Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 01:19:54 -36000
From: Jason Long <civguy@dusable.cps.k12.il.us>
Subject: Re: GE and Russia

I feel that Stalin would have attacked in 1942 no matter what the Germans 
were up to. Reportedly he even admitted a plan to do so in a speech to 
officer cadets.
There would have been drastic differences in the Soviet forces if they'd 
been permitted another year of production and training. Modelling them 
would require at least three or four countersheets. Maybe we can include 
them in GE, or perhaps a special module is inorder though I'd feel very 
uneasy about extending their OB into '43 and beyond.


Jason

Date: Tue, 19 Mar 1996 23:45:18 -0600
From: bdbryant@mail.utexas.edu (Bobby D. Bryant)
Subject: Re: Swedish ore.

Jason wrote:

>The Swedes greatly expanded the capacity of their North Baltic ports 
>during the war so that the damage inflicted on Narvik had little overall 
>effect on Swedish iron ore deliveries. ...

Now that I think on it, were the Swedes restricted to trade with or through
Germany and Finland after Barbarossa?

                                                - Bobby.

p.s. -- In my earlier book reference, the call number should have been
described as Dewey rather than Library of Congress.


Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 01:29:20 -36000
From: Jason Long <civguy@dusable.cps.k12.il.us>
Subject: Norway and Sweden

Alan,
I think that things would be very uncomfortable for the RAF in southern 
Norway for a year or so, but that the Germans would have little ability 
to seriously threaten to retake it. 
The precise course taken by the Swedes depend greatly on just how the Allies
get Southern Norway. If the Germans aren't doing so well (aka 
Stalingrad/El Alamein) and/or the Allies have built up serious numbers in 
Scandinavia then the Swedes will lean towards them, but not until.

Jason 

Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 01:34:18 -36000
From: Jason Long <civguy@dusable.cps.k12.il.us>
Subject: Re: Howling about Alan's post.

We sorta attempted to cover it in assigning replacement rates and the old 
repair roll, but that ratio of serviceable to total aircraft varied so 
much for day to day and by nation, theater, etc. that we just had to 
ignore it. After all ground units are generally rated at their TO&E 
strengths, with certain adjustments for especially plentiful replacements.

Jason

Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 00:43:27 -0600
From: bdbryant@mail.utexas.edu (Bobby D. Bryant)
Subject: Europa politics.

Jason said:

>There would have been drastic differences in the Soviet forces if they'd 
>been permitted another year of production and training. Modelling them 
>would require at least three or four countersheets. Maybe we can include 
>them in GE, or perhaps a special module is inorder though I'd feel very 
>uneasy about extending their OB into '43 and beyond.

This is what I was getting at in my first post on Europa politics, a week or
two ago.  It's not that I'm *against* politics in Europa, it's just that I
don't think a system with full options for the players is feasible.  I've
expressed several reasons for thinking so, but the first one was this OB
issue.  The OBs depended too much on the course of history, and guessing at
OBs as the situation gets farther from history first becomes speculative,
then becomes fiction (or at least a list of generic sort of units that is
far removed from the Europa we all love).

                                                - Bobby.


Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 00:33:46 -0600
From: bdbryant@mail.utexas.edu (Bobby D. Bryant)
Subject: Re: GE and Russia

Jason said:

>I feel that Stalin would have attacked in 1942 no matter what the Germans 
>were up to. Reportedly he even admitted a plan to do so in a speech to 
>officer cadets. ...

This might have been propaganda rather than plan: announcing it in a speech
is not very good pre-invasion security. Or, if the announcement came after
Barbarossa, all the more reason to view it as propaganda. (Note that I'm
*not* dismissing it as "mere propaganda", but rather raising the question.)


I had hoped to provoke discussion of a theory in an earlier post, so pardon
me if I repeat it:

If the phoney war stayed cool or evolved into a cold war, might Stalin not
have seen some advantage in prolonging this state of affairs? He couldn't
have felt much love for the Allies after their anti-Communist interventions
in Russia/USSR during the late teens and early twenties. How much better to
have your enemies at each others' throats rather than taking them on yourself!

Among other things, the Japanese were still viewed as a serious threat to
the USSR (witness all those reinforcements that show up after Japan goes to
war with the USA). Stalin might have wanted to avoid the risk of a two-front
war; the Japanese, so long as they had to allow for a war with the USSR,
might not have undertaken war against the USA. In the event, Hitler broke
the deadlock with Barbarossa, but if Hitler had been less ambitious the
deadlock might have remained indefinitely.

                                                        - Bobby.


Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 09:33:50 +0100
From: o-noreli@jmk.su.se (Elias Nordling)
Subject: Re: Second Front end game

>Stefan Farrelly Said:
>>
>> My brother and I have played many SF scenarios and weve never had a problem
>> with not enough Air RP's, despite in one game deliberatly trying to hit the
>> Axis air to see if we coould impact their RP's long term. No good.
>>
>> Consequently we think the Air RP's are too generous for all sides.
>
>As I recall (correct me if I'm wrong here), air replacements do not
>accumulate from one phase to the next.  We didn't catch this at first.
>This makes a big deal.  We did manage a couple of times to get the
>Krauts weak in air force with many months to recover.

I didn't miss this, the allies tried actively to take out the german
airforce, and their fighter force STILL remained intact.

On a related issue, has anybody ever run out of resource points in this
game? Keeping track of the amount of them for the Allies is a complete
waste of time. As for the axis, I used all but a few construction units
(some were repairing rail in France) in resource-spending activities, and I
boosted my rail capacity almost every turn, and I just kept getting more
and more of those RPs...

Mvh Elias Nordling
o-noreli@jmk.su.se



Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 09:49:38 +0100
From: o-noreli@jmk.su.se (Elias Nordling)
Subject: Re: SF Game report

>Rich Velay Said:
>>
>>     Hi Jeff.
>>          I was interested in your game report.  I have a
>> couple of questions though...
>>
>> >>The Brits fried the Achen sector then proceeded
>> >>to overrun a 4-6-6 Inf XX in a major city hex (figure out
>> >>that stack....)

Um, this is turning into a rules question. Don't you take into
consideration the terrain effects when overrunning?

Mvh Elias Nordling
o-noreli@jmk.su.se



Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 10:13:43 +0100
From: o-noreli@jmk.su.se (Elias Nordling)
Subject: Re: Swedish ore.

>Jason wrote:
>
>>The Swedes greatly expanded the capacity of their North Baltic ports
>>during the war so that the damage inflicted on Narvik had little overall
>>effect on Swedish iron ore deliveries. ...
>
>Now that I think on it, were the Swedes restricted to trade with or through
>Germany and Finland after Barbarossa?

Yes. And to that, I could add that after the winter war, Swedish trade with
the Soviets were very unlikely. So Sweden was actually more or less limited
to trading with Germany from April 40 and on. As an example, Sweden bought
airplanes from neutral USA in 41 (I think). These had to be shipped through
the finnish arctic port of Petsamo! Then the US confiscated the remaining
Swedish fighters and sent them to the Philippines (with manuals in
Swedish). I think this was the only case of Swedish trade through Petsamo.
Also a number of Swedish ships was negotiated through the german blockade
of the baltic, but only to deliver basic supplies.

Mvh Elias Nordling
o-noreli@jmk.su.se



Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 10:57:08 +0100
From: o-noreli@jmk.su.se (Elias Nordling)
Subject: Re: Narvik (Was: Re: The Fall of France (to be or not to be))

>> The control of Narvik could possibly have allowed the allies to outbid the
>> Germans for the Kiruna-ore (since transports would have been more expensive
>> to Germany, during winters, at least). But then, there's a strong
>> possibility that the Swedes would have reacted so strongly to an allied
>> invasion of Norway that they would have refused to sell the ore to them.
>> This may sound strange. After all, they were selling the ore to the Germans
>> after they had invaded Norway. But then, Sweden was in no position to
>> react. And, in 39-40, Sweden was by no means pro-allied.

>Actually I'm thinking more in the 1942-43 period. I'll tentatively agree
>that the retention of Narvik does little to persuade the Swedes not to
>sell to the Germans since the Germans are still in position to invade
>Sweden through southern Norway. If the Allies can remove that threat by
>evicting the Germans then the Swedes have little choice but to sell to
>the Allies and there's not much the Germans can do about it. And that
>could be decisive.

You sound like you think that the Swedes would have preferred to send the
ore to the allies if they could. I'm not so sure about this. As I said, the
Swedish population, if not the government, was fairly pro-German at the
beginning of the war. The sympathies for Germany waned considerably with
the invaion of Norway and Denmark, then went up again with Barbarossa. By
1943, however, Sweden was quite tired of being pushed around by Germany.

Mvh Elias Nordling
o-noreli@jmk.su.se



Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 11:14:25 +0100
From: o-noreli@jmk.su.se (Elias Nordling)
Subject: Re: The Fall of France (to be or not to be)

>     There is an interesting point I've never heard anyone bring up
>before.  There is a rail line in Sweden that runs from the area of the
>Iron ore fields down toward the Baltic.  I can't remember if it is on the
>Europa maps.  I looked into the situation some years ago since I wondered
>if the Allies took or shut off Narvik, but did not actually violate
>Swedish territory, could the Germans still get their ore over this line.
>     I could come up with no definitive answer.  I didn't know if the
>rail line ran all year?  Or if the Baltic freezing up could keep that
>line from being effective?
>     Perhaps one of our Swedish Europa people can shed some light on this.

Yes. Perhaps you've noticed I've been quite active in this thread ;-)

The rail line between Kiruna and Lulea could be used just as easily for ore
transport. Lulea freezes in the winter, however, so that would be a problem
(though hardly insurmountable).

And, as I've pointed out in earlier posts, the really important ore-mines
aren't located in the Kiruna area at all, but in central Sweden (along the
center-axis of Sweden, a few hexes north of Stockholm). This ore was
definitely not transported through Narvik, nor was it within reach for the
allies with less than a downright invasion of Sweden and Norway.

Mvh Elias Nordling
o-noreli@jmk.su.se



From: Roberth Lundin <rln@bull.se>
Subject: RE: Narvik & Iron Ore
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 11:39:00 +-100

> >First, contrary to popular belief, Narvik wasn't that all important =
to the
> >mines in the Kiruna area. The ore could be shipped just as easily =
from
> >Lulea. Lulea freezes, but the ore trains could have taken the long =
trip to
> >Gothenburg during winter. It would have been more expensive, but it=20
> > could have been done.
>=20
> Sure, it could have and probably would have been done as an expedient.
> However, doing this would have disrupted Sweden's rail system, tying =
up
> capacity and track time for the ore trains from the north. By itself, =
this
> would have disrupted the Swedish economy, so the Swedes would have=20
> been reluctant to allow this without compensation from the Germans.=20

This is not true at all.=20

> Thus, loss of Narvik would have meant delays and higher costs to the=20
> Germans -- not crippling, but burdensome nonetheless. Also, the Allies =

> goal was not just the capture of Narvik, see next comment...

Speculations. Se facts later on.=20

> >So, if Narvik was occupied by the allies, the Germans would be denied =

> > The less-important half of the Swedish ore for a third of the year =
until
> >alternative transportation routes had been worked out, which wouldn't =

> > have taken long. Talk of an inefficient blockade!

> The Allies goal was not just to invade Norway and take Narvik, but to
> invade Sweden and seize the iron ore mines. Presumably an outraged=20
> Sweden would allow a German expeditionary force to help force out the=20
> Allies, and presumably the Allies would wreck the mines as much as=20
> they could before they withdrew. Narvik in this context is a =
convenient=20
> port of entry to reach the mines.

Narvik was important for Allies. Quite true. But i think both parties =
overestimated=20
the importans of Kiruna and Narvik.


Here are the facts:

German Supply of Iron Ore 1936/1938 - 1944 in 1000 ton fe:
------------------------------------------------------------
Year    Own production              Import             Total
        -------------------------   ------------------
        From      Other Reich+      From     Other   =20
        Altreich  Einflussgebiete   Sweden   Import
------------------------------------------------------------
1936/38   2793         -             5265     4085     12142
1939      3928        853            6226     4092     15099
1940      5019       2354            5339      666     13378
1941      4755       8624            5027      298     18704
1942      4137       9005            4205      806     18153
1943      4080      10338            5568      264     20250
1944      2636       5633            2628       83     10980

The next table is most intresting, look at Oxel=F6sund and vhere it is =
placed in Sweden:

Ironore shipment from Sweden in precent:
---------------------------------------------------------
Year    Narvik   Lule=E5   Oxel=F6sund  Other Harbours
---------------------------------------------------------
1936/38   53       22       16       9
1939      44       27       18      11
1940      13       53       17      17
1941       8       49       22      21
1942      13       43       21      23
1943      19       43       20      18
1944      24       31       22      23

If you look at these number, you se that Narvik is not very important.
Kiruna Ore is not that important either.

		Robbox



From: Roberth Lundin <rln@bull.se>
Subject: RE: Narvik & Iron Ore
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 11:42:55 +-100

> >The Allies goal was not just to invade Norway and take Narvik, but to
> >invade Sweden and seize the iron ore mines. Presumably an outraged 
> > Sweden would allow a German expeditionary force to help force out the 
> > Allies, and presumably the Allies would wreck the mines as much as they 
> > could before they withdrew. Narvik in this context is a convenient port of 
> > entry to reach the mines.

> Is Sweden the only source of the ore in Eurasia?  Could the Germans not have
> gotten it from the USSR so long as they maintained a pact?  Would the Allies
> have to blockade the still-neutral Italy and the Balkan nations to ensure
> that Germany did not get ore through a middle man?

The Ore Sweden do export is of a very good quality. And if you are using the German
Ore of from conquered areas you would have to expend more Coal to produce the
same amount of Steel.

Germans favoured the Swedish ore because of this. And a reasons for this they
could export Coal to Sweden in payment for Ore.

		Robbox


                                                        - Bobby.





From: Roberth Lundin <rln@bull.se>
Subject: RE: Narvik (Was: Re: The Fall of France (to be or not to be))
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 13:19:28 +-100

> The Swedes greatly expanded the capacity of their North Baltic ports=20
> during the war so that the damage inflicted on Narvik had little =
overall=20
> effect on Swedish iron ore deliveries. So far as I've been able to=20
> determine the southern ports don't seem to have been used much in the=20
> iron ore traffic. Perhaps a lack of the proper type of handling=20
> equipment? I don't know. There alos seems to be a shortage of RR cars =
to=20
> carry the ore itself so that the Swedes couldn't move the same =
tonnages=20
> over a longer distance.=20

Sweden loaned Germany 500 freight cars for making the transport in =
Germany of
Swedish Coal and such a more effective. You cant say that you are low on
transport capacity if you are able to do that.

> Actually I'm thinking more in the 1942-43 period. I'll tentatively =
agree=20
> that the retention of Narvik does little to persuade the Swedes not to =

> sell to the Germans since the Germans are still in position to invade=20
> Sweden through southern Norway. If the Allies can remove that threat =
by=20
> evicting the Germans then the Swedes have little choice but to sell to =

> the Allies and there's not much the Germans can do about it. And that=20
> could be decisive.
>
>Jason
>PS I have tonnage figures for the ports by year and I'll try to post =
them=20
>early next week when I come back on line.

You will see that if that Narvik about 20%, Lule=E5 about 40%, and =
Oxel=F6sund
about 20% and other harbours about 20%.

This makes your reasoning not correct. Narvik is not very important for =
Swedish
purposes of exporting to Germany. And Bergslagen is more important than =
have
popped up to far in the debate.

		Robbox




From: Roberth Lundin <rln@bull.se>
Subject: RE: The Fall of France (to be or not to be)
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 13:36:51 +-100

> There is an interesting point I've never heard anyone bring up=20
> before.  There is a rail line in Sweden that runs from the area of the =

> Iron ore fields down toward the Baltic.  I can't remember if it is on =
the=20
> Europa maps.  I looked into the situation some years ago since I =
wondered=20
> if the Allies took or shut off Narvik, but did not actually violate=20
> Swedish territory, could the Germans still get their ore over this =
line.
>      I could come up with no definitive answer.  I didn't know if the=20
> rail line ran all year?  Or if the Baltic freezing up could keep that=20
> line from being effective?
> Perhaps one of our Swedish Europa people can shed some light on this.

There are rail line from Lule=E5 to Kiruna and further on to Narvik. =
There goes a=20
railline along the coast. Electrified!!!!!!!!!!!!. ALL year around.=20

There are a complaint when the Volountear Brigade in Finland, when it =
switched
places with some Finnish battalions. That when the temperatur went down =
to -47
degrees Celsius, the problem was not to get the Trains moving, but to =
load
full amount of cargo, because the Rails was cracking of the cold and =
pressure of=20
the train!!!!!!

I dont know way everybody complains that winter, and so on. Its a =
naturall part
of our climate, and it usally only shows that there some delays the =
first few days
when the first snow falls. But else everything should be on time. Why =
would
any snow be of any problem, except at Severe snowstorms? You have a =
timetable
for Summer part and one for Winter part of the year, and delays should =
not occour.

		Robbox


From: Roberth Lundin <rln@bull.se>
Subject: RE: Swedish ore.
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 13:48:52 +-100

> Now that I think on it, were the Swedes restricted to trade with or through
> Germany and Finland after Barbarossa?
>
>                                               - Bobby.
>
> p.s. -- In my earlier book reference, the call number should have been
> described as Dewey rather than Library of Congress.


Well both Germany and Allied did mine the Skagerak. But Swedish diplomats
did manage to make deals with both parties, to let boats through. Here is the 
numbers during the war:

Swedens trade through Skagerak-blockade 1941-1945
----------------------------------------------------------
                              1941  1942  1943  1944  1945
----------------------------------------------------------
Number of ships out             32    59    47    79    17
Number of ships in              35    62    44    78     6
Imported goods in 1000 ton     206   426   346   528   108
               in milj SEK     222   347   350   500     -
Exported goods in 1000 ton     128   196   150   277    30
               in milj SEK     115   158   125   240     -
----------------------------------------------------------

This trade made int possible togheter with Swedens own resources to
survive and produce almost all of its own war matriell and get the society
to go on and working. Most of what was imported was very essential 
missing goods.

And remember that both sides had to agree on this trade. Political
miracle?

			Robbox



Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 08:42:52 -0500
From: mpitcava@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu (Mark Pitcavage)
Subject: Keeping On Topic

>     I got asked, and I forget who by, about the book "Desperate 
>Voyagers" on the Japanese and the Jews in WW2.
>
>     The authors are Marvin Tokayer and Mary Swartz, it was also entitled 
>"the Fugu Plan," and was published in 1979 by Dell Press in paperback.


Because this list is rapidly growing very unwieldy and does not contain a
digest option, I would hope that in the future subscribers will be more
careful to limit posts to Europa subjects.

Thanks very much.

Dr. Mark Pitcavage                
mpitcava@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu      
http://www.greyware.com/authors/pitman


From: "Mark Popofsky, ATR, 514-3764" <popofsms@justice.usdoj.gov>
Subject: noneuropa topics
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 9:24:55 -0500 (EST)

Mark Pitcavage writes that he would appreciate keeping traffic 
on this list concerned solely with Europa.

I strongly disagree.  I am interested in Europa, and have been 
since age 12, primarily becuase of my interest in history 
in general and military history in particular.  Getting the 
occassional book recommendation is well worth wading through the 
material, I think.

If the problem is excess traffic, perhaps subscribers could try 
to send only one E-mail a day, or keep remarks concise.

Mark Popofsky
Washington, D.C.


Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 07:00:01 -0800
From: Renaud.Gary@corona.navy.mil (Renaud.Gary)
Subject: Peaceful Russia

Jason:

"There would have been drastic differences in the Soviet forces if they'd 
been permitted another year of production and training. Modelling them 
would require at least three or four countersheets."

Would it?

It seems to me that if they hadn't been attacked, the Russians wouldn't 
have done all that much with their mismanaged economy and semi-hostile 
population.  I don't claim to be an expert, but I rather doubt they would 
have had anywhere near the the production totals that they achieved in war 
time.  I suppose you must balance that against the chaos of the invasion 
and the loss of all those factories. 

Since this is a low-probability scenario, maybe we shouldn't expect it to 
be as accurate as the historical ones.  You can't research an OB that 
didn't exist, after all.  

Maybe just say they can (eventually) flip over all those Tank XX cadres and 
upgrade their 3-6s into 4-6s, or something.  I mean, if you take the 1941 
army, fix those up, and deploy it rationally, it looks pretty fierce.

I don't know about adding a whole slew of additional countersheets.  I have 
no problem with paying $100 for a game, considering how much I'll get out 
of it, but a lot of people will be turned off by the sticker shock. 

Maybe a 2-tier system?  GE with just the constituant component games, and 
GE with all the extra counters and stuff?

                 A                Renaud.Gary@Corona.Navy.Mil
This graphic is  |\                    CompuServe: 73627,1114  
a LOT smaller    | \      _,,,---,,__        Genie: G.Renaud1
than a PGP key   /,`.-'`'    -.  ;-;,---__    W: 909-273-5378
block          __|,4-  ) )-,_. ,\ (  `'==--'  H: 714-750-9243 
              `-----''(_/--'  `-'\_)    
DNRC Holder of Past Knowledge           
I CAN'T speak for this administration; I tell the truth.

Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 07:04:41 -0800
From: Renaud.Gary@corona.navy.mil (Renaud.Gary)
Subject: Europa unit ratings

Jason:

"After all ground units are generally rated at their TO&E strengths, with 
certain adjustments for especially plentiful replacements."

WHAT?!

So a unit which was chronically understrength would be rated at its TO&E (or 
cadre)?  I always thought the reason the US units were rated so highly was that 
they were always up to strenght (and then some...), while everyone else was 
always somewhat down.  

I guess it shows how little I know...

                 A                Renaud.Gary@Corona.Navy.Mil
This graphic is  |\                    CompuServe: 73627,1114  
a LOT smaller    | \      _,,,---,,__        Genie: G.Renaud1
than a PGP key   /,`.-'`'    -.  ;-;,---__    W: 909-273-5378
block          __|,4-  ) )-,_. ,\ (  `'==--'  H: 714-750-9243 
              `-----''(_/--'  `-'\_)    
DNRC Holder of Past Knowledge           
I CAN'T speak for this administration; I tell the truth.

Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 10:38:24 -0500
From: "James B. Byrne" <byrnejb@harte-lyne.ca>
Subject: Re: noneuropa topics

I would vote for less quoting.  I find that the flow of the 
discussion is not well served by the amount of quoting that goes 
on.  And yes, I'll admit that I'm guilty of it as well.  If you 
have to quote do a little editing and just show the key phrase 
or two.

What is particularily wasteful is to have a two page letter 
quoted only to have one or two tag lines added at the end.  Let 
us just say that 'silence is assent' and leave it at that. 
-- 
James B. Byrne			mailto:byrnejb@harte-lyne.ca
Harte & Lyne Limited		http://www.harte-lyne.ca
Hamilton, Ontario		905-561-1241

Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 09:33:16 -0600 (CST)
From: David Holmes <David.Holmes@dlep1.itg.ti.com>
Subject: Non-Europa topics

I agree with Dr. Pitcavage.  Although history is certainly of interest to
subscribers, this list is for Europa, not history.

David Holmes


Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 10:55:52 -0400
From: jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell)
Subject: Re: GE and Russia

On 20 March 96, Jason Long wrote:

>I feel that Stalin would have attacked in 1942 no matter what the Germans
>were up to. Reportedly he even admitted a plan to do so in a speech to
>officer cadets.

Yeah, and Stalin never lied, either, right? Stalin would tell his audience
what suited him, and he certainly wanted the Soviet military to be ready to
fight Germany. Aside from that, Stalin was an opportunist militarily and
wasn't going to go to war with Germany on principle. Had Germany screwed
up, look for the Red Army to march west, but in the meantime it is as
likely that Stalin would sit tight as not. Don't forget, Hitler is the one
man that Stalin thinks (wrongly) he understands, because their positions
were so similar. The evidence points to the fact that Stalin thought Hitler
would do what Stalin himself would have done -- not attack someone who you
know you can do business with (the Nazi-Soviet Pact was a good deal for
both sides up to June 1941), and Stalin had a hell of shock when Hitler
invaded.

Also, a lot of the "we'll get Germany in 1942" business seems to be
propaganda churned out by the Soviets after the war, to obscure the fact,
in hindsight, of how guillable the USSR was in 1939-41. Believe it at your
own risk,




Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 10:55:46 -0400
From: jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell)
Subject: Re: GE and Russia

>I feel that Stalin would have attacked in 1942 no matter what the Germans
>were up to. Reportedly he even admitted a plan to do so in a speech to
>officer cadets.
>There would have been drastic differences in the Soviet forces if they'd
>been permitted another year of production and training. Modelling them
>would require at least three or four countersheets. Maybe we can include
>them in GE, or perhaps a special module is inorder though I'd feel very
>uneasy about extending their OB into '43 and beyond.
>
>
>Jason



Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 10:55:41 -0400
From: jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell)
Subject: Re: The Fall of France (to be or not to be)

>     There is an interesting point I've never heard anyone bring up
>before.  There is a rail line in Sweden that runs from the area of the
>Iron ore fields down toward the Baltic.  I can't remember if it is on the
>Europa maps.  I looked into the situation some years ago since I wondered
>if the Allies took or shut off Narvik, but did not actually violate
>Swedish territory, could the Germans still get their ore over this line.

The rail line runs down to Lulea, and, yes, it is on the E-map of Sweden.
When the Baltic wasn't frozen, the ore trains would run to Lulea, where the
ore would be loaded on ships and sent to Germany. I presume this was one
for one or more of the following factors: 1) the shipping distance is less
via the Baltic, 2) fees paid to Norway (if any) for the passage of the ore
through Narvik would be avoided, 3) the Baltic is usually calmer (hence
safer) than the North Sea.




Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 10:55:59 -0400
From: jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell)
Subject: Re: Keeping On Topic (Not?!)

>>     I got asked, and I forget who by, about the book "Desperate
>>Voyagers" on the Japanese and the Jews in WW2.
>>
>>     The authors are Marvin Tokayer and Mary Swartz, it was also entitled
>>"the Fugu Plan," and was published in 1979 by Dell Press in paperback.
>
>
>Because this list is rapidly growing very unwieldy and does not contain a
>digest option, I would hope that in the future subscribers will be more
>careful to limit posts to Europa subjects.

I vote for "let 'er rip." Anything related to WW2, such as the Pacific, has
at least interest and possible significance to Europa. Anyone find a post
not to their interest can simply hit the DELETE key.





Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 10:56:04 -0400
From: jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell)
Subject: RE: Narvik & Iron Ore

>Narvik was important for Allies. Quite true. But i think both parties
>overestimated
>the importans of Kiruna and Narvik.
>Here are the facts:
>
>German Supply of Iron Ore 1936/1938 - 1944 in 1000 ton fe:
>------------------------------------------------------------
>Year    Own production              Import             Total
>        -------------------------   ------------------
>        From      Other Reich+      From     Other
>        Altreich  Einflussgebiete   Sweden   Import
>------------------------------------------------------------
>1936/38   2793         -             5265     4085     12142
>1939      3928        853            6226     4092     15099
>1940      5019       2354            5339      666     13378
>1941      4755       8624            5027      298     18704
>1942      4137       9005            4205      806     18153
>1943      4080      10338            5568      264     20250
>1944      2636       5633            2628       83     10980

Actually, it looks like Swedish iron ore is very important, comprising
about a third of Germany's iron ore in 1939-40. Losing this would have had
serious consequences for the German economy and war effort. Certain the
British and French believed this -- as I remember, the British in 1940
thought that depriving Germany of the Swedish ore would have cripple the
German economy within 6 months. Now, Germany could have imposed heavy iron
rationing (essential war production only) and sought other sources (the
USSR), but they certainly would have a crisis on their hands at a minimum.

After 1940, the Germans have overrun and appropriate other countries' iron
ore mines, so the importance of Swedish ore goes down. Even still, it's
about a quarter of the total, still significant.



Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 12:22:34 -0500
From: Ray Kanarr <RayK@smtp4.aw.com>
Subject:  Re: Howling about Alan's post.

Here again, I must say:

This looks like a job for: <pregnant pause> Computerized Europa.

The fact is that the air war, outside of direct battlefield support
[which does include things like Operations Overlord and Cobra], is
primarily attritional warfare geared toward economic/morale ends
[that's the whole point of "terror bombing", although one nation's
gangster attacks is another's economic warfare].

If the German fighter arm attrits Bomber Command sufficiently, the
bombing stops. If 8th AF bombs the synthetic fuel plants
sufficiently, the German war machine stops [well, maybe not stops,
but slows to a crawl]. Even most air/sea interaction is attritional
in nature, geared towards furthering other ends.

Additionally, the air war [like the sea war] is very complex. As
noted in Alan's most recent post, 

>Except that it is not the TO&E but the number of aircraft 
>actually  operational that counts.

I've always thought that there must be some sort of fudge factor in
Europa to reconcile operational strengths with TO&E strengths. There
are any number of factors like this that can be programmed in, to
generate anything from actual combats to just a generic number of
TBFs/SBFs that could then be applied as each side chooses. This would
create available resources within historic parameters which might,
dependent on the programming effort, be made somewhat adjustable for
the 'what if' crowd, and could also encorporate the
economic/production aspects, which are more closely tied to this area
than to actual ground combat.

Sortie rates, operational strengths, ACTUAL bomb loads available at
various ranges, available pilot and training levels, all theses
statistics are available, I believe even for the Germans [who tried
their best to destroy as much of the Luftwaffe records as possible at
the end of the war].

Anyhow, the point is that, for the air war and the naval war, their
interactions, and their connection with the necessary
economic/production portions of GE,computerization of these aspects
could allow those primarily interested in the ground combat to push
on, and just grind out raw numbers of factors to be added, while
providing the option of some level of chrome for those of other
persuasions.

Ray


Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 12:34:36 -0500
From: Ray Kanarr <RayK@smtp4.aw.com>
Subject:  Re: noneuropa topics

On 3/20/96, Mark Popofsky wrote:

>Mark Pitcavage writes that he would appreciate keeping 
>traffic  on this list concerned solely with Europa.
>I strongly disagree.  I am interested in Europa, and have 
>been  since age 12, primarily becuase of my interest in 
>history  in general and military history in particular.

Glad to see another old Europa hand on this list. Welcome Mark P.

The list has grown tremendously since the publication of the address
in TEM. I think that it is in everone's best interest to stay to
topic as much as possible. Citations when giving out info for Europa
purposes is a positive action. I'm not sure how information on the
Japanese treatment of Jews is related to Europa, unless someone is
doing a slave labor subroutine to the Nazi economy, which would
certainly generate  a LOT of mail on this list.

I wade through an awful lot of junk on the WW II List to get book
recommendations and such, which I think is a better forum for that
than this list is. I no longer have the subscription info for the WW
II List, but if you shout to the list owner, Joe Barone, at

<WWII-L@UBVM.CC.BUFFALO.EDU>

he'll give you the info.

Ray


From: Jay Steiger/Forte <Jay_Steiger/Forte.FORTE@notes.san.fhi.com>
Date: 20 Mar 96  8:43:17 PS
Subject: And Why Not?

In response to Mark's request to keep postings restricted to Europa.  I most 
strongly disagree with this.  I will agree that topics largely outside the 
scope of Europa, Glory, and The Great War, should be best kept to a minimum, as 
this is (after all) supposed to be focused on the world according to Europa.  
However, within those boundaries a little extra historical spice improves the 
flavor greatly.  I'm sorry, but I just can't get into hair splitting over the 
finer points of rules (I guess that places me in the RAW camp).  I do think 
that those with rules questions or suggestions should continue to post as often 
as they want.  This is ultimately how the rules structure for Europa becomes 
better and stronger.  For those of us who just aren't concerned with taking our 
JD in rules law, some give and take of the history behind the conflict is quite 
rewarding.  Europa is not just about rule 10.2, it's about World War II.  This 
war is one of the greatest events of world history and it is composed of 
countless facets of historical fact (and some of fiction too!).  History comes 
alive through these stories and for me at least, it makes the games that much 
more interesting.  There is plenty of room for rules postings and history 
postings in Europa.

My humble opinion.

Jay Steiger
San Diego, CA


Date: Wed, 20 Mar 1996 13:32:36 -0500
From: Ray Kanarr <RayK@smtp4.aw.com>
Subject:  Re:Europa unit ratings

Jason:"After all ground units are generally rated at their TO&E
strengths, with  certain adjustments for especially plentiful
replacements."

Gary:"WHAT?! So a unit which was chronically understrength would be
rated at its TO&E (or  cadre)?"

And I always thought that they were rated on their average 'bayonet'
strength. Any help here, John?

Ray