Date: Mon, 18 Mar 1996 12:29:18 -0600
From: conrad alan b <abcclibr@ux1.cso.uiuc.edu>
Subject: Re: East Africa
On 15 Mar 1996, Jay Steiger/Forte wrote:
> Greetings all,
>
> With the release of WitD drawing ever nearer, I would like to re-open a
> persistant can of Europaworms. This is the question of Europa East Africa
> (also known as Africa Orientale). I am very much interested in seeing an
> expansion game for WitD which will include this theater of operations (after
> all we are going to get most, if not all of the forces needed in WitD). I
> would be curious as to hearing what the level of interest among other Europa
> players is. Additionally, I have heard rumors that this game may emerge as a
> game covering the Italian invasion of Ethiopia with expansion rules for the
> African campaigns during WWII (kinda like Spanish Torch in FWTBT). I think
> this would be a great idea (but then again, I'm one of the crazies who wants
> Naval Europa, Strat Air, PioT, Glory, The Great War...). Commentary from the
> masses? Also, anybody want to weigh in with scale and linkage opinions. My
> view is change the scale back to 16mi/hex and expand maps to link up with WitD.
>
> Jay Steiger
>
My two cents: everyone will be drawing lines in different places as
to what they want for GE/Europa. As for me, I would draw my line with
Ethiopia left out. Too much size, time, effort, for too little effect on
the war.
On the other hand I also would have drawn my line leaving out the
Spanish Civil War also. And I am in favor, to an extent, on expanded
air/naval, but particularly production systems for GE.
Alan Conrad
Date: Mon, 18 Mar 1996 14:29:51 -0400
From: jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell)
Subject: Re: Gas Warfare
>Tony LeTissier, in his latest book, *Zhukov on the Oder* notes on p.
>17 that: "1st Byelorussian Front had a chemical warfare bn equipped
>with poison gas with them in the field".
>
>Unfortunately, he does not list this in his otherwise excellent
>citations. It does point out, however, that the Soviets [at least;
>the accident at Bari shows that the Allies had gas in-theatre, though
>not 'in the field'] were prepared to use gas, probably in retaliation
>for any Axis first-use.
Every major belligerent was prepared to defend against gas attacks, and
almost every major belligerent had the capability to make gas attacks.
Reportedly, the US actually used gas once -- by mistake, on a small scale,
and against a Canadian unit! The RAF had gas bombs and was very keen to
drop them on German cities. I belive the RAF brass urged Britain to
retaliate with gas for the the V weapons attack on Britain. Fortunately,
cooler heads prevailed, and the western Allies stuck to their "no first
use" policy.
Date: Mon, 18 Mar 1996 15:28:00 -0500
From: Ray Kanarr <RayK@smtp4.aw.com>
Subject: Re: The Fall of France (to be or not to be)
Without recapitulating all of the points made by Alan, Perry, Nick and
others, and there are a number of good ones, I would just like to
raise the issues of morale and professional competence on the
operational level.
On the issue of morale, there was:
1) Significant resistance to the war in the first place, both from
people who remembered the bloodbaths of 1914-1918 and from the
Popular Front, where German-Soviet detente made a war with Germany
less palatable.
2) The period of the Phony War [9/39-4/40] was used to good effect on
the part of German propagandists, directed primarily at the French.
3) Training of line troops was, in many cases, geared to positional
warfare, with a lack of training in mobile warfare from a defensive
stand point. Sure the 'checkerboard' defense existed, so did a plan
to put torpedo nets around the capital ships at Pearl, so what! Such
plans were not implemented until the 3rd week of battle, long after
there was any real hope of successful implementation.
This point also speaks to the competence of the operational level
officers. Implementation of plans during the Fall of France campaign
was chaotic at best, leadership on all levels, while not lacking
elan, was dunderheaded overall, and the ability to adjust from
set-piece plans to the realities of the battle practically
non-existent. This was as true for the French AF as it was for the
army.
I also don't think that having 2 to 2.5 times as many slow,
short-range tanks as a more maneuverable enemy is any advantage; nor
is having a huge AF if you haven't got the experienced pilots and
sufficient ground resources for it, as the Germans discover in 1945.
Overall, I believe that the French in FoF already have too many
ahistorical advantages and that [based on training/
morale/leadership deficiencies], all metropolitan ground units should
be down one point for attack/defense/
movement as well as all air, or there should be much stricter idiot
rules for the idiotic handling of French operational forces.
Ray
from current levels.
Date: Mon, 18 Mar 1996 15:23:22 -0500
From: "James B. Byrne" <byrnejb@harte-lyne.ca>
Subject: Re: Who is the player
Steve wrote:
> 2. Develop ground to air missiles
> What's so radical about that? It would merely be a more
> effective anti-aircraft battery. You'd still have to
Actually I read somewhere, and no I can't remember where,
that Albert Speer regretted not backing the wasserfell
(sp?) project. This was the development of a high
altitude, wire or radio guided SAM with a tv or ir sensor
in the nose. The ground station steered the weapon into a
bomber. It also had a command detonation capablity.
Apparently the A1 and A2 projects got the funding instead.
AH's bomber mentality again I guess.
>>
I see this kind of protest from the Europa gamer who I
> don't understand. That likes to play the game as a kind
> of exercise in mathematical prowess-playing the exact
> same scenarios ... , then why would you even be
> interested in discussing Grand Europa? Why not just
> link all the battles together and play them sequentially
> - predicting all the outcomes ahead of time. This idea
> of 'simulation' is mere 're-creation'. I can see clearly
> that this is exactly what many are hoping for ... What
> this amounts to is a sort of Marxist historical
> determinism - it was all fated to happen. And what I
> hope comes out of this dialectic is a Grand Europa that
> the determinists can play on their own in their own
> redundant fashion, while the experimental players can
> play out WW2 on its own terms.
>>
HEAR! HEAR! This is precisely the root of my concerns with
the discussion about GE. If I am going to invest the
amount of time that this thing is going to take, even if
only as a intellectual exercise, I want to see what were
the considerations that went into making a decision in the
context of WWII in Europe. I don't expect any earth
shattering insites, but I don't what to be caught in a
paper version of 'Groundhog Day' either.
I also feel that the ongoing argument over the 'role of the
player(s)' in GE is spurious. If the players have a role
that can be defined at all it is more nearly that of
computer than human. We are providing all of the inputs
and exercising the program (game rules) to determine the
outputs, which are then feed back into the system for the
next cycle. We have to accept that we, the players are de
facto providing national, economic, diplomatic and military
leadership for the country / alliance that we happen to be
playing. There is no escaping from this simple truth.
Given that, we should be looking for ways to encourage the
player to make decisions in a manner sympathetic with those
made during the actual events. My personal opinion on this
is that the rules of the game should reflect the costs and
benefits of making certain decisions without mandating that
the decison be made one way or the other. I am sure that
as a group we have the resources and ability to define
simple and elegent rules for national behavior which would
reflect the substance of the limitations facing WWII
military and political leadershp.
--
James B. Byrne
mailto:byrnejb@harte-lyne.ca
Harte & Lyne Limited http://www.harte-lyne.ca
Hamilton, Ontario 905-561-1241
Date: Mon, 18 Mar 96 15:24:31 EST
From: "Frank E. Watson" <FEWatson@LANMAIL.RMC.COM>
Subject: Re: Stacking
> I've recently had the pleasure of setting up and
> tinkering with Frank Watson's latest scenario,
> and I'd like to comment on an issue that it highlights
> very clearly: The 3-3-2 stacking limit is overly
> restrictive, and probably disfunctional in Europa.
Always nice to hear someone actually enjoys the stuff.
The stacking limits seem to me to be too restrictive only in one case
(albeit a rather general one): that of a static situation where one side has
had plenty of time to arrange for extra stacking capacty.
On average, the Europa stacking limits are just right, IMO. Of course, all
situations are not average. Before DIADEM, the Allies had weeks to get
ready and made the most of it, cramming all sorts of assets into a very
tiny living space. After they broke out and were swarming up Italy
however, the regular stacking took hold - e.g. the Polish Corps was
"pinched out" by the advance of somebody else. What is that but the
stacking limits taking effect?
The 3-3-2 stacking is just about right in an open, flowing campaign. This
is probably no coincidence since these are the types of campaigns
Europa is really based on (Russia '41 for the prime example, WD for
another). Seems to me that only when things slow down to a crawl
(combined with high unit density) do the stacking limits not match history
- DIADEM, Stalingrad, Cobra, variety of Soviet 43-35 offensives (not sure
about FoF).
Same thing happens at a football game. 100,000 people cram into a
stadium (they are all c/m, look at the parking lot). Everything is relatively
orderly because everyone has bought a reserved seat ticket and there
are ushers and police to make sure everything works right, everybody
screams and does their thing. Three hours later everything goes to hell
when the game is over and everyone bolts for the parking lot and all
these c/m units start moving. I see a smaller version of this every day at
5:00 pm.
I think the solution, if one is indeed needed, is to tie increased stacking
to either a major offensive requiring extra logistics as has recently been
discussed, or to pre-planning a la airborne operations (or both). Either
route means (sigh) added complexity.
Frank
From: NASU002.USAP@iac.org.nz (Public Affairs Officer)
Date: Tue, 19 Mar 1996 08:47 GMT
Subject: I blew it, guys
My apologies for extending a post on Alfried Rosenberg to include
the 1960s New Left, which has as much to do with Europa as rap music does
to Gregorian chants.
I got on a roll on Alfried Rosenberg, and only realized I had
overshot the runway after I went home for the weekend.
If I wasted anyone's time and offended anyone, I'm extremely sorry.
Sincerely,
David H. Lippman
Public Affairs Officer
US Naval Antarctic Support Unit
Christchurch, New Zealand
From: NASU002.USAP@iac.org.nz (Public Affairs Officer)
Date: Tue, 19 Mar 1996 08:52 GMT
Subject: Graziani
Dear John: Your defense of the Libyans and Ethiopians is powerful,
and certainly they were on the side of the angels, and fought hard.
Invaded people often fight well against their enemies, regardless of
their strength of technology. The Ethiopians and Libyans did give Italy a
bloody nose.
My problem with Graziani is his behavior in the 1940 campaign
against the British. He sat whining in his bunker while his armies
disintegrated in the field. He reminds me of Lloyd Fredendall at
Kasserine.
Best,
Dave Lippman
Public Affairs Officer
US Naval Antarctic Support Unit
Christchurch, New Zealand
From: NASU002.USAP@iac.org.nz (Public Affairs Officer)
Date: Tue, 19 Mar 1996 09:11 GMT
Subject: The Italian soldier
No soldier was more ill-served by his leadership than the Italian
warrior. He was poorly led, poorly-equipped, badly motivated, and sent to
fight in appalling climes like Russia, Greece, and Libya, and developed
an undeserved reputation for quick surrender.
Most of that came from the 1940 Western Desert campaign, where the
British scooped up more than 130,000 PoWs, gaining a textbook victory and
a propaganda triumph. But Italian forces under Erwin Rommel later proved
to have sterner stuff, hastening the winning of numerous battles that
have gone to Rommel's credit.
Italian troops fought hard against overwhelming odds at Stalingrad,
and retained unit cohesion while Soviet prisoners.
Nor was Italian bravery confined to land. The exploits of Italian
midget submariners against the Royal Navy is legendary. The man who sank
HMS Queen Elizabeth was decorated for that feat by the Queen Elizabeth's
captain. British pilots in Malta commented that Italians airmen, when
cornered, fought back, while Germans would jettison bombs and flee.
The invasion of Sicily was not a great hour for Italian arms, but by
then Mussolini was on the way out. But after the surrender, Italians
chose sides in a manner like 14th-century Englishmen tugging at red and
white Roses to choose between York and Lancaster, and fought with great
courage on both sides. Northern Italy turned into a charnel house as
partisan and Fascist fought it out. Thousands of Italian soldiers caught
in Yugoslavia by the armistice joined Tito's partisans.
In the end, Italian partisans redeemed their nation's military honor
by capturing Mussolini and seizing Milan ahead of the US Army. And, as
I've mentioned, the Gurkhas paid tribute to their Italian opponents in
East Africa as the toughest they ever faced.
All nations have their characteristic brand of courage, and only a
cretin or a clod would suggest that a given nation is purely a land of
cowards. All causes have their loyal adherents, and so do all countries.
David H. Lippman
Public Affairs Officer
US Naval Antarctic Support Unit
Christchurch, New Zealand
From: pardue@hilda.mast.QueensU.CA (Keith Pardue)
Subject: Gas Warfare
Date: Mon, 18 Mar 1996 17:00:11 -0500 (EST)
Hi all,
In the middle of a long post, Steve wrote:
> Much like nerve gas (a weapon noone has yet brought into discussion- and
> one I think should be discarded for similar reasons.)
> Use of these kinds of weapons turns the game from WW2 into apocolyptic
> nightmare.
>
It seems to me that WW2 WAS an apocolyptic nightmare. Of all the
awful things that might have happened during World War II, about the
only thing that didn't happen (other than a fascist victory) is the use
of gas. This is something that could EASILY have happened.
Actually, it did happen (on puropose) in a few isolated incidents.
The Japanese used gas grenades during the invasion of India, but Weinberg
feels that this was not official policy and a halt was called to it
eventually. I believe that Manstein used poison gas in the final stages
of his Crimea campaign, but I don't remember the reference (Seaton?).
John Astell wrote that the RAF was keen to use it in retaliation
for the V2 attacks. Weinberg writes that Churchill was very much
for this, but that his cabinet and the American president convinced
him not to. He also writes that the British were planning to start
using poison gas if the Germans were to gain a stable foothold in
England.
The gas capability of the Soviets, according to Weinberg, is
still not clear but the openning of Soviet files should shed some
light on this. But, the Soviets were very concerned lest the Germans
start using it and secured an ultimatum from the the Western Allies
that the Allies would retaliate with gas if the Germans started using
it anywhere.
The Germans were apparently the only power to have nerve gas,
as opposed to the older WWI era gasses, such as mustard gas. After
Hitler declared war on the US, he apparently realized that he
couldn't win against US industry (oops! I guess I goofed!) and
ordered Speer to increase nerve gas production, thinking that
this would give Germany a decisive advantage. But, the Germans
later received erroneous information that the US also had nerve
gas stockpiles. Since at this point in the war, the Allied
air forces were bombing German cities with relative impunity
and the Germans didn't have enough gas masks to distribute
to civilians, the Germans did not initiate the use of nerve gas.
So, it appears that some sort of deterrence can work, even against
Nazi Germany in the middle of the Second World War!
I have read that the US Army had some plans to use poison
gas in the invasion of Japan. But, according to Weinberg, all such
plans were either dropped by the army or discouraged by the President.
Weinberg gives a citation for these plans, and I'm waiting to get the
paper via interlibrary loan.
When reflecting on WWII, it really takes my breath away
that poison gas wasn't used on a large scale. It really doesn't
seem to me that using poison gas is crossing any more notable a
line than attempting to systematically wipe out whole populations,
attempting to flatten cities with thousand bomber raids, fire bomb raids or
atomic bombs, or using bacteriological warfare as the Japanese
did in China. Although it is miraculous that poison gas wasn't used,
this is an option that I have never seen explored in a WWII game.
Does anyone know what the rules on gas in March to Victory
look like?
Should it be possible for poison gas to be used in certain
Europa games and in Grand Europa? Should this option be explored
in the remake of Their Finest Hour?
I somehow think that this possibility should be looked at.
It seems to me much more plausible that someone might have started
using gas in WWII than, say, that Germany should write off Franco
and invade Spain.
But, perhaps this is too radical.
Best Wishes,
Keith Pardue
Kingston, Ontario, Canada
From: Dave Humphreys <davehum@uniserve.com>
Subject: Computers and Europa
Date: Mon, 18 Mar 1996 14:36:22 -0800
Has anyone seen the promo material for the Gateway 2000 Destination
system? Apparently it will come with a 31" TELEVISION monitor and wireless
keyboard and mouse. Could be a way to overcome the limited display
that would hinder a game of computer Europa.
Date: Mon, 18 Mar 96 17:54:07 EST
From: "Frank E. Watson" <FEWatson@LANMAIL.RMC.COM>
Subject: re:Gas Warfare
There was an interesting article in (I think) Command magazine a while
back on the use and development of gas. It mentioned that the Germans
were scared to use their nerve gase because in 1941 or 42 the American
technical journals suddenly removed all references to [Insert some
humongo chemical name here] that was the necessary precusor to their
nerve gas (Sarin was it?). They figured that the Americans had found
they could make nerve gas.
Actually the Americans didn't have a clue as to nerve gas, but were
using the same precursor agent in the development of DDT, equally as
secret. And used to good effect in the Pacific jungle campaigns.
For you youngsters, DDT was a kick-ass pesticide, banned in the 60s or
early 70s in the US for its environmental effects. When I was a kid the
DDT truck would come by fogging for mosquitoes. I'm sure it affected me,
which is probably why there are major gaffs in TEM from thyme to thyme.
The article also mentioned some of the companies involved in gas
development, one of which immediately brought to mind a possible
addition to their TV commercial, "At **** we don't make mustard gas. We
make it better."
Still slapping at mosquitoes,
Frank
Date: Mon, 18 Mar 1996 17:16:21 -0600
From: bdbryant@mail.utexas.edu (Bobby D. Bryant)
Subject: Re: East Africa (fwd)
Keith wrote:
>there were at one point contingency plans for a British withdrawal
>into Sudan if the Axis broke into the Delta. So, linking maps make
>sense.
I had a game that needed such a link: the Axis broke in and the surviving
Allied units had nowhere to go, so I arbitrarily withdrew them up the Nile
and declared the game over.
- Bobby.
Date: Mon, 18 Mar 96 15:15:20 PST
From: "Renaud.Gary" <renaud.gary@corona.navy.mil>
Subject: Re: Computers and Europa
Warning! Neepery alert!
"...the Gateway 2000 Destination ...31" TELEVISION monitor... Could be a way to
overcome the limited display that would hinder a game of computer Europa."
Actually, that won't help that much. What you really need for a game is high
RESOLUTION. Unless the monitor has special sweep circuitry and high IF
bandwidth, you will have WORSE than regular VGA resolution (actually, you can
push a TV to 700x520+, but you will have to interlace, which looks awful, as any
Amiga user can attest). That's why only low-end computers ever used the TV as
their display device.
If you assume a moderate resolution of 72 dpi, then a 31" diagonal screen would
have somewhere around 1600x1200. This would let you 50x38 hexes with a good
amount of detail or maybe 66x50 with moderate detail. Good for AWW or FWTBT,
but a long away from FITE.
Assuming 256 colors (the low-end standard now), that comes to about 2M of VRAM
and a dot clock rate of 138MHz. And people have complained that they don't want
to have their programs under Windows because it takes too much resources!
A Renaud.Gary@Corona.Navy.Mil
This graphic is |\ CompuServe: 73627,1114
a LOT smaller | \ _,,,---,,__ Genie: G.Renaud1
than a PGP key /,`.-'`' -. ;-;,---__ W: 909-273-5378
block __|,4- ) )-,_. ,\ ( `'==--' H: 714-750-9243
`-----''(_/--' `-'\_)
DNRC Holder of Past Knowledge
I CAN'T speak for this administration; I tell the truth.
Date: Mon, 18 Mar 1996 17:37:23 -0600
From: bdbryant@mail.utexas.edu (Bobby D. Bryant)
Subject: Re: The Fall of France (to be or not to be)
Ray wrote:
>1) Significant resistance to the war in the first place, both from
>people who remembered the bloodbaths of 1914-1918 and from the
>Popular Front, where German-Soviet detente made a war with Germany
>less palatable.
>
>2) The period of the Phony War [9/39-4/40] was used to good effect on
>the part of German propagandists, directed primarily at the French.
>
>3) Training of line troops was, in many cases, geared to positional
>warfare, with a lack of training in mobile warfare from a defensive
>stand point. ...
What would have happened in the West if Germany had not taken the
initiative? Were the Allies seriously committed to invading Germany? Might
the phony war have devolved into a cold war, with no WWII as we know it?
>I also don't think that having 2 to 2.5 times as many slow,
>short-range tanks as a more maneuverable enemy is any advantage ...
My historical knowledge is pretty much restricted to conventional wisdom,
but CW holds that those tanks, if not committed in dribbles, would have cut
off the German spearhead bound for the coast. [Of course, by contradicting
you here, I only make your point about a leadership handicap all the more
important.]
- Bobby.
Date: Mon, 18 Mar 1996 20:10:50 -0500
From: Ray Kanarr <RayK@smtp4.aw.com>
Subject: Re: Computers and Europa
On 3/18/96, Dave Humphreys wrote:
>Has anyone seen the promo material for the Gateway
>2000 Destination system? Apparently it will come with a
>31" TELEVISION monitor and wireless keyboard and
>mouse. Could be a way to overcome the limited display
>that would hinder a game of computer Europa.
I haven't seen this yet, but I've had my Gateway 386 since 1990 [with
a 486 upgrade in 1995], and I'd certainly buy another computer from
them.
Ray
Date: Tue, 19 Mar 1996 00:23:18 +0100
From: cloister@dircon.co.uk (Perry de Havilland)
Subject: Re: German Surface to Air Missiles
James Byrne et al wrote re.German SAMs:
>> What's so radical about that? It would merely be a more
>> effective anti-aircraft battery. You'd still have to
>
>
>Actually I read somewhere, and no I can't remember where,
>that Albert Speer regretted not backing the wasserfell
>(sp?) project. This was the development of a high
>altitude, wire or radio guided SAM with a tv or ir sensor
>in the nose. The ground station steered the weapon into a
>bomber. It also had a command detonation capablity.
>Apparently the A1 and A2 projects got the funding instead.
>AH's bomber mentality again I guess.
Yes, I remember something similar (maybe in Speer's book? I also forget
where): Which only goes to prove Albert should have stuck to building
monuments.
Actually, I suspect the impact of a sustained Waserfall programme would
have been one of the great expensive non-events of German aerospace
technology (along with the Lichtenstein C-1 air-intercept radar and a
litany of other EW fiascos).
Given the *tremendous* advantage held by the Allies in electronic warfare
from 1943 onwards, Waserfall would most likely have had a useful
operational life measured in weeks or possibly even days. Compare the fate
of the various German glide-bombs: point defence barrage jammers on most
high-value naval targets (and even some clever (and cheap) spoofers on
escort ships) made these weapons, which were fairly alarming in Italy,
almost completely useless by D-day.
Much the same fate awaited Waserfall.
Electronically yours
Perry ...-
Date: Mon, 18 Mar 1996 19:30:21 -0400
From: jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell)
Subject: Re: Gas Warfare
On 3-18-96, Keith Pardue wrote:
> John Astell wrote that the RAF was keen to use it in retaliation
>for the V2 attacks. Weinberg writes that Churchill was very much
>for this, but that his cabinet and the American president convinced
>him not to. He also writes that the British were planning to start
>using poison gas if the Germans were to gain a stable foothold in
>England.
Yes, I had forgotten about the British plans to use gas if invaded. They
had outfitted Lysander recon planes to make gas attacks against ground
troops. I am unaware whether or not they had any artillery-deliverable gas
rounds in 1940.
From: grd1@genie.com
Date: Tue, 19 Mar 96 00:03:00 UTC 0000
Subject: Re: The Fall of France
As RayK said there were a number of problems with French morale and doctrine.
The Germans had what is now called better agility. They were able to change
their plans to met the developing situation more quickly than the French.
I.E They consistantly beat the French to the punch, never letting the French
recover from their last blow.
Also known as fighting inside the other guys' decision cycle.
Alan Tibbetts
Date: Mon, 18 Mar 1996 19:45:20 -0400
From: jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell)
Subject: Re: Graziani
On 3-19-96, Dave Lippman wrote:
> My problem with Graziani is his behavior in the 1940 campaign
>against the British. He sat whining in his bunker while his armies
>disintegrated in the field. He reminds me of Lloyd Fredendall at
>Kasserine.
Yes, he undoubtedly contributed to the Italian collapse -- conceivably the
Italians could have shored up and saved more troops or even held Tobruk had
Graziani acted energetically in Dec. 1940. I'm not arguing that he's one of
history's great generals; I'm just saying he did have some good abilities,
and has an unduly harsh reputation because most people ignore his pre-WW2
actions.
Date: Tue, 19 Mar 1996 01:22:32 +0100
From: cloister@dircon.co.uk (Perry de Havilland)
Subject: Re: Gas Warfare
Le Grand Fromage wrote:
>Yes, I had forgotten about the British plans to use gas if invaded. They
>had outfitted Lysander recon planes to make gas attacks against ground
>troops. I am unaware whether or not they had any artillery-deliverable gas
>rounds in 1940.
Yes, the Brit did have artillery gas rounds. That said, I recall reading
many were for calibers no longer in general use (typical, huh)! If memory
serves, the airborne delivery idea was quite advanced and there were also
plans mooted to kit out civilan light aircraft to do the same.
Additinally, some rather alarming ad hoc designs for gas delivery vehicle
appeared in 1940, some of which were built: such as a wierd thing that
looked rather like a modern street cleaning vehicle as rendered by Heath
Robinson. I suspect driving this (and its ilk) would not have been a
highly sought after job!
Regards
Perry ...-
Date: Mon, 18 Mar 1996 20:59:14 -0500
From: Ray Kanarr <RayK@smtp4.aw.com>
Subject: Re: German Surface to Air Missiles
On 3/18/96, Perry said:
>Given the *tremendous* advantage held by the Allies in
>electronic warfare from 1943 onwards, Waserfall would
>most likely have had a useful operational life measured in
>weeks or possibly even days. Compare the fate of the
>various German glide-bombs: point defence barrage
>jammers on most high-value naval targets (and even some
>clever (and cheap) spoofers on escort ships) made these
>weapons, which were fairly alarming in Italy, almost
>completely useless by D-day.
A sentiment with which I completely agree, given the historical
evidence. Introduction of advanced German AA missiles gives German AA
rolls a plus modifier for a couple of turns, max, until
countermeasures begin to kick in, and the Germans have to give up
other projects/materials in exchange, because of the costs for making
Wasserfall operational.
Ray
Date: Mon, 18 Mar 1996 20:54:01 -0500
From: Ray Kanarr <RayK@smtp4.aw.com>
Subject: Re: The Fall of France (to be or not to be)
On 3/18/96, Bobby Bryant wrote
>What would have happened in the West if Germany had
>not taken the initiative? Were the Allies seriously
>committed to invading Germany? Might the phony war
>have devolved into a cold war, with no WWII as we know
>it?
As shown by the truly lackluster performance of the French, where
they advanced to take a few square klicks, and then retreated, early
in the Phony War, that there was no real commitment on the part of
France to Invade Germany, especially against the perceived strength
of the Westwall fortifications. They'd had enough of that 25 years
earlier.
Also examine the farcical experience of the Allies in Norway.
I think that it might well have devolved into a cold war situation,
particularly if a tight rein could be held on the Luftwaffe. And
wouldn't that be an interesting scenario to game?
>CW holds that those tanks, if not committed in dribbles,
>would have cut off the German spearhead bound for the
>coast. [Of course, by contradicting you here, I only make
>your point about a leadership handicap all the more
>important.]
In at least one case, possibly more, French tank forces were
massacred when they had to stop to refuel, and the Heinies caught up
to them.
I really question whether the French tanks of 1940, as strongly built
as they were, had the stamina or ability to coordinate [the one-man
turret/
commander as gunner effects] that would have been necessary to
actually cut off [as opposed to an infantry-style counterattack] the
German spearheads, especially as the accounts that I've read citing
CW do not give any space to speculating what the German reaction
would/could have been to such an attack, and there certainly would
have been one in short order, as thinking/acting on the fly is one
area where the German officer corps [overall] excelled. So I think
that the juxtaposition of these two command structures needs to be
acknowledged in some way, as you point out.
Ray
Date: Mon, 18 Mar 1996 21:47:02 -0500
From: Ray Kanarr <RayK@smtp4.aw.com>
Subject: Re: Gas Warfare
On 3/18/96, Perry wrote:
>Additinally, some rather alarming ad hoc designs for gas
>delivery vehicle appeared in 1940, some of which were
>built: such as a wierd thing that looked rather like a
>modern street cleaning vehicle as rendered by Heath
>Robinson. I suspect driving this (and its ilk) would not
>have been a highly sought after job!
Any book citations for descriptions/pictures of these? Sounds a bit
like the British went full out designing [and building] odd vehicles
in 1940, like the Beaverbrook airfield defense armoured trucks.
Ray
Date: Mon, 18 Mar 1996 19:50:53 -0600
From: bdbryant@mail.utexas.edu (Bobby D. Bryant)
Subject: Re: Gas Warfare
Perry wrote:
>Additinally, some rather alarming ad hoc designs for gas delivery vehicle
>appeared in 1940, some of which were built: ...
I remember hearing on "Engines of Our Ingenuity" about an interwar invention
of some kind of "vortex generator" that could propel gas in the form of a
smoke ring, which would travel several hundred yards before dispersing.
Ideal, I suppose, for trench warfare. I don't know if it was ever deployed;
indeed, I'm not even sure of the nationality of the inventor.
- Bobby.
Date: Tue, 19 Mar 1996 02:11:23 +0100
From: cloister@dircon.co.uk (Perry de Havilland)
Subject: Re: Strange vehicles
Ray wrote:
>Any book citations for descriptions/pictures of these? Sounds a bit
>like the British went full out designing [and building] odd vehicles
>in 1940, like the Beaverbrook airfield defense armoured trucks.
This was a memory number, but I will see if I can dig up the refs for you.
I do remember seeing a picture of this critter plus a few others odd-balls
and I think it might have been in a book I read some years ago on Hobart's
'Funnies' which also touched on the earlier background of strange vehicles
that the Brits had in WWII. Give me a few days.
As an aside, in the old Brit TV series *Dad's Army* (which is the comedic
adventures of a bunch of Home Guard chaps in 1940) they lampoon the strange
vehicles of the time with a daft vehicle that they all ride around it (a
converted butcher's delivery van if I recall, with all manner of gun-ports
and a hilarious drill to go with it).
When I was in Croatia a few years ago, I saw some very bizarre 'home made
armoured vehicles' which rather reminded me of those Brit things circa
1940. Most looked like death traps but a few were rather clever.
Necessity really IS the mother of invention.
Regards
Perry ...-
Date: Mon, 18 Mar 1996 21:18:39 -0400
From: jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell)
Subject: Re: The Fall of France
>The Germans had what is now called better agility. They were able to change
>their plans to met the developing situation more quickly than the French.
>I.E They consistantly beat the French to the punch, never letting the French
>recover from their last blow.
>
>Also known as fighting inside the other guys' decision cycle.
1. The French High Command was organized to fight a war where an advance
went forward at 2.5 miles per hour -- e.g., an infantry offensive supported
by tanks a la 1918. In the short weeks that followed the German offensive
starting 10 May 1940, the High Command simply did not have the time (and
perhaps not the mental agility) to adjust to an offensive that proceeded at
25 miles per hour. Thus, the French response to German moves was typically
12-24 hours too late, with disasterous results.
Interestingly, the German High Command in 1940 is not impressive, either.
They could react faster, but it is unclear to me how effective their
reactions were. In essence, the German offensive ran off of plans made in
advance (with excellent improvisation at the operational level) until the
Germans reached the Channel. After that, the High Command had to direct
things, mostly botching things up and suppressing operational improvisation
by the commanders on the spot. The hesitation to grab Dunkerque, followed
by an order to attack it after the British had shore up the defenses, seems
little different than what the French High Command was doing.
2. Having said how bad the French were, it's now time for something in
their favor. People go on and one about how bad the French doctrine was,
which lead to the French defeat in 1940. Very likely, the problem wasn't
the doctrine in itself but the rigidity and brittleness of the 1940 French
High Command. Look at how the Free French forces fought the war in 1942-45
-- no worse (if no better) than the Americans or British forces. (Or, the
Vichy French against the Allies in Syria for that matter.) Well, the Free
French fought under commanders who had been trained in French doctrine, and
these officers certainly didn't go back to military school to learn
American or British doctrine during the war!
The secret is that French doctrine was more flexible than its reputation
says it was, and that was, in various ways, directly applicable to the
conditions of 1943-45. Tell me how the French set-piece attack was
inherently different or inferior from a typical 1943-45 Soviet offensive,
an Allied offensive, or a German offensive like Kursk or the Bulge. Yes,
the pacing differs, but that's a detail that can be adjusted for, not an
inherent flaw.
Date: Mon, 18 Mar 1996 21:31:22 -0400
From: jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell)
Subject: Re: The Fall of France (to be or not to be)
On 18 March 96, Ray Kanarr wrote:
>As shown by the truly lackluster performance of the French, where
>they advanced to take a few square klicks, and then retreated, early
>in the Phony War, that there was no real commitment on the part of
>France to Invade Germany, especially against the perceived strength
>of the Westwall fortifications. They'd had enough of that 25 years
>earlier.
This is true for 1939-40. The French and British alliance's plans, however,
were to stay on the defensive until 1941. By that time, the combined
wartime output of their
industry would have given them large (presumably decisive) advantages in
aircraft, tanks, artillery, and other material vis-a-vis the Germans. It is
not an unreasonable strategy given the circumstances (why attack the
Germans before you are ready to beat them?), and it might just have worked
had the Allies not botched the defense of France in 1940.
From: EuropaStag@aol.com
Date: Mon, 18 Mar 1996 21:45:31 -0500
Subject: Re: Howling about Alan's post.
In a message dated 96-03-18 13:11:04 EST, you write:
>>I have never understood why air units are represented as hardware rather
>>than as historical units. We don't represent armored formations according
to
>>tank type. Why not represent air formations according to the units actually
>>deployed, with historical IDs and "typical" strengths?
>
>I'd never thought about it before, but I must say that you're really onto
>something there- that's areally great idea.
At first the historical information was not there. Now the air units DO
represent specific units as much as possible. It is possible to track all US
and UK units most of the German and all of the Soviet after 1942
One problem is that for the soviets each counter represents an Air Division
after 1942 but 1-3 regiments before that and 2 counters to a brigade before
that!
I had great fun with the Soviet OB in AWW because units existed as regiments
AND Brigades!
Date: Mon, 18 Mar 1996 21:02:56 -0600
From: bdbryant@mail.utexas.edu (Bobby D. Bryant)
Subject: Re: The Fall of France (to be or not to be)
Ray wrote:
>As shown by the truly lackluster performance of the French, where
>they advanced to take a few square klicks, and then retreated, early
>in the Phony War, that there was no real commitment on the part of
>France to Invade Germany, especially against the perceived strength
>of the Westwall fortifications. They'd had enough of that 25 years
>earlier.
>
>Also examine the farcical experience of the Allies in Norway.
Since the Allies were supposedly at sea at the same time as the Germans, I
wonder if they had intelligence about German intentions and were trying to
beat them to the draw. Was Ultra available that early?
>I think that it might well have devolved into a cold war situation ...
The USSR is something of a wildcard. A British blockade might not strangle
Germany as long as Germany had accesses to resources from the USSR. Stalin
might have cooperated, seeing more advantage in prolonging the cold war than
in crushing Germany.
If the Germans went ahead and took Norway, they would get the security for
the Swedish ore but a higher chance of the war warming up. (I.e., presumably
a temptation for the Allies to contest them in Norway, and maybe a long-term
higher chance for US involvement.) But if Germany stayed passive and the
Allies took Norway (that's what my questions up top were leading up to),
things might have been pushed toward the cold. (I.e., Allied actions push
USSR to a status more favorable to Germany, and more motivation for the US
to stay isolationist -- unless I'm just spouting patriotic naivete' on that
last item.)
- Bobby.
Date: Mon, 18 Mar 1996 19:22:14 -0800
From: bstone@sub.sonic.net (Bill Stone)
Subject: Re: East Africa
>Keith wrote:
>
>>there were at one point contingency plans for a British withdrawal
>>into Sudan if the Axis broke into the Delta. So, linking maps make
>>sense.
Bobby Bryant responded:
>
>I had a game that needed such a link: the Axis broke in and the surviving
>Allied units had nowhere to go, so I arbitrarily withdrew them up the Nile
>and declared the game over.
"General Auchinleck intended, if he failed to stop the enemy at Alamein, to
fight step by step through Egypt, and in the last resort to hold the Suez
Canal with part of his force while the remainder withdrew along the Nile.
Plans for these operations were made, taking advantage of the work already
done to develop Aqaba and link it by road to the new branch of the Hedjaz
railway from Ma'an. GHQ made ready to move to Gaza and leave an operational
section in Cairo."
Playfair, Major-General I. S. O. THE MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST, volume
III: (September 1941 to September 1942) British Fortunes Reach Their Lowest
Ebb. London: HMSO, 1960. Page 334.
I once drove the British out of Egypt and they elected to withdraw across
the Suez Canal. We played along a bit more but the game pretty much
collapsed, mostly due to the (understandable) failure of the Brit player's
morale. Perhaps he would have toughed it out if he could have withdrawn up
the Nile.... Nah.
----------------------------
Bill Stone
Santa Rosa, CA
bstone@sonic.net
World War II Web Site:
http://www.sonic.net/~bstone
----------------------------
From: NASU002.USAP@iac.org.nz (Public Affairs Officer)
Date: Tue, 19 Mar 1996 15:47 GMT
Subject: French tactics
John Astell makes a good point about the French armies of 1942-45
being ably fought and led.
In point of fact, while French armor tactics and large unit
leadership were weak, it's worth noting that the outfits that
disintegrated on the Meuse River were the class C and B divisions, which
were sadly lacking in training, equipment, and motivation. For example,
an order issued to Maginot Line personnel actually read, "Officers must
adhere approximately to the 40-hour week and must not order work at
night, or on Saturdays, or Sundays."
One regiment was equipped with rifles stamped with their production
year, "1891" on the butt, and iron rations date-stamped 1920. A quarter
of the men in the 42nd Infantry Division's men's socks had rotted away.
At Merlebach, Lt. Philippe de Bosmelet found no man in his unit would
advance into a wood unless an officer went 50 yards ahead to show there
was no danger. One reserve artillery reigiment had only tractors,
unrepaired for 20 years, to tow its guns into battle.
And, when the Germans whacked the 71st Division, the men turned
their helmets around -- a Communist gesture -- threw down their rifles,
and went home. One artillery officer told his men, "Look here, men, here
are some guns! There's plenty of ammunition! Carry on fighting!"
The men answered, "Colonel, we want to get home and to our little
jobs. There's nothing to be done. We're finished. We've been betrayed."
This from the Class B and Class C divisions that faced the brunt of
the Wehrmacht in 1940.
While these outfits disintegrated (as anyone who looks at the Fall
of France deployments can tell), some of the toughest outfits in the
French army sat rivetted to their positions in and around the Maginot
Line, while others were trapped in Belgium.
Outfits like the Colonial Divisions, the African Divisions, and the
vaunted Foreign Legion, had little chance to give account of themselves
against the Germans in 1940. Their tactics were similar to those (on
paper) of the 9th Army, but they were properly equipped and reasonably
motivated. Indeed, no one has ever questioned the Foreign Legion's
ability to fight, even when it was Gaulliste or Vichyite Legionnaires
slaughtering each other in Syria. (In fact, the French kept a lot of
Legion Etrangere outfits out of the 1940 battle because many of them were
pro-Communist German and Spanish refugees whom Gamelin considered
security risks in battle!)
When they did have a chance to fight, they did well. The stand of
the First French Brigade at Bir Hakim did much to derail Rommel and
rebuild the reputation of the French Army. French Moroccan, Algerian, and
Colonial Divisions under Marshal Alphonse Juin tore through the German
mountain positions in Operation Diadem to lead the US 5th Army to Rome.
Juin's knowledge of mountain warfare, ignored by his superiors, could
have reduced the Cassino mess. Most of these troops were drawn from
ex-Vichy units that had spent most of the war waiting for something to
happen. By the time Diadem rolled around, they had better equipment, but
pretty much the same training.
It's a little too easy to laugh at the French for the debacle in
1940, but that had many causes, which have been outlined here in many
posts, which range from the flabby weakness of French military and
political leadership, to the outright hatred the commanders like Gamelin
and Weygand bore their own government, to the colossal blunders that left
France with a yawning gap in the Ardennes and no means to close it. But
the French soldier led by Juin, LeClerc, Koenig, and De Lattre De
Tassigny was a much better fighter than those led by Gamelin and Weygand.
It's worth noting that the top generals of 1940 promptly disappeared
from the war after their defeats. Weygand, Gamelin, Corap, Huntziger,
Nogues, Pretelat, Georges, Blanchard, Olry, even Giraud, did not hold
field command after the debacle. Billotte was killed in a car crash.
Their subordinates, however, Mast, Bethouart, De Lattre, De Gaulle,
LeClerc, Juin, rebuilt French military ability from the ashes.
It's a bit far to say that France liberated itself, as French
historians like to say today (they call the invasion of Normandy "les
debarquements," and build up the French warships and commandos in that
campaign out of proportion), but France did rise like a phoenix and its
forces fought with credit and honor....when properly led, motivated, and
equipped.
The essential strengths of the French fighting man were solid. But
the tool was improperly used in 1940.
David H. Lippman
Public Affairs Officer
US Naval Antarctic Support Unit
Christchurch, New Zealand