, it has
> to be in the high 90s as far as percent...
>
IMHO, the fact that Hitler had the ultimate command authority has very
little to do with the outcome of WWII, as he did not in fact exercise it
significantly before the war had been lost under the leadership of the
German generals. By the time he issued the first of the controversial
commands, in Winter of 1941, Germany was losing. Every order Hitler made
from then on was a more or less inept attempt to change the situation
so that Germany might win. Therefore, I think that Hitler's responsibility
is due to his political leadership, that he led the nation into a war
that it was not prepared to win, and that his military skills are
irrelevant.
David H. Thornley, known to the Wise as thornley@cs.umn.edu O-
Disclaimer: These are not the opinions of the University of Minnesota,
its Regents, faculty, staff, students, or squirrels.
Datclaimer: Well, maybe the squirrels. They're pretty smart.
From: NASU002.USAP@iac.org.nz (Public Affairs Officer)
Date: Fri, 22 Mar 1996 14:30 GMT
Subject: Hitler as a military leader
The best analysis I know of Hitler as a military mind is in John
Keegan's "The Mask of Command," which examines four styles of leadership,
Hitler being the last, in the category of "false heroism." I have it at
home, but not in front of me, so I'm not going to comment on him in
detail until I've got my facts straight.
One thing I know is that he had an incredible grasp of minutiae,
like how many towed 75 mm guns were assigned to a given infantry
division, and the thicknesses of armor, but the result was that the
highest level of German planning got bogged down in trivia, right up to
the end of the war.
He also believed that force of will could overcome any opposition
and force. That goes only so far.
I wouldn't rely on anything David Irving has written. The man has
described himself as a Fascist, run for British Parliament on Fascist
tickets, espoused neo-Nazi causes in public, and published articles,
books, and speeches that deny the Holocaust happened. His act so offended
the present German government that they kicked him out of the country.
He's a man with a penknife to grind.
Sincerely,
David H. Lippman
Public Affairs Officer
US Naval Antarctic Support Unit
Christchurch, New Zealand
From: Jay Steiger/Forte <Jay_Steiger/Forte.FORTE@notes.san.fhi.com>
Date: 21 Mar 96 17:32:18 PS
Subject: WWII: Excuse me, I've got gas.
Regarding commentary on gas at Sevastapol, I've never run across any citations
for use of poison gas during the seige. I think Ray's comments about the
possiblity of WP fumes are a good possibility, as is good old screening smoke.
This stuff is not fun to inhale anyway, and does tend to bring about some
coughing and watery eyes. Battle brings on terror and panic anyway so it is
surely possible that some Soviet soldiers inhaled chemical smoke (or the smoke
from the countless fires of the battle) and thought that the Nazi's were
gassing them.
As for gas in general, John's comments about initial surprise and subsequent
decline of effectiveness are very true. By 1918, the main use of gas was to
hurt morale and make life as miserable as possible for the enemy stuck in
masks, rather than actually kill and wound a bunch of them. Although there are
some horrible stories of satuation gas bombing where the fumes were so dense
that they penetrated the mask filters and advancing troops would find their
enemy coughing up blood and dying slowly (very nasty war!). Off Europa for a
moment, the excellent Third World War series by GDW simply factored mutual use
of gas into the crt and dispensed with any modifiers. A bit of trivia: The
first modern use of poison gas appears to be during the Russo Japanese War,
where the Japanese burnt arsnic and let the fumes drift onto Russian lines. It
was a miserable failure, but the lessons were not lost on the observers. Both
the Russians and the French unsuccessfully used gas during early WWI, but the
Germans were the first ones to get it right at Ypres in 1915.
Jay Steiger
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 1996 23:42:52 -0600
From: conrad alan b <abcclibr@ux1.cso.uiuc.edu>
Subject: Re: Cross-channel '43
On Sun, 10 Mar 1996, Bill Stone wrote:
> Does anyone have experience with landing the Allies in France from the UK
> in summer 1943 using Second Front? What was the outcome and what lessons
> were learned? Is this a viable Allied strategy?
>
In my second game of SF I get the Allies. I wanted to be bold. So
I decided to try a two front approach. I did the Sicily/Corsica landing
on July I, but tried a shot into Brittany also.
Just sending two LCs up north and having plenty of transports I
grabbed two of three attempted minor ports (ungarrisoned) and poured in
the troops in exploitation. The trouble is I did not want to tie up too
many air units up north. The Luftwaffe shifted into France. I could not
expand the bridgehead.
What really killed me was that the Germans were able to mine off one
of my ports and I could not support the troops with enough supply or
gunfire. I had already lost a lot of naval factors to a minefield and
anti-naval air in the Med. So I was unwilling to take too many losses in
France with each one costing me VPs.
I lost a lot of Canadians and Brits. But I had just enough
replacements to cover losses so I lost no VPs there. It took the Germans
several turns to take back the ports. And a couple of EXs also. I had
hoped that forcing the Germans to send so many troops to France would
give me a freer hand in the Med, but I can't see that it worked that way.
The bigger question is can the Allies invade France in '43? I would
like to try it next time I play SF. Unfortunately the game is not well
set up for that attempt. All your forces are set up with the Med
option set up. There are two problems with this. First it would take
time to redeploy your forces for a France invasion. But mostly the
problem is that there is not provision in the game for getting air
units from theater to theater.
If you start in the Med, once you take Corsica you can transfer most
air units back and forth as needed. But if you start with most of your
air assets in England you may never get enough air units to the Med to
put pressure there.
As to whether an invasion will work or not I still think that in
Europa terms that the question is open. Lets compare a France invasion
with a Sicily invasion in '43. In Sicily the German can not counterattack
your bridgehead very well. In fact it seems to be the weight of opinion
that players will not even contest Sicily at all. In France they can throw
everything at you right away.
But in Sicily your air units are well away from the action and you
have to build airfields to get them into the main action in Italy. From
England you can put all your air right on the bridgehead.
There is a lot of French coast to defend with not a lot of Germans
to defend them in '43. So places like Brittany (see above) will be open
and poooible to get in cheap. You have just as much LC/lift capability as
you will have in '44. Just not as much airborne potential.
So it is worth trying to see what happens IMO.
Now in an expanded GE setup things might be even more interesting.
Since all those air units got to the Med somehow, there has to be a way to
ship them in the game, so one makes up a rule for that. There is a slightly
greater problem with troop setup. Sure one can let the Allies start with
a certain portion of ground forces in England not the Med (although remember
many of those forces in North Africa are there because they just finished
up taking Tunisia).
The problem game wise is how to start a France invasion without
having your German opponent knowing you are going to do that when the game
starts. Since the German forces are sort of spread all over since they
did not know what is coming, one could mandate that. But only if the
person you are playing against will agree to that.
Certainly if/when I try this I would rationalize that a France
invasion could start a turn to two earlier also. Most of the air-naval
assets that are going to be used in the north were not needed in Tunisia
to mop up the Germans in May '43. Of course one could make the same
logical claim for Overlord historically. It should be run in May I. For
reasons that will never come up in a Europa game they wasted two valuable
turns. In fact in my last game the Allies invaded on April II. The seas
were calm so he could sail. The mud did not bother the invasion, in fact
it helped slow down and German reaction.
That's my take on the '43 Brittany option. Any others?
Alan Conrad
Champaign, Illinois
Date: 22 Mar 96 01:41:13 EST
From: Jim Arnold <74133.1765@compuserve.com>
Subject: Re: Stacking
Frank Watson wrote,
"the Polish Corps was "pinched out" by the advance of somebody else. What is
that but the stacking limits taking effect?"
Actually, the Poles (and Br 10 Corps) could have been vectored to the right
where there was more room; they were probably pinched out because they'd
suffered so heavily at Cassino. In any case, the Brits and French to their left
were already well over even 4-4-3 stacking at the time.
"The 3-3-2 stacking is just about right in an open, flowing campaign."
I don't know of a reference where the real-life analog of 3-3-2 stacking (3 divs
with typical support in clear) was described as maximal, or where 4-4-3 (4 divs
with typical support) showed signs of being crowded. If East Front densities
were generally less than 4-4-3, it was evidently because of the vast frontages
to be covered. The same factor would tend to keep Europa stacking in the East at
lower levels.
On the other hand, I know of lots of cases where something like 4-4-3 was the
norm, especially in the more constricted West. Look at the situation maps. The
problems associated with overstacking (a confused attack, traffic problems)
occur under conditions that are clearly beyond what we would represent as 4-4-3.
I mentioned the commitment of the Cdn Corps in Diadem in my original post. See
chapter VI of the US Army's _Breakout_and_Pursuit_ for an example in Normandy.
Stacking rules could be made a lot more complicated, but that's another issue;
I'm just saying that with no increase in complexity 4-4-3 would significantly
improve the Europa model of WWII.
Jim
From: Rich Velay <richv@icebox.iceonline.com>
Subject: GURU:SF Supply
Date: Fri, 22 Mar 1996 00:55:14 PST
Hi <ALL>
Regarding the recent question about whether or not reducing a
force's rail cap on a particular net will effect supply, the answer is NO.
Much like rail hits don't affect supply, temporary rail capacity reductions
don't change the fact that the player has X capacity on a net, they just
change his available capacity.
So no putting people out of supply with rail marshalling yard attacks
or Strat air war effects...
late/R
RichV@Icebox.Iceonline.com
Europa, tomorrow's games about yesterday, TODAY