Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 12:56:39 -0400
From: jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell)
Subject: Re: noneuropa topics
>I would vote for less quoting.... If you
>have to quote do a little editing and just show the key phrase ....
Excellent suggestion!
From: Jay Steiger/Forte <Jay_Steiger/Forte.FORTE@notes.san.fhi.com>
Date: 20 Mar 96 9:35:51 PS
Subject: Fiction
Jim said...
>One off beat what-if book for prehistoric Grand Europa postulated an
>invasion of New York by the Kaiser right after the Spanish-American War
>when the best U. S. troops were still overseas. The author was someone
>named Conroy and it was called 1904 or something like that. A footnote in
>a book about the Spanish-American War [AN ARMY FOR EMPIRE] mentions that
>Germans actually formulated plans along those lines!
The book is called 1901 and the author is Robert (I think) Conroy (I know). I
haven't read it and the only place I seem to see it even mentioned is in the
catalogs from the Millitary Book Club.
Dave mentioned Fatherland as a good novel from the "what if they won"
hypothoses. Very well written and very very creepy. File this one under why
we fought! (Also you will most certainly cringe when you read of the Gestapo's
latest torture technique agains males...yipes!).
Jay Steiger
Date: 20 Mar 1996 13:09:09 U
From: "Merrill, Robert C" <merrill@txpcap.hou.xwh.bp.com>
Subject: RE: Narvik & Iron Ore
[much of R. Lundin's post snipped for bandwith]
>The next table is most intresting, look at Oxelosund and vhere it is placed in
>Sweden:
>Ironore shipment from Sweden in precent:
>---------------------------------------------------------
>Year Narvik Lulea Oxelosund Other Harbours
>---------------------------------------------------------
>1936/38 53 22 16 9
>1939 44 27 18 11
>1940 13 53 17 17
>1941 8 49 22 21
>1942 13 43 21 23
>1943 19 43 20 18
>1944 24 31 22 23
I think that this table makes it pretty obvious why the Allies wanted to take
Narvik. The invasion was April 1940, right? Probably planned in February -
March 1940. The allied planners would not have known that that shipments from
Narvik would drop to about 20% of the total. Rather, they whipped out their
handy 1939 (or 1938!) shipping almanacs and said "A HA! we can disrupt 50% of
Germany's iron supply by taking Narvik!"
That's whats "dangerous" about loading-up GE with too many what-ifs. We (that
is the players) have just far too much information/knowledge available.
Knowing
that Sweden can (will) ship 80-90% of its ore through the Baltic makes the
Narvik adventure look stupid or foolish. On the other hand, depriving the
enemy of 50% of their iron ore sounds pretty good to me.
Similar reasoning will apply to the Fall of France/Russian belligerence/etc. I
don't have Narvik (which along with the FoF are the only games I don't have!),
but I would imagine that the Allied VP award for Narvik itself is pretty high
to reflect the political reality that the planners thought they could stop the
iron ore shipments to Germany by its capture.
I would be very happy with a detailed GE that permitted me to play all of the
campaigns up to Barbarossa more-or-less historically. After Barbarrossa and
the
entrance of America, the war became, in my view, less dominated by "wishful
thinking" plans and actions. Thus, the players could have more leeway once the
basic framework is constructed.
Bob in Bogota
From: Jeff White <jwhite@naybob.ghq.com>
Subject: Re: SF Game report
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 12:44:13 -0600 (CST)
Elias Nordling Said:
>
> >Rich Velay Said:
> >>
> >> Hi Jeff.
> >> I was interested in your game report. I have a
> >> couple of questions though...
> >>
> >> >>The Brits fried the Achen sector then proceeded
> >> >>to overrun a 4-6-6 Inf XX in a major city hex (figure out
> >> >>that stack....)
>
> Um, this is turning into a rules question. Don't you take into
> consideration the terrain effects when overrunning?
Sure. The 14-10 Arm XX is halved. The 5-3-6 Aslt Eng Tank X is
doubled. So are the 2-1-8 Sieg Art II.
>
> Mvh Elias Nordling
> o-noreli@jmk.su.se
>
>
--
Jeff White, ARS N0POY
jwhite@ghq.com
"I am Pentium of Borg. Arithmetic is irrelevant. Prepare to be approximated."
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 12:45:25 -0600
From: conrad alan b <abcclibr@ux1.cso.uiuc.edu>
Subject: Re: Second Front end game
On Wed, 20 Mar 1996, Elias Nordling wrote:
>
> On a related issue, has anybody ever run out of resource points in this
> game? Keeping track of the amount of them for the Allies is a complete
> waste of time. As for the axis, I used all but a few construction units
> (some were repairing rail in France) in resource-spending activities, and I
> boosted my rail capacity almost every turn, and I just kept getting more
> and more of those RPs...
>
>
In my first SF game, as The German I ended up with maybe a hundred
leftover Resourse Points. I had been carfull early in the game and did
not realize how they would pile up. Then later in the game I did not
have enough engineers to use them. Although they did come in handy to
build up emergency rail cap when the Allied stategic air had cut it way down.
My Allied opponent on the other hand used up almost every RP every
turn. He was always building airfields and later building up his own
rail cap in Italy and France.
Hense, in my second game, I as the Allies am being carful early on
and using a lot of temporary airfields to save RPs
Alan Conrad
From: Jeff White <jwhite@naybob.ghq.com>
Subject: Re: Second Front end game
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 13:12:58 -0600 (CST)
conrad alan b Said:
>
>
>
> On Wed, 20 Mar 1996, Elias Nordling wrote:
>
> >
> > On a related issue, has anybody ever run out of resource points in this
> > game? Keeping track of the amount of them for the Allies is a complete
> > waste of time. As for the axis, I used all but a few construction units
> > (some were repairing rail in France) in resource-spending activities, and I
> > boosted my rail capacity almost every turn, and I just kept getting more
> > and more of those RPs...
> >
> >
> In my first SF game, as The German I ended up with maybe a hundred
> leftover Resourse Points. I had been carfull early in the game and did
> not realize how they would pile up. Then later in the game I did not
> have enough engineers to use them. Although they did come in handy to
> build up emergency rail cap when the Allied stategic air had cut it way down.
We also had the Axis side building rail cap in Germany. We were not
sure about this, but it takes a minimum of 10 points of rail
cap to draw supply though a rail net. The Germans start out
with 60 (I think) rail cap. So, if the Strat war takes them down to
10% of capacity (6 rail cap), can the Germans still draw supply?
Maybe even rail marshalling yard hits could knock them under 10
for a turn. Would this take most of Germans on the map out of supply?
> My Allied opponent on the other hand used up almost every RP every
> turn. He was always building airfields and later building up his own
> rail cap in Italy and France.
> Hense, in my second game, I as the Allies am being carful early on
> and using a lot of temporary airfields to save RPs
>
> Alan Conrad
>
--
Jeff White, ARS N0POY
jwhite@ghq.com
"I am Pentium of Borg. Arithmetic is irrelevant. Prepare to be approximated."
From: Jeff White <jwhite@naybob.ghq.com>
Subject: Re: Second Front end game
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 13:25:16 -0600 (CST)
Elias Nordling Said:
>
> >Stefan Farrelly Said:
> >>
> >> My brother and I have played many SF scenarios and weve never had a problem
> >> with not enough Air RP's, despite in one game deliberatly trying to hit the
> >> Axis air to see if we coould impact their RP's long term. No good.
> >>
> >> Consequently we think the Air RP's are too generous for all sides.
> >
> >As I recall (correct me if I'm wrong here), air replacements do not
> >accumulate from one phase to the next. We didn't catch this at first.
> >This makes a big deal. We did manage a couple of times to get the
> >Krauts weak in air force with many months to recover.
>
> I didn't miss this, the allies tried actively to take out the german
> airforce, and their fighter force STILL remained intact.
I remember one really cunning maneuver we pulled on the Germans to nail
fighters. It was 43 and there was an air campaign in France to hit rails
airfields, etc. So there's these bunch of good Germans fighters in the
St. Nazier (sp) area. We've blown out a bunch of airfields, and
the Germans (I forget for what reason, I think to protect some anti-shipping
planes on the ground), are flying a lot of CAP over a hex. We then
proceeded to blow out all of the airfields (not too hard with the short
range the fighters have) that were in return range.
8 or so fighters went into the eliminate box when they had no place
to land. The Germans were not amused. This was also sorta
"arranged" by advanced planning to do this.
I agree that the fighters tend to survive a long time, but with there
short range, low bombing factors and usual lack of airfields, they
are not terribly effective.
>
> On a related issue, has anybody ever run out of resource points in this
> game? Keeping track of the amount of them for the Allies is a complete
> waste of time. As for the axis, I used all but a few construction units
> (some were repairing rail in France) in resource-spending activities, and I
> boosted my rail capacity almost every turn, and I just kept getting more
> and more of those RPs...
>
> Mvh Elias Nordling
> o-noreli@jmk.su.se
>
>
--
Jeff White, ARS N0POY
jwhite@ghq.com
"I am Pentium of Borg. Arithmetic is irrelevant. Prepare to be approximated."
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 14:44:48 -0400
From: jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell)
Subject: Re:Europa unit ratings
>Jason:".... ground units are generally rated at their TO&E strengths,
>with certain adjustments for especially plentiful replacements."
>
>Gary:"WHAT?!...."
>
>Ray: "And I always thought that they were rated on their average 'bayonet'
>strength...."
The TO&E is the starting point -- how many men, what equipment, how they're
organized. This is an important starting point, but it's nowhere near the
whole story. If it was, then the 1941 Soviet divisions would rate stronger
than equivalent German divisions!
Next, their proficiency is examined -- how well trained and led they are,
how effective they are vis-a-vis other forces, etc.
Finally, other factors are examined, such as how well they can stay at TO&E
strength over time, etc.
For example let's take a look at some 1944 infantry divisions: US, British,
German. A Br inf div is the largest of the lot -- a US one has fewer men
(to minimize the need to tie up shipping for "nonessential" men and
equipment) and a German one has still fewer men (German is running out of
militarily acceptable men by 1944). For div equipment, the Br div has the
most lavish equipment (surprise!), followed by the US, and trailed by the
Germans. On a firepower basis, however, the German div has the most -- the
Germans were substituting firepower for manpower. (How come they have the
least equipment then? They stinted on the non-weapons side, particularly
transport.)
Typically, raw manpower gives you offensive ability (since in an advance
you'll take casualites and need to have infantrymen left to hold the ground
you capture), while raw firepower gives you defensive ability (since you
can shoot up an enemy advance better). If these were the only factors
considered, Br inf divs would rate higher than US, and Ger inf divs would
have defense strengths greater than either.
But, that's not the only thing going on. In general, German troops were
better trained and better led that Br or US troops, for a variety of
factors I haven't time to go into here. Between the Br and US, it is
debateable which were trained and better led. The Br were perhaps slightly
better trained and had a more professional officer corps, but the US seemed
to be better at learning from actual combat experience and improvising.
This leads to the Br divs being close to one another in ratings, while the
US divs varied more (Regular Army divs were consistently better than
National Guard divs, for example).
Finally, other factors are considered. A full strength German inf div may
have more firepower than a US one, but after several weeks of combat, the
Ger div is going to be at half strength (or worse), while the US one is
still going to be at full strength -- even if it has suffered 100+%
casualties in those weeks. (The US simply had the ability to keep its
divisions at full strength, while the Germans didn't. This partly explains
how the Allies won in Normandy: the US ground down the Ger divs in front of
them until they broke through.) The British were running out of men, which
led them to be more cautious than the US, with the result that Br troops
tended to perform less aggressively (and hence advance more slowly) than US
troops.
All these factors were considered when rating Second Front units. This is
why the best US inf divs outrate all others, followed by the British and
other US, and trailed by the Germans.
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 15:28:48 -0500
From: Nicholas Forte <nforte@osf1.gmu.edu>
Subject: Re: The Fall of France (to be or not to be)
On Mon, 18 Mar 1996 15:28:00 -0500 RayK@smtp4.aw.com (Ray Kanarr) wrote:
>Without recapitulating all of the points made by Alan, Perry, Nick and
>others, and there are a number of good ones, I would just like to
>raise the issues of morale and professional competence on the
>operational level.
>
>On the issue of morale, there was:
>
>1) Significant resistance to the war in the first place, both from
>people who remembered the bloodbaths of 1914-1918 and from the
>Popular Front, where German-Soviet detente made a war with Germany
>less palatable.
Although it is true that WWI had a great effect on the morale of French Army, I
am not sure that it was unique in this. Most observations of the French Army
prior to May 40 fail to indicate any unique defeatist attitude. Most
commentaries on the defeatism of the French Army are based on the army's morale
during the breakthrough on the Meuse and represent the situation in a the worst
units of the army. The French army continued to fight after Dunkerque when it
must have been clear to all the they had no hope of victory. The French 1st
Army in Belgium valiantly fought off the Germans even after they had been cut
off. Similarly, the French Army fought on the Weygand Line better than should
have been expected for their condition.
While the German Army went into battle with a string of victories in Poland to
bolster its morale, there was a widespread uneasiness throughout the army that
France would not be as easy Poland. Contrary to the current view of teh French
Army of 1940, at the time it had the reputation of being one of the best in
world. Many of the veteran's of WWI in the German Army also remembered the
resolution of the French at Verdun and the ability of the French to snatch a
victory from an almost assured defeat in the Miracle of the Marne. The average
German private would not have been privy of the German plans so would not have
be able to understand the significance of Ardennes offensive. Apart from
Guderian and a few others, even most German generals were not totally convinced
that the Ardennes offensive would work. O.K.H. tried to slow down the offensive
on several occasions because of its uncertainty.
German morale was built up by victory on victory. It is unclear what would have
been the effect of a defeat on the Meuse to German morale. Would it have been
shattered by the thoughts of a repeat of WWI and possible eventual defeat?
>2) The period of the Phony War [9/39-4/40] was used to good effect on
>the part of German propagandists, directed primarily at the French.
Again, this was not evident on the eve of the German offensive. The defeat of
the French Army led to a search for scapegoats and escuses. I am not sure if
the effect of German propagandist was not exagerated after the war to absolve
the failure of French generals.
>3) Training of line troops was, in many cases, geared to positional
>warfare, with a lack of training in mobile warfare from a defensive
>stand point. Sure the 'checkerboard' defense existed, so did a plan
>to put torpedo nets around the capital ships at Pearl, so what! Such
>plans were not implemented until the 3rd week of battle, long after
>there was any real hope of successful implementation.
My point was not that the French should be able to adopt the 'checkerboard'
doctrine earlier than they did, but rather if the first week of the offensive
was not so much of a disaster that it was they would have been able to
effectively counter the German blitzkieg tactics. The key to survival in the
first week was troop deployment, not doctrinal changes.
>This point also speaks to the competence of the operational level
>officers. Implementation of plans during the Fall of France campaign
>was chaotic at best, leadership on all levels, while not lacking
>elan, was dunderheaded overall, and the ability to adjust from
>set-piece plans to the realities of the battle practically
>non-existent. This was as true for the French AF as it was for the
>army.
But how much of this was the result of Gamelin and how much in the essential
qualities of the French Army. Weygand was apparently able to get much more out
of the French command system than Gamelin. If Rommel, Guderian, Patton, etc.
can clam credit for their superior generalmanship, then certainly the lossing
generals must take blame for their failures.
>I also don't think that having 2 to 2.5 times as many slow,
>short-range tanks as a more maneuverable enemy is any advantage; nor
>is having a huge AF if you haven't got the experienced pilots and
>sufficient ground resources for it, as the Germans discover in 1945.
While the French tanks were less mobile than their German counterparts, they
were also more heavily armored and on average carried larger guns. If properly
handled, they could prove a difficulty to the Germans. The crisis on the Meuse,
however, led the French to commit their armored divisions in a piecemeal fashion
as individual battalions approached the front. A counter example would be the
battle of the Gembloux gap, where French armored divisions fought their German
counterparts to a standstill. The Germans found that, even at point blank
range, most of their shells would just bounce off the more heavily armored
French tanks.
As for the French AF, despite fighting a battle while half of its units were
undergoing re-equipment, the French AF shot down 583 confirmed (plus another 228
probable) German aircraft while lossing only 413 aircraft of its own to aerial
combat. Although the French fighter force could contest the skies with the
Luftwaffe, the bomber force lacked a sufficient number of modern bombers to have
any effect on the ground. The newer models just coming into service would have
corrected this defect.
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 15:36:12 -0500
From: Nicholas Forte <nforte@osf1.gmu.edu>
Subject: Re: The Fall of France (to be or not to be)
On Mon, 18 Mar 1996 17:37:23 -0600 bdbryant@mail.utexas.edu (Bobby D. Bryant)
wrote:
>What would have happened in the West if Germany had not taken the
>initiative? Were the Allies seriously committed to invading Germany? Might
>the phony war have devolved into a cold war, with no WWII as we know it?
The Western allies were looking at an economic strangulation of Germany, with a
possible offensive latter after the Germans were sufficiently weakened. This
accounts for Narvik, the plan to bomb Baku, and some intrigues regarding the
Romanian oilfields.
Nick Forte
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 15:39:43 -0500
From: Nicholas Forte <nforte@osf1.gmu.edu>
Subject: Re: The Fall of France
On Tue, 19 Mar 96 00:03:00 UTC 0000 grd1@genie.com wrote:
>As RayK said there were a number of problems with French morale and doctrine.
>
>The Germans had what is now called better agility. They were able to change
>their plans to met the developing situation more quickly than the French.
>I.E They consistantly beat the French to the punch, never letting the French
>recover from their last blow.
>
>Also known as fighting inside the other guys' decision cycle.
>
>Alan Tibbetts
While I agree this was a great advantage to the Germans, the question is whether
it was enough to guarantee victory? My arguement is not that the French could
have guaranteed victory if properly handled, but rather that they had a fighting
chance than many wargamers (and historians) overlook.
Nick Forte
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 15:46:27 -0500
From: Ray Kanarr <RayK@smtp4.aw.com>
Subject: To GURU [was: Re: Second Front end game]
On 3/20/96, Jeff White sent in:
>We were not sure about this, but it takes a minimum of 10
>points of rail cap to draw supply though a rail net. The
>Germans start out with 60 (I think) rail cap. So, if the Strat
>war takes them down to 10% of capacity (6 rail cap), can
>the Germans still draw supply?
>Maybe even rail marshalling yard hits could knock them
>under 10 for a turn. Would this take most of Germans on
>the map out of supply?
Definitely questions for the GURU. How 'bout it Rich?
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 15:44:56 -0500
From: Nicholas Forte <nforte@osf1.gmu.edu>
Subject: Re: The Fall of France (to be or not to be)
On Mon, 18 Mar 1996 21:31:22 -0400 jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell) wrote:
>On 18 March 96, Ray Kanarr wrote:
>
>>As shown by the truly lackluster performance of the French, where
>>they advanced to take a few square klicks, and then retreated, early
>>in the Phony War, that there was no real commitment on the part of
>>France to Invade Germany, especially against the perceived strength
>>of the Westwall fortifications. They'd had enough of that 25 years
>>earlier.
>
>This is true for 1939-40. The French and British alliance's plans, however,
>were to stay on the defensive until 1941. By that time, the combined
>wartime output of their
>industry would have given them large (presumably decisive) advantages in
>aircraft, tanks, artillery, and other material vis-a-vis the Germans. It is
>not an unreasonable strategy given the circumstances (why attack the
>Germans before you are ready to beat them?), and it might just have worked
>had the Allies not botched the defense of France in 1940.
One of the great ironies of WWII is that the French planned for a long war and
got a short one while the Germans planned for a short war and got a log one.
Nick Forte
From: Rich Velay <richv@icebox.iceonline.com>
Subject: GURU:ARPs
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 12:55:22 PST
Hi <ALL>:
A couple of people have asked/commented on the
saving of ARPs from cycle to cycle. Here's how that works,
if anyone is confused.
Per the third bullet of Rule 25D., you lose all
accumulated ARPs, except for two, at the end of each air
cycle. In other words, you can "save" no more than 2 ARPs
for use in the next cycle.
So, if we were to look at the Combined US Air OB for,
say, Jul 44, we would see that they get an allotment of 93
ARPs. Now let's say that May-Jun 44 were light air combat
months, and they end that cycle with 50 ARPs. They will
lose 48 of those ARPs and be able to add 2 only to their new
allotment of 93, for a total of 95 ARPs for Jul-Aug 44.
So anything left at the end of a cycle, over 2 ARPs, is
a waste of resources. Use 'em up. The new air system
promotes *flying* the air forces; there is no benefit to
"hiding" them anymore. If you find yourself ending a cycle
with a wad of ARPs left over, maybe you aren't being
aggressive enough with your air...
RichV@Icebox.Iceonline.com
Europa, tomorrow's games about yesterday, TODAY
From: Rich Velay <richv@icebox.iceonline.com>
Subject: Volume
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 12:56:59 PST
Hi everyone.
On volume, I have to say that I am probably getting
as much as anyone, since I get privates with rules questions
in addition to all of the list stuff.
I say, as JMA does, "let er rip". I've had almost 800
messages since I became jr poohbah, about what, two and a
half weeks ago? That doesn't strike me as excessive.
I would agree with James that quoting is out of control;
too often we get complete repeats of messages with nothing
but a comment or two added on. Take the time to edit the
messages you are replying to, people. A aragraph at most,
and usually less, is enough to give us the idea of what you
are replying to. Pages of quoted material is not needed,
since we all got the original too...
It also seems pointless, to me, to "cc:" stuff to people
on the list; it just ends up as a dupe and gets deleted
anyway. Most everything, except private mail, should just
go to Lysator, period. Sending a post to Rich Velay, cc:
Lysator just means I get two copies; why not just to
Lysator?
I would also recommend paying attention to your use of
the subject line; while it is easy to just <ENTER> here, a
moment spent on providing a fresh, *meaningful* one can help
people to scan through the mail and pick out what they want.
As an aside, I'd like to thank everyone for being so good
about using the :GURU:<title> format to me; it really helps!
If a little care is taken, we can satisfy everyone.
late/R
RichV@Icebox.Iceonline.com
Europa, tomorrow's games about yesterday, TODAY
From: NASU002.USAP@iac.org.nz (Public Affairs Officer)
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 1996 08:44 GMT
Subject: Stalin's choices
The problem with trying to figure out what Stalin was up to before
the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union is that the facts are buried,
partially by Stalin himself.
He was a fairly devious character, who could and did order the
execution of his closest allies and friends. He also was frighteningly
cold to his family...his wife committed suicide...his son died in German
captivity... and tyrannized his nation on a titanic scale. He was
secretive and paranoid.
After his death, the record was falsified first by those who sought
to deify Stalin, then by those who sought to destroy him, then by those
who sought to erase him. Nikita Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" wasn't very
secret, but it ripped Stalin bloody. After Khrushchev fell out of favor
and power, Stalin's role in Soviet history books was reduced again.
We may never know Stalin's true agenda in full, but I have a hunch
that he himself didn't have one in the early part of the war. He seems to
have been something of a cross between a paranoiac and an opportunist. IT
was Churchill who said it best about Russia being a riddle wrapped in a
mystery, shrouded in an enigma...but the key was Russian national
interest.
But what that was may be an even bigger mystery.
David H. Lippman
Public Affairs Officer
US Naval Antarctic Support Unit
Christchurch, New Zealand
From: NASU002.USAP@iac.org.nz (Public Affairs Officer)
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 1996 08:59 GMT
Subject: My post on the book
The only reason I put the post on the Europa net was that I did not
have the address or name of the chap who asked me the question about
"Desperate Voyagers."
I spent a week ransacking my home to find the damned thing, and then
couldn't find the original address and name. So I was determined to honor
the request, to go the extra mile, to do the right thing, and answered it
the only way I could. I kept it short, and I kept it to the point, and
for this I seem to be drawing considerable condemnation for doing what I
considered the right thing. I don't see why I'm being made the bad guy.
The alternative would have been to blow off the request. If I blow
off requests in my job as PA officer for the US Antarctic Program, then
I'm not doing the job I'm being paid for, and the results can include a
snotty letter from the ignored party to my commanding officer, who in
turn can give me a flogging that goes on my Navy record.
I tried to do my job as best as I could. I was asked a question, and
I tried to go the extra mile. Why am I the bad guy?
Sincerely,
David H. Lippman
Public Affairs Officer
US Naval Antarctic Support Unit
From: NASU002.USAP@iac.org.nz (Public Affairs Officer)
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 1996 09:31 GMT
Subject: Wasserfall
Somebody earlier talked about the German "Wasserfall" missile, which
was one of the innumerable toys the Peenemunde boys worked on. I rooted
through my piles of books to find something on it.
Wasserfall, or C-2, is described as a 26-foot long liquid-fuelled
rocket which bore a lot of resemblance to the V-2, with four stubby fins
amidships. It was intended to travel at 560 mph, have a working radius
uof 30 miles and destroy aircraft up to 65,000 feet altitude with a
674-lb. warhead.
The missile was proposed in 1942 as an air defense system for large
cities, 200 batteries in three zones, 50 miles apart, to virtually seal
of Germany from the North Sea. A later idea called for 300 batteries,
which would require a production rate of 5,000 missiles a month, a hard
feat for the hard-pressed and poorly organized German war economy.
The missiled was to be vertically launched, gathered into a beam of
radar in the first five or six seconds of flight, then radio-controlled
in accordance with the radar tracking system.
At three km from the target, an infrared homing system would take
over, detect the heat from the enemy aircraft engines, and guide the
missile to the target. Fairly advanced stuff in a war that began with
horse cavalry and biplanes.
The missile was also fitted with a proximity fuse to detonate within
10 meters of the target, which would give it killing power even with a
near-miss.
The first tests took place at Griefswalder Oie, a Baltic island near
Peenemune, on Feb. 28, 1944. The missile reached an altitude of 23,000
feet, which was a third of what was hoped for. After that, little went
right. Fifty Wasserfalls were rolled out of the Peenemunde works, set up
on their test stands, and fired. But nearly 35 of these missiles were
failures for one reason or another, providing German scientists and
technicians with dramatic explosions on liftoff, but little else.
The Germans gave up on this missile in February 1945, as the war
came close to Peenemunde itself.
If Europa chooses to delve into this weapon, doubtless it'll impact
as a position AA unit of some sort, perhaps the Germans suddenly getting
high value AA units, probably late in the war.
Europa could also address this in terms of the strategic air war,
possibly as an abstraction that reduces in turn the abstract Allied
strategic air war attacks.
The Germans came up with a lot of interesting secret and special
weapons, some of which had dramatic impact on history...jet fighters,
cruise missiles, flying bombs, snorkel-equipped submarines, rocket
fighters, but a lot of them have lapsed into obscurity for a variety of
reasons.
Will I get flogged for this one?
Sincerely,
David H. Lippman
Public Affairs Officer
US Naval Antarctic Support Unit
Christchurch, New Zealand
Date: 20 Mar 96 18:08:46 EST
From: Alan Philson <100626.2267@compuserve.com>
Subject: Re: Swedish ore.
Britain also ran the German blockade of the Skagerrak to import special steel
products between 1941-44 at first using interned merchant shipping and later
purpose built small fast ships. The regular diplomatic flights were also used to
ship small quanties of these products. A book on this 'The Blockade Runners' was
published several years ago, I cant remember the authors name.
From: pardue@hilda.mast.QueensU.CA (Keith Pardue)
Subject: Keeping On Topic (fwd)
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 18:10:46 -0500 (EST)
Hi,
Mark Pitcavage wrote:
>
> Because this list is rapidly growing very unwieldy and does not contain a
> digest option, I would hope that in the future subscribers will be more
> careful to limit posts to Europa subjects.
>
> Thanks very much.
>
> Dr. Mark Pitcavage
> mpitcava@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu
> http://www.greyware.com/authors/pitman
>
>
The message that Mark used as an example of what not to
post was a book reference that Dave found for me. But, he couldn't
remember who he was finding it for, so he posted it generally,
which I am thankful for. I hazard to guess that the reference,
which concerns Japan's policies regarding Jews during WWII, is
of interest to several other people on the list as well.
I enjoy this list for its general discussion of the history
of the Second World War as well as for its discussion of the
Europa series. It seems to me that discussion of Europa leads
naturally in these directions. Although there are other lists
for discussion of WWII, I'm not that interested in joining
them, whatever their merits, as I get quite enough interesting
messages from this list.
Mark is quite right that the list is really for Europa
discussion and shouldn't diverge too much from that. He
obiviously thinks that Dave's post is too far. I
can understand, although I disagree.
One "solution" to this problem is that people
should state clearly in their message header what they
are writing about. Then one can read only what one is
interested in and ignore the rest.
This is, of course, what Dave did in his
original post; the subject heading was "Japan and the Jews."
In fact, this is what people have done in general. So,
in my long winded and muddled way, I am saying that I
don't see that we actually have a problem here.
Best Wishes,
Keith Pardue
Kingston, Ontario, Canada
From: Jay Steiger/Forte <Jay_Steiger/Forte.FORTE@notes.san.fhi.com>
Date: 20 Mar 96 15:07:57 PS
Subject: Ethiopia
Regarding Dave's commentary on Ethiopian forces being "On the side of the
Angels" I'm not sure I would wholeheartedly endorse this. The Italian conquest
of Ethiopia was an act of aggression and bullying by a stronger (sort of)
nation against a weaker one. It was a shameful affair for the Italians and for
Europe as a whole for turning a blind eye to this land grab. Use of poison gas
and terror bombing (including bombing of hospitals) by the Italians were
examples of what war under the Fascists would be like. However, Ethiopia was
not a noted bastion of western law and order. David Clay Large's book <Between
Two Fires> paints a good picture of Ethiopian life prior to and during the
invasion. The Ethiopian Army was a shambles. Western instructors found the
soldiers brave but illiterate and unwilling to submit to conventional
discipline and military order. Everyone seemed to feel that it would be Adowa
all over again. They looked forward to cutting off <trophies> from their
defeated foes as had been done in 1896. When some Italians raised hands in
surrender during the invasion, they were disemboweled by the Ethiopian
soldiers. This was also a society which still practiced slavery, death by
torture for female infidelity, and regularly lopped off limbs for various
crimes. When, Selassie fled Addis Abbaba , Ethiopians ran a wave of terror,
murder, and riot in the city. Most of this was directed against whites who
then actually contacted General Badoglio and asked that his column hurry to
occupy the city and rescue them. Admittedly, Haile Selassie was interested in
reforming his country and <westernizing> it, but when the Italians invaded, he
had barely begun to crack the years of entrenched traditions which made
Ethiopia more like a kingdom of the Middle Ages than the modern world.
Again, in no way am I justifying the Italian invasion or their acts of terror
against Ethiopia. I think it was a despicable action and one which clearly
showed not only Anglo-French unwillingness to confront the evils of fascism,
but also the deep rascism still present in the west. My argument is against
deifying any opponent of fascist aggression. Stalin fought Hitler and
Mussolini and he certainly ranks as one of the biggest butchers of world
history.
That's All...
Jay Steiger
steigerj@notes.san.fhi.com
From: NASU002.USAP@iac.org.nz (Public Affairs Officer)
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 1996 12:07 GMT
Subject: The Fall of France goes on
Interesting posts on why France fell.
It seems to me that there was a combination of events...the wrong
people were in the wrong place at the wrong time. The French defenders of
the Ardennes were the very worst troops in the French army. The generals
leading the French, Gamelin, Georges, Billotte, all look pretty inept.
But they were in charge at the time. French armor was good, but poorly
deployed, trained and organized. French tactics were good, but in some
cases couldn't be used (one division assigned to hold the Meuse River
crossings couldn't find the keys to its strongpoints. So they had to
blast them open, which kind of reduces the value of the concrete).
A lot of French troops were demoralized before the battle started,
as various accounts point out, but a lot of French troops of excellent
quality never got into action or didn't until it was too late.
I think the real comment on France's preparedness for war was that
the day the Germans invaded France, both Gamelin and Reynaud had
resigned. France faced a battle for her life without a generalissimo at
the head of her armies or a prime minister at the head of the nation.
The big question is still: how does this play into Europa. Well, I
think the fall of France has to be gamed. If an Allied player is better
than a German player (and the German is cautious like me), France may not
fall. Assuming it does, the ramifications of the campaign are immense.
Does it take longer? Shorter? Does the BEF get away? With or without
equipment? Do Petain and Laval form Vichy France? Or does Reynaud fight
on from Algiers?
The great thing about Europa is that we have a highly detailed, and
well-crafted gaming shot at exploring all these opportunities. We can sit
there and see what would have happened if the French got their armor act
together, or how a squadron of Dewoitine 520s fares against Me 109s. We
can find out what would have happened if Reynaud had glared determinedly
across the Med at Hitler's legions.
I grant that it'll take a zillion counters to do "France does not
fall, so here are its 1945 armored divisions," which is probably a bit
much, but we have an opportunity here to see how the dynamics of all
these forces work when they come together. Without any damage to human
beings.
One thing...if the Free French of Second Front are blue, and the
French of 1940 are the same blue, and the Vichy French are blue, how do I
tell the Free French brigades from the Vichy French brigades when I
invade Syria? Civil wars are hard enough, you need some way to tell the
enemies apart.
David H. Lippman
Public Affairs Officer
US Naval Antarctic Support Unit
David H. Lippman
Public Affairs Officer
US Naval Antarctic Support Unit
Christchurch, New Zealand
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 20:51:39 -0500
From: Ray Kanarr <RayK@smtp4.aw.com>
Subject: Re:Ethiopia
<Read Jay's original>
Good post, Jay. Succinct, to the point, and with a citation! I think
that part of the interest of history is that, as they say, "The Truth
is out there." It just remains to be revealed, and this is an example
of that.
Ray
From: grd1@genie.com
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 96 00:36:00 UTC 0000
Subject: Re: GE and Russia
From: grd1@genie.com
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 96 00:37:00 UTC 0000
Subject: Unsubsribe
To whomever,
Please remove GRD1@GEnie.geis.com from this mailing list.
55 messages in one day is beyond my time limit.
Double quoting should be outlawed on the internet.
If there is someone who would like to forward the best 10% of the messages
to my address I will be glad to post them on GEnie.
On to the GRD WWW site at: http://www.grdgames.com
Alan Tibbetts
GRD GEnie Rep
From: WANDREW@aol.com
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 20:19:38 -0500
Subject: Re: Keeping On Topic (Not?!)
>I vote for "let 'er rip." Anything related to WW2, such as the Pacific, has
>at least interest and possible significance to Europa. Anyone find a post
>not to their interest can simply hit the DELETE key.
I agree with John on this. I've been overwhelmed with posts; but the delete
key works very well. I've also found a wealth of information in alternate
history books and other material.
However, I do think that some of the excessive quoting can be left out. Just
keep the gist of the post, the important stuff -- Please.
--Andy
From: Jeff White <jwhite@naybob.ghq.com>
Subject: Re: Europa unit ratings
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 19:17:45 -0600 (CST)
John M. Astell Said:
>
> >Jason:".... ground units are generally rated at their TO&E strengths,
> >with certain adjustments for especially plentiful replacements."
> >
> >Gary:"WHAT?!...."
> >
> >Ray: "And I always thought that they were rated on their average 'bayonet'
> >strength...."
>
> The TO&E is the starting point -- how many men, what equipment, how they're
> organized. This is an important starting point, but it's nowhere near the
> whole story. If it was, then the 1941 Soviet divisions would rate stronger
> than equivalent German divisions!
>
> Next, their proficiency is examined -- how well trained and led they are,
> how effective they are vis-a-vis other forces, etc.
>
> Finally, other factors are examined, such as how well they can stay at TO&E
> strength over time, etc.
>
> For example let's take a look at some 1944 infantry divisions: US, British,
> German. A Br inf div is the largest of the lot -- a US one has fewer men
> (to minimize the need to tie up shipping for "nonessential" men and
> equipment) and a German one has still fewer men (German is running out of
> militarily acceptable men by 1944). For div equipment, the Br div has the
> most lavish equipment (surprise!), followed by the US, and trailed by the
> Germans. On a firepower basis, however, the German div has the most -- the
> Germans were substituting firepower for manpower. (How come they have the
> least equipment then? They stinted on the non-weapons side, particularly
> transport.)
On the subject of OB, I was paging through some old Europa magazines,
and I came across the US OB for Europa in TEM #9. I noticed some
interesting differences.
The US AT battalions and tank battalions are separated from the AT brigades
and tank brigades. Plus the brigades were a point bigger. Were the
brigades cut (I think from the Stanton book they were separate units)
to reduce the counter count?
I also noticed the US Infantry divisions were all about 1 point bigger.
(ie 1st Inf XX is a 12-8). The tank divisions are also a point bigger.
Another point was that initial US engineer regiments were assault
engineers rather than the combat engineers they are now. A gentleman
I play with pointed out that they might be more like an
assault-combat-engineer (mix of all three engineering units).
>
> Typically, raw manpower gives you offensive ability (since in an advance
> you'll take casualties and need to have infantrymen left to hold the ground
> you capture), while raw firepower gives you defensive ability (since you
> can shoot up an enemy advance better). If these were the only factors
> considered, Br inf divs would rate higher than US, and Ger inf divs would
> have defense strengths greater than either.
>
> But, that's not the only thing going on. In general, German troops were
> better trained and better led that Br or US troops, for a variety of
> factors I haven't time to go into here. Between the Br and US, it is
> debateable which were trained and better led. The Br were perhaps slightly
> better trained and had a more professional officer corps, but the US seemed
> to be better at learning from actual combat experience and improvising.
> This leads to the Br divs being close to one another in ratings, while the
> US divs varied more (Regular Army divs were consistently better than
> National Guard divs, for example).
I remember reading in a Patton biography about the 90th Inf XX (7-8 Europa).
How it performed poorly, going through several commanders in a few months.
But improved substantially after some time, enough to be highly rated
by Patton. Any idea about upgrades?
In the same line of thinking, I recall reading how the US Army had
a tank battalion and AT battalion attached on a regular basis to
the European divisions. Perhaps the US could say, combine a
US Inf XX (say a 9-8), a truck, AT 1-2-10 AT II, and a 2-1-10 Tank II
to get something like a 12-10 Mech XX. Similar to the optional
British Mech XX (78th??).
>
> Finally, other factors are considered. A full strength German inf div may
> have more firepower than a US one, but after several weeks of combat, the
> Ger div is going to be at half strength (or worse), while the US one is
> still going to be at full strength -- even if it has suffered 100+%
> casualties in those weeks. (The US simply had the ability to keep its
> divisions at full strength, while the Germans didn't. This partly explains
> how the Allies won in Normandy: the US ground down the Ger divs in front of
> them until they broke through.) The British were running out of men, which
> led them to be more cautious than the US, with the result that Br troops
> tended to perform less aggressively (and hence advance more slowly) than US
> troops.
>
> All these factors were considered when rating Second Front units. This is
> why the best US inf divs outrate all others, followed by the British and
> other US, and trailed by the Germans.
>
>
Oh, and by the way, I'd like to thank you and all of the Europa
staff for giving me and my friends so much enjoyment. Thanks
for producing one of the coolest wargames around.
--
Jeff White, ARS N0POY
jwhite@ghq.com
"I am Pentium of Borg. Arithmetic is irrelevant. Prepare to be approximated."
From: NASU002.USAP@iac.org.nz (Public Affairs Officer)
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 1996 13:29 GMT
Subject: Re: Ethiopia
My saying that Ethiopia was on the side of the angels referred to
them as being the victims of a bloodthirsty act of shameful and violent
aggression, and unlike the Soviet Union in 1941, lacking the wherewithal
to fend it off. Ethiopia had all kinds of internal problems (which are
among the factors in its military and political weakness that made it a
ripe target for Mussolini), but it in no way deserved or earned its fate
at the hands of Mussolini.
David H. Lippman
Public Affairs Officer
US Naval Antarctic Support Unit
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 21:05:04 -0500
From: "James B. Byrne" <byrnejb@harte-lyne.ca>
Subject: Re: Volume
Rich Velay wrote:
>
> It also seems pointless, to me, to "cc:" stuff to people
> on the list; it just ends up as a dupe and gets deleted
> anyway. Most everything, except private mail, should just
> go to Lysator, period. Sending a post to Rich Velay, cc:
> Lysator just means I get two copies; why not just to
> Lysator?
>
When rebutting a previous post to a mailing list, it is considered proper to reply
directly to the poster and cc: the list. This is because most list generated
traffic is sent out with a lower priority than direct mail (think of it as bulk
versus first class) and mailing directly to the poster gives that person a chance
to respond in a timely fashion. Posting threaded responses solely to the list can
result in many intervening posts before the original correspondent gets a chance
to reply.
--
James B. Byrne mailto:byrnejb@harte-lyne.ca
Harte & Lyne Limited http://www.harte-lyne.ca
Hamilton, Ontario 905-561-1241
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 21:39:09 -0500
From: Nicholas Forte <nforte@osf1.gmu.edu>
Subject: Re: The Fall of France goes on
On Thu, 21 Mar 1996 12:07 GMT NASU002.USAP@iac.org.nz (Public Affairs Officer)
wrote:
> One thing...if the Free French of Second Front are blue, and the
>French of 1940 are the same blue, and the Vichy French are blue, how do I
>tell the Free French brigades from the Vichy French brigades when I
>invade Syria? Civil wars are hard enough, you need some way to tell the
>enemies apart.
What, don't you want the opportunity for a little friendly fire? ;)
Nick Forte
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 18:36:28 -0800
From: bstone@sub.sonic.net (Bill Stone)
Subject: Re: Keeping On Topic
>>I vote for "let 'er rip." Anything related to WW2, such as the Pacific, has
>>at least interest and possible significance to Europa. Anyone find a post
>>not to their interest can simply hit the DELETE key.
>
>I agree with John on this. I've been overwhelmed with posts; but the delete
>key works very well. I've also found a wealth of information in alternate
>history books and other material.
>
>However, I do think that some of the excessive quoting can be left out. Just
>keep the gist of the post, the important stuff -- Please.
Guess I'm out of step. I believe in "let 'er rip" and I also have no
problem with excessive quoting.
In fact, I think the two go hand in hand.
On high-traffic days when I'm busy and only skim a few messages, I'm likely
to miss a lot. The next day, I'm just as likely to have the time to read a
response to a thread I've previously skipped (sometimes I read according to
subject, sometimes according to contributor), at which point it's nice to
have a recap of the original message(s).
Just like it's easy to delete messages that I don't want to read, it's also
easy to scroll past blocks of quotation that I've already read.
Would also like to see more bibliographic references for some of the
assertions that get thrown out around here.
PS: Howdy to Mark "the Popofsky Maneuver" Popofksy.
----------------------------
Bill Stone
Santa Rosa, CA
bstone@sonic.net
World War II Web Site:
http://www.sonic.net/~bstone
----------------------------