From: "David H. Thornley" <thornley@cs.umn.edu>
Subject: Re: GE debate rages on!
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 1996 20:38:44 -0600 (CST)
>
> Like Yul Brynner in *Westworld*, the GE debate just won't be stopped!
>
Unless we start sending pictures; we can't possibly clog the whole band-
width of the net just arguing with words, after all!
> I have an opinion on everything. This is my topic of topics, so please
> allow me to opine on your vision of Grand Europa...
I've got opinions, can I play too?
> >* Germany and Poland, France and Britain are at war at
> >start. Everyone except Germany at Neutrality Watch, Germans
> >get free set up.
> >* Italy must enter war, by conducting ground operations
> >against Fr or GB, before the surrender/collapse/armistice of
> >a major power or they lose the game.
We might want to extend this principle to other possible Axis powers;
maybe Spain signs on after one major power has fallen and England is
invaded?
> >* Historical Nazi-Soviet Pact (with possibilities for
> >minor border adjustments as was the case)
> >* No Japanese attack on USSR.
> >* Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria minor Axis-Allies from
> >historical date (1 or 2 turns either way could be used)
Iffy. I might go along with this for simplicity's sake, but I
think we're sweeping an awful lot of stuff under the rug.
>[snip]
>
> >* Germany must invade the USSR before Aug I '41, or they
> >lose the war.
>
> This could really screw the Germans. Why not say before August 1943? Make
> the Allies guess.
>
I kinda like the Third Reich approach: let the Soviet Union declare
war any time they like after (say) Aug I '41. Without the German surprise
turn. We'd have to divide Soviet reinforcements into peacetime and
wartime, but that shouldn't be all that difficult. I think we'll find
the Germans attacking the Soviet Union more or less at the historical
time.
> >* Adolph and Benito declare war on US Dec I '41
>
> Again, this could really force the German to shoot themselves. What if
> Russia is doing better than in real life? Hitler declared war on the USA
> when the German fortunes in Russia were not so high, but if a total
> disaster had occured, then maybe he wouldn't have. Are we to assume that
> total disasters won't occur in the game?
>
Of all the political and economic decisions of the war, this is the one
that is the least operational and the most political. From a point of view
of playing Europa, and avoiding political and economic systems, we'd
do just as well playing Days of Decision II as we would not having the
Axis declare war on the U.S.
There is no reason for Germany to do this, in the game just as much as in
real life. The only effect is that the Allies start getting lots of green
counters with large numbers on them in '43 and '44; how the blazes do you
ever get the Axis players to do something so stupid?
If Germany is suffering disasters in Russia, fine. They're going to lose
anyway, and keeping the Americans out isn't going to change that. There is
no justification for cutting the Axis any slack. It would be just as
reasonable to start in '38, after Churchill dominates the Munich conference.
> >* Historical Air and Naval production, modified by ability
> >to retain more of unspent ARPs and NRPs, but these can not
> >be converted into new or different units.
>
> I would argue for a slightly more liberal approach- adding a few more
> counters of various types to let people play around with alternate air
> reinforcements.
>
The ground reinforcements probably are no big deal; we might want to pull
some out of the OB, dump them (and some other forces) in a pool, and let
the players decide which to build. If the players want a bit more armor,
or a bit more mountain troops, and are willing to sacrifice some infantry
(or vice versa) it shouldn't hurt. I feel much the same way about the
air OB, but it's a little trickier. We can (I think) afford to let the
players change the bomber/fighter/attack/transport ratio somewhat, but it
would be unhistorical to let them tune the reinforcements to get only
the best aircraft. Either let them change the numbers of types only,
or do the World in Flames thing (let's see, did I draw a P-39 or a
P-38 this turn?).
> >* France must sign armistice when offered (as in FoF)
> >* Vichy sets up as historical as far as territorial
> >divisions. Commitment to Axis depends on events, pressure
> >and a table.
>
> I would tentatively agree to rules like this, if only to get the design
> process underway. If the French have basically been forced to sue for
> peace, then they shouldn't have many other options. It would be useful to
> have an alternative scenario in which France either fights on, or the Axis
> decide to just occupy them in toto and seize as much of North Africa as
> they can get.
>
We've been hashing this out for a while, and I think we've got usable
solutions. Just as long as France only surrenders when militarily
defeated, and just as long as the Vichy/Free French/whatever makes
some sort of sense. I think it would do no harm to the game if the
Axis could take a "no surrender" option, and I think that allowing
the French to fight on from Africa if they've held out in Europe long
enough would work fine.
> >* Spain and Turkey as historical. Attitude based on
> >changed circumstances to be developed, but no Turkey joins
> >Axis/Allies based on one die roll or chit pick.
>
> Yeah- I'm against random die rolling for random allies, but something like
> the Finnish War Effort Rules might be workable here if the circumstances
> bring them into the war.
>
Turkey, like most countries, can be allowed to be neutral until somebody
attacks, or can be allowed in very late to join in the victory. Spain,
I think, had more of a chance of joining the Axis. Possibly if France
fell and a significant German force was in England and in supply.
Even then, I think Spain would be unenthusiastic and easy to remove from
the war.
> >* Military technology remains as historical.
> >* Economic war, ie Strat air and U-boat campaign as much
> >in the background as possible, SF Strat air good example.
Fine with me. The problem with economic war is that it isn't Europa and
it can drastically influence the game. The only kicker is that it should
pay to occupy the traditional real estate: as many Atlantic ports as
possible for the Germans, Italy for the Allied Mediterranean strat bombing
campaign. Other than that, the closer to the historical results, the better.
Not that I have any objections to a scenario in Europa concerning major
changes, of course, but I would like to see GE stay out of this.
> >* Task Force Naval system.
No. For all but a few campaigns, that's far too much of a naval system.
Granted that GE will require some more attention to the ocean than most
of its components do, it should require as little as possible.
> >* OB based on Replacement points (Inf, Art, Arm) to
> >"build" historical units (largely, some variation for
> >circumstances permitted)
>
> I would agree that these might be useful concepts for a basic Grand Europa,
> but I would certainly want to see more flexibility in all those areas-the
> sooner the better.
>
Commented on above.
> >* No random events, no Political Instability Table, no
> >player control of the "Home Front", no players for minor
> >powers. (Random Events: that are game breakers or
> >significantly distort history)
>
> In the case of minor countries, once they get into the war, most of them
> become too intermingled with allied forces to differentiate a player for,
> say Roumania.
> I haven't seen anyone advocating Ronald Reagan movie rules, House
> Unamerican Activity Rules, War Bond or Scrap Metal Drive rules, ((unless
> you mean economics)) then I'm with you on leaving out the home front.
>
The problem with the random events that distort history is that the blasted
things did happen, and I'm not comfortable saying that one improbable thing
happens and another didn't just because that's how it worked out in real
life. I agree with game-breaking random events, though. Italy does not
join the Allies until defeated. Spain doesn't join the war while it still
might help the Axis if they did. No small planetoid crashes into central
Europe in May II '40. The U.S. joins the war at the historical time.
> > To which some will reply, "But you are just refighting
> >WW II!" Exactly. Completely right. Bravo! Hit the nail
> >on the head.
There is something of a continuum here. At one end, I can curl up in
a comfortable chair, and read Weinberg or Willmott or whoever. Moving
along slightly, I can play individual Europa games, making sure that
my decisions are the historical ones (i.e., SF starting with Sicily,
invading Salerno, Anzio, Normany, South France at the right times).
Or I can play Europa games in historical order without worrying about
making the exact historical decisions.
We now move on to what I want to see: a game in which we can make
our own decisions, so Germany can attack whoever the German player wants
when he wants to do it, etc. This could lead to a considerably different
WWII, but I don't see that as a problem, any more than I see a quick
southern France invasion as a SF problem, or the possibility of an
Army Group Center offensive in 1942 is a SE problem.
If I continue down that continuum a long ways, of course, I get to
World in Flames with all the expansions, especially including Days of
Decision II. I assume that this, in particular, is what we don't want
for Europa. (To paraphrase Stroustrup, Europa is not the best WiF,
WiF is the best WiF. And, if you want WiF, you know where to find it.)
On the other hand, if I am artificially limited in where I can push
my units, or if odd military results early in the game make the OB
ludicrous later in the game, I'm not going to be happy.
> > Europa, IMO, is an operational level game depicting WW
> >II at the divisional level, with those air and naval aspects
> >which had a significant impact upon the ground war.
Precisely what I want to see out of GE, with the proviso that
the expanded size necessitates strategic decisions that were nicely
wrapped into the initial setups of the component games.
In other words, in a game covering all of WWII, it will be necessary
to make some strategic and economic decisions. I'd like to see these
kept as simple and unobtrusive as possible, and no simpler and no
less obtrusive. If the game favors a German approach of Poland-
France-Balkans-USSR, that's just fine. If it mandates it, who needs it?
> > It is not a series of maps and OB provided to gamers to
> >play "The war of 1939-194? as it might have been if x,y and
> >z did or didn't happen." It is not a blown-up version of
> >3dR, nor WIF, nor WW II or any other Strategic-politico game
> >on the time period between 1939 and whenever. It is not a
> >early 1940s version of Empires in Arms, Diplomacy, Risk or
> >Badminton.
>
So how about the war in 1943-1945 if the Western allies make lots of
different decisions on returning to the continent? We seem to find
that just fine for a Europa game. Again, if I want nothing but
re-creation of the historical situations, I'll read a book.
> > Europa games are 70% ground combat, 20% tactical air
> >force, 5% naval; leaving 5% for politics, production, coup
> >die rolls, etc and 0% for alternative political history.
>
> If you mean alternative history to include things like a Communist Germany
> allying with Russia against whatever... then I'm with you. (although I
> guess I'd be happy to game *that* too if somebody with the basement and the
> time wanted to do it)
>
At one Europafest, I saw somebody agree to play Poland in Case White provided
the Reds came in on his side. No problem. (He lost anyway.) I have
no problems with people doing strange things with Europa components, as
long as they don't do it in the street and block traffic. On the
other hand, is it really alternative political history if France hangs
on until October and continues to fight from North Africa? (It is if
the Axis doesn't declare war on the U.S. in Dec I '41, I assure you.)
Is it alternative political history if Germany pulls off Sealion and
Spain joins the Axis? Is it alternative political history if Italy
doesn't attack Greece, the Balkans remain partly neutral, and Germany
starts Barbarossa a turn or two earlier? How about if the British
decide to try to finish off Tripolitania at Greece's expense?
If these are "alternative political history", and hence forbidden, what's
the point of GE after all? Europa games covering all the major campaigns
are safely in my closet (OK, so Fall of France and Their Finest Hour could
use revision); the only point I see in writing additional rules is to
allow different things to happen.
David H. Thornley, known to the Wise as thornley@cs.umn.edu O-
Disclaimer: These are not the opinions of the University of Minnesota,
its Regents, faculty, staff, students, or squirrels.
Datclaimer: Well, maybe the squirrels. They're pretty smart.
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 1996 20:40:01 -0600
From: bdbryant@mail.utexas.edu (Bobby D. Bryant)
Subject: Re: 1st Pz XX [longish]
>>A number of the units in the SE holding box are fulfilling
>>similar functions, like the 22 Luftland on Crete and Rhodes
>>(either place, at various times) and the Lehr and 21st
>>Panzer Divs that so inconveniantly go there over
>>winter/spring '44.
>
>As I stated in another context, it makes much more sense to generally
>state that: upon fulfillment of condition "a" [in the case that you
>cite, the fall of Africa], "x" number of REs [or AFs or DFs] need
>to garrison geographic region "512" [in this case, the Balkan
>states].
Better yet, the Europa partisan rules should "require" a player to decide
how much occupation force is needed, and make him suffer consequences if he
tries to skimp. As to the presence of 1st Pz in the Balkans, that will
depend on the Axis player's judgements as to 1) whether it is useful for
anti-partisan warfare under the rules, and 2) what he feels like the
prospects for an Allied invasion of the region are and what forces could
best meet it. In other words, we may not need any special rules at all for
Europa. The problem only occurs when playing scenarios that don't include
all fronts, and here I can see no choice but to start with historical
provisions.
Granted, an early collapse in the East or West would have had the Germans
drawing on garrisons in quiet regions. Perhaps scenarios such as CoT should
allow borrowing from the SE garrison for a VP penalty, or beefing it up for
a VP bonus (shades of AH's _1914_!). But the best solution would be to
include the SE front in the scenario, and give both sides their full range
of military options.
>As for mathematical blind doo dah hocus pocus about near-
>infinite permutations, that's a lot of eyewash [as my granddad would
>say. Dear Lord, I'm not turning into my father, I'm turning into my
>grandfather!]. To paraphrase the paraphrase of the Luftwaffe Fat Man,
>"when I hear the word factorial, I reach for my gun.'
My earlier post of hocus pocus eyewash was more directed toward political
rules than toward garrisoning, but it the problem arises even here, if only
to a lesser extent. For instance, your sample/conceptual rules would not let
possession of Gibraltar have any effect on the size of the Axis occupation
forces in the Balkans, but I suspect it would have a big effect on the
allocation of any forces intended to resist invasion (vs. partisans). The
problem is that effects don't arise from purely local causes (much more so
for political than for strictly military effects, but to some extent even
then). It's when you have to account for things everywhere on the map that
you get the combinatorial explosion that makes it difficult to even specify
the charts, let alone to playtest them.
I mentioned only Gibraltar, but what about Suez/Alexandria, prior Allied
naval losses, Allied commitments elsewhere, etc. The ones we *don't* think
of are a bigger source of trouble than the ones we do.
- Bobby.
From: Rich Velay <richv@icebox.iceonline.com>
Subject: GE cont.
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 1996 20:45:43 PST
From: Ray Kanarr <RayK@smtp4.aw.com> To:
richv@icebox.iceonline.com Cc: europa@lysator.liu.se
Subject: Re: 1st Pz XX [longish]
>On 3/14/96, Rich Velay [speaking AS Rich Velay] stated:
>>The main reason 1st Panzer was sent to Greece was to
>>guard against an anticipated Allied landing, after Africa
>>was lost. They weren't there as part of the Anti-Partisan
>>garrison so much as a mobile reserve to protect Hitler's
>>southern flank.
>That's exactly the point: If Africa is not lost on the
>historic timetable; if the Axis is doing much better [or
>worse] in the USSR than historically; if the Allies decide
>on and execute a cross-Channel attack in 1943; etc., etc.,
>what rationale is there for any particular unit to be
>forcibly sent to, or forced to remain in, a particular
>geographic location?
I don't know. Perhaps when GE is published it will have
garrisons handled differently than they are in the single
front game SF. I would imagine so, anyway. As to how it is
handled, I guess we'll know when we get the shrink wrap off
of the box. :)
>>A number of the units in the SE holding box are fulfilling
>>similar functions, like the 22 Luftland on Crete and
>>Rhodes (either place, at various times) and the Lehr and
>>21st Panzer Divs that so inconveniantly go there over
>>winter/spring '44.
>As I stated in another context, it makes much more sense to
>generally state that: upon fulfillment of condition "a" [in
>the case that you cite, the fall of Africa], "x" number
>of REs [or AFs or DFs] need to garrison geographic region
>"512" [in this case, the Balkan states]. As for
>mathematical blind doo dah hocus pocus about near- infinite
>permutations, that's a lot of eyewash [as my granddad would
>say. Dear Lord, I'm not turning into my father, I'm turning
>into my grandfather!]. To paraphrase the paraphrase of the
>Luftwaffe Fat Man, "when I hear the word factorial, I reach
>for my gun.'
Wjat you propose will almost assuredly be incorporated
into GE, in one permutation or another. Of course, that's
just a guess on my part.
>The following is entirely on the fly:
> [...]
>Given that I have simplified this somewhat [but ONLY
>somewhat], and that it is only for one aspect of the
>overall job, it certainly isn't a task where the
>constellations will have shifted unrecognizably before its
>done!
Very impressive stuff. My only comment would be that I
would prefer to see C/M REs also tracked by AEC. For
example, I don't like the idea of the Axis avoiding the loss
of 1st Pz XX to the Balkans by simply loading up the
garrison box with Mot MG battalions and Mot Inf regiments.
Beyond that, it all looks very interesting and well thought
out.
>>The hand of Dolph is never far away when looking at any
>>German move....
>While that's an accurate strategic assessment in its
>historical context, to say that the hand of Uncle Adolf is
>inflexible under any conditions buys more into the German
>General Staff apologists than it does help create a
>simulation. There are indeed certain activities that can be
>proscribed as being out of touch with the historical
>realities of who Hitler was [the German armed forces will
>NOT engage in a runaway defense!], but to state that he
>would have dictated the exact same activities by the same
>units [or types of units] under varying conditions ignores
>his actual, historical responses to situations that DID
>exist.
Oh, I don't know. Uncle Dolph had a pretty limited
repetoire of reactions to events from winter 41 on. "Defend
to the last man", "Kill him", "Never give up", "Kill them"
seems to pretty much cover the essentials.
One has to make a pretty narrow design window to look
through when designing a game, even one as expansive as
Europa. The more you include, the worse the game is as a
game. That's what I think, anyway.
>Sorry to blather on, but the insistance that historical
>units/ unit types go to [or stay in] in historical regions
>under quasi-historical [at best] Europa circumstances takes
>Europa out of the realm of historical simulation, and
>squarely into the realm of historical game, and eliminates
>the option of a Grand Europa.
Europa, IMO, *is* a game, and can do no more as a
"simulation" than simulate one man's opinions about WW II.
And whether or not having a heavy hand on Strategic or
National Leader questions eliminates the option of GE, I
don't know. It appears to eliminate your version of GE; it
doesn't seem to eliminate my version.
>The mandates from above the level of player decision-
>making should be:
>DIRECTIVE [you must do this if this],
>GENERAL [x number of >REs (not 169th Inf Div., 1st Pz Div.,
>and 369th Emergency Lederhosen Bde) go here],
>CONSTRAINED BY EVENTS, NOT TIME [until either the Allies
>are no longer adjacent, or an anti-Axis revolt occurs, x
>REs must remain in region 512],
>and ACTUALLY STRATEGIC, AND NOT OPERATIONAL IN NATURE.
Interesting ideas, and a pretty good way of handling it.
Probably, GE will incorporate much of this. or at least
something vaguely similar.
>Otherwise, we might as well play 3R. This is not rocket
>science, you know. Historical research is time-consuming
>and generally thankless, as John Astell could probably tell
>you, but its not like building a V-2. You're supposed to
>get some enjoyment out of it. Ray
Not too sure what this is refering to. I already have
3dR and don't want a divisional level version. And the only
historical research I do, I do *for* my own enjoyment.
Anyway, I enjoyed your post. Hope you get what you want
from Europa. late/R
RichV@Icebox.Iceonline.com
Europa, tomorrow's games about yesterday, TODAY
Date: 15 Mar 96 02:34:34 EST
From: Jim Arnold <74133.1765@compuserve.com>
Subject: Re: The Battle for Rome and 3-3-2
> Hurray! Tell 'em, Jim. (Except I'd vote for 5-5-3 instead of your 4-4-3.)
>
> - Bobby.
You rascal, you. I actually meant to say "6-6-3".
Jim
Date: Fri, 15 Mar 1996 01:37:08 -0600
From: bdbryant@mail.utexas.edu (Bobby D. Bryant)
Subject: GR/D web site.
The GR/D web site now lets you browse the list of persons who have signed
the guest book. It includes e-dresses, so you might find it useful for
looking up people who haven't posted here lately.
(I also notice that the main page shows you how to get on this list.)
- Bobby.
Date: Fri, 15 Mar 1996 13:43:03 -0400
From: jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell)
Subject: Re: Grand Europa
>RE: German Declaration of War on US
>If Germany did not DW on US then the allies wouldn't have taken some of the
>heavier naval losses sufered in late-41/early-42.
> US lend lease shipments to Britain in 1942 would have increase.
> Allied shipyards could have been building more LC.
> US "volunteers" would probably have joined the RAF in large numbers.
>Hitler couldn't ignore these actions, and would have been baited into
>declaring war sooner or later. US troop movements to Europe didn't amount
>to much before mid-42 anyway.
Yes, more lend lease would have reached Britain in 1942, but why would this
force Hitler to declare war? The more likely scenario is that German
submarines would attack US ships more and more, with the USN escalating its
response, until the American public was outraged at German attacks on
neutral (US) shipping and the US declared war.
Date: Fri, 15 Mar 1996 14:26:01 -0400
From: jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell)
Subject: Re: 1st Pz XX in the Balkans
I don't get all this hand wringing about the 1st Pz Div having to being in
the SE theater. Just take a look at the SF rules: you determine what you do
with the forces in a theater you control, including sending them anywhere
in any theater you control. Only units specifically listed as being part of
a garrison are restricted, (and only while the garrison hasn't been
activated). Now, take a look at the SE theater: 1st Panzer and tons of
other forces that deploy in the SE aren't part of the SE GARRISON, and
you'll be able to send them anywhere you want in E and GE scenarios where
you control the SE.
Date: Fri, 15 Mar 1996 14:26:36 -0400
From: jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell)
Subject: Re: Mussolini and Graziani
> As far as Rodolfo Graziani goes, he was extremely brave in fighting
>badly-armed Libyan and Ethiopian tribesmen. He also was quite right, the
>Italian 6th and 10th Armies were in no shape for offensive warfare.
I often wonder why an opponent becomes "badly armed" and primitive
("tribesmen") when you want to disparage the accomplishments of their foe?
Fighting qualities count for a whole lot more -- I far more prefer to face
a heavily-armed creampuff nationality/group (insert the name of your
favorite here), than a poorly armed Libyan and Ethiopian force! The
Ethiopians after all had beat the 19th Century Italian invasion at Adowa --
the only indigenous people south of the Sahara to defeat a 19th Century
European invader and keep their independence. The Libyans were good
fighters, too. Neither rolled over and played dead in the face of the
Italians.
The Rif Moroccans were poorly armed vis-a-vis the French, but that didn't
make them contemptable. Rifles and machineguns against clubs and spears is
certainly a mismatch, but that didn't make the Zulu wars in general or the
Battle of Isandlwana in particular a walk-over for the British.
Date: Fri, 15 Mar 1996 19:12:46 -0500
From: Ray Kanarr <RayK@smtp4.aw.com>
Subject: Re: 1st Pz XX in the Balkans
John M. Astell, on 3/15/96, wrote,
>I don't get all this hand wringing about the 1st Pz Div >having to
being in the SE theater.
-snip-
>Only units specifically listed as being part of a garrison are
>restricted, (and only while the garrison hasn't been >activated).
-snip-
>1st Panzer and tons of other forces that deploy in the SE
>aren't part of the SE GARRISON, and you'll be able to
>send them anywhere you want in E and GE scenarios
>where you control the SE.
John [and others],
Apologies for not being clear in my earlier post. The issue regarding
1st Pz Div. et al. was related to a recent SF game in which the Allies
opted for a continental invasion in 1943. Given this, it was decided
that a reasonable course of action for the Axis was to allow all
non-garrison units in the SE Theatre free movement, as per the rules
[but also in contravention of the rules, as SE Theatre is not in
play], and to allow for the release of German units in garrison, as
long as they were replaced with equivalent Italian units [the issue
of the Bulgarian sphere of influence was not addressed].
This led to the discussion of why the SE Theatre is not in play, and
why garrisons are related to specific units after initial, historical
placement [rather than based on a number of Axis/Allied REs, or AFs,
or DFs, (except for training/
replacement type units, for which there is some rationale for them to
be tied to specific areas) once play has started], or even to specific
levels of forces, irrespective of the overall strategic/operational
situation. It didn't start out as being about 1st Pz Div. at all, per
se.
Ray
Date: Fri, 15 Mar 1996 16:44:21 -0800
From: zaius@teleport.com (Steve)
Subject: Re: GE politics
>SF gives a great example of the implausibility of the notion of Europa
>players representing individuals: what individual or body had the ability to
>decide when and where the Allies returned to the continent, but also had the
>responsibility of deciding which fighter groups should escort which air raid
>along the Rhine or of ensuring sufficient anti-tank assets (and which ones)
>were "stacked with" individual divisions on the Italian front?
I recently came to this conclusion myself. While I continue to advocate
optimal flexibility and decision making power of players, it seems more
logical to say that the player represents simply the decision making bodies
of the country he plays- in Britain, Churchill annoyed his commanders by
meddling, the office of CIGS changed hands at least once that I can recall
offhand, front commanders were sacked, transferred, kicked upstairs...
So a player can't be said to represent a specific person (thus rendering
pointless arguments back and forth about Hitler being assasinated or
Marshall being sent to Europe instead of Ike.) really- is that your opinion
as well?
"Freedom is always against the law."
-J.R. "Bob" Dobbs
Date: Fri, 15 Mar 1996 16:43:49 -0800
From: zaius@teleport.com (Steve)
Subject: If Hitler won the war.
> Books like these entertain, and they also hold our feet to the fire.
>We realize just what the world might have been like had Hitler won the
>war.
I have a hard time believing the British would have had it much worse than
the French- which is to say not bad at all. Django Reinhardt continued to
play at the Hot Club. Things didn't get really bad until the pressure on
Germany mounted and they started leaning on the French to implement
anti-Semitic regulations and shortages started hitting more severely.
As far as Fatherland, where Germany has a moribund economy- compare this
with the economy of Chile, Brazil or Argentina- all these countries were
seen in the 50s as the up and coming powers, but in all of them, military
coups led by Fascist military officers took place. These regimes
thoroughly gutted their economies by following the export oriented Chicago
school economic model.
Germany, however was not under the Imperial aegis of the United States-
indeed a primary reason for Germany's fighting the war in the first place
was to achieve autarky. When it became clear that Hitler was serious about
making Germany independent of the system envisioned by the US, that elites
in the west turned against Hitler. But not entirely. Texaco Oil, for
instance sent as much oil as possible to Germany before it became
impossible to do so. Henry Ford kept an autographed picture of the Fuhrer
close at hand. Sosthanes Behn of ITT was similarly an admirer. ITT is
known for its active support for autocratic regimes.
Germany had a dynamic capitalist economy which was organized in the same
way as it is today. In fact, the major players are largely the same. Did
you know that I.G. Farben still exists? It just changed its name. In
fact, if you buy a music album on cassette, that cassette is manufactured
by BASF, which is part of the new Farben combine.
Steve P.
"Freedom is always against the law."
-J.R. "Bob" Dobbs
Date: Fri, 15 Mar 1996 16:44:15 -0800
From: zaius@teleport.com (Steve)
Subject: Re: Italy
Dave the Public Affairs Officer finished with:
> So whatever shape Italy takes in Europa (I find it hard to see as an
>independent player, but it could be done), it will have to reflect on the
>personality of this sawdust Caesar, this strutting pretender, whose image
>remains that of Mussolini's shaven skull, head flung back, jaw pointed
>up, as he delivers yet another bellicose and bombastic speech to his army
>of claques, forever thrusting out a flabby, insubstantial aggression
>towards the world.
Curtain Falls...thunderous applause! This man should be writing the promo
material to all the Europa games.
I would agree that Mussolini was a washout and a joke as a stateseman. But
it should be remembered that prior to WW2, he was not so villified.
Winston Churchill wrote peans of praise as did FDR and others. Mussolini's
methods were admired widely by the decision makers of Europe and the United
States.
Which leads me to make the point that Italy would do well to have an
independent player- to be rewarded by attempting to play a game of
upsmanship with Germany-all the time pushing Italy far beyond its realistic
capabilities. If only because it was supposed that Italy might prove to be
as formidable on the battlefield as they looked in the newsreels. And
perhaps they may have accomplished something if they'd picked their fights
better.
Steve P.
"Politicians have neither the training, nor the inclination for strategic
thought." --General Jack T. Ripper, USAF in *Dr. Strangelove*
"Freedom is always against the law."
-J.R. "Bob" Dobbs
Date: Fri, 15 Mar 1996 16:44:43 -0800
From: zaius@teleport.com (Steve)
Subject: Re: GE politics
>As for Spain:
>
>Why wait until 1941 when you can invade in 1940? No need to upset your
>timetable in Russia. While your at it, why not invade the Balkans in 1940?
A realistic logistical system (or one that at least imposes realistic
constraints) should make planning something like a German invasion of
France leading directly to an invasion of Spain more involved than just
taking it on the fly.
Consequenses to invading a country seen both at home and abroad as an ally
of sorts should be a powerful deterrent.
Steve P
"Freedom is always against the law."
-J.R. "Bob" Dobbs
Date: Sat, 16 Mar 1996 03:22:47 +0100
From: cloister@dircon.co.uk (Perry de Havilland)
Subject: Re: If Hitler won the war.
I am sorry about the political rant that follows....actually, I am not
sorry at all (but do not take offense, please)
Steve wrote:
>As far as Fatherland, where Germany has a moribund economy- compare this
>with the economy of Chile, Brazil or Argentina- all these countries were
>seen in the 50s as the up and coming powers, but in all of them, military
>coups led by Fascist military officers took place. These regimes
>thoroughly gutted their economies by following the export oriented Chicago
>school economic model.
Crumbs! I see we have **VERY** different views on economics. I am an
honest-to-goodness-real-in-the-flesh advocate of Austrian school economist
(of which the Chicago school is an off-shoot). We also have a rather
different take on the history of Chile under Pinochet.
>Germany, however was not under the Imperial aegis of the United States-
>indeed a primary reason for Germany's fighting the war in the first place
>was to achieve autarky. When it became clear that Hitler was serious about
>making Germany independent of the system envisioned by the US, that elites
>in the west turned against Hitler
Likewise, I suspect our opinions re. the dynamics of real world
international politics and economics are so dissimilar as to suggest we are
talking about different planets
>But not entirely. Texaco Oil, for
>instance sent as much oil as possible to Germany before it became
>impossible to do so. Henry Ford kept an autographed picture of the Fuhrer
>close at hand. Sosthanes Behn of ITT was similarly an admirer. ITT is
>known for its active support for autocratic regimes.
>Germany had a dynamic capitalist economy which was organized in the same
>way as it is today.
Argg! To describe a fascist economy as capitalistic is, well, bizarre.
The essence of a fascist economy is state intervention to achieve various
goals in accordance with some set of nationalist views. The essence of how
capitalist an economy is is the extent to which market forces are allowed
to function within a legal structure that secures several (i.e. personal)
property rights. In crude terms (very crude), a (true) socialist economy
is one in which the state owns the means of production. In a fascist
economy, the means of production are (to varying degrees) in private hands
but under such a very high degree of state regulation. There is little
practical difference in purely macroeconomics terms. In both cases, market
forces are largely ignored.
So if a large multi-national company supports a nasty regime in return for
favours, that does not mean this is a *capitalist* thing to do. Having the
state do favours for your company is a distortion of market forces and
hence a diminution of capitalist market forces. It may or may not be a
good idea, but it aint capitalism.
The name National Socialist (Nazi) is very accurate. It is a mutant form
of SOCIALISM not capitalism. Marxist descriptions of fascism as *late
capitalism* are absurd. For a good refutation read 'The Road to Serfdom'
by Hajak. Some people think it strange that Mussolini started off as a
Communist: not really. Both systems have a horror of self regulating
mechanisms such as markets.
Of course, a plain vanilla socialist (as opposed to National socialist)
system has much the same structural (and subjectivist, dare I say Platonic)
qualities as a fascist one, but aims to manipulate the state for the
benefit of a different group of people that a Nazi regime. Please note: I
am talk ECONOMICS here and not such weirdness as the racial or nationalist
aspects of a fascist regime. Socialist systems can be utterly savage
(Stalin) or ostensibly benign. Fascist systems can be utterly savage or,
well, somewhat savage (Franco).
Suffice to say that statist societies of any form are not to my taste, but
that is just my opinion.
Does ANY of this have anything to do with Europa?
Well, a bit (but only a bit).
The various economic aspects of fascist/socialist/capitalist/groucho
marxist societies is largely irrelevant. All we care about is how many
tanks/aircraft/ships/lederhosen etc. each combatant nation produced and
when. The reason the USA out produced the Germans in just about everything
may have been because they had a powerful capitalist economy: or it may
have been because Elanor Roosevelt wore rather nice hats and the hot-dogs
on Conney Island inspired superhuman productivity (probably the later).
This is, of course, utterly irrelevant. The bald facts of what the Yanks
DID produce are all we need to know.
However, if we have a dramatically different take on the political
interaction between the various nations: THAT could seriously colour how
we attempt a Europa simulation of what is/is not politically possible. If
you take the view that an Imperial America was behind the actions of the
British and French in 1939 (or whenever), well, I doubt there is going to
be much meeting of the minds with a person such as myself, who thinks that
the British, French and Americans all had their own agendas. If France did
not fall, it is hard to see the Anglo-French alliance not pursuing its war
aims without asking Washington if it is okay with them.
I must say I rather enjoy reading other peoples views on such matters and I
DO hope no one (particularly Steve) is offended by my views. If anyone IS
offended, well, too bad: nevertheless, causing offence is not what I am
setting out to do.
Any continuation of this topic is probably best done away from the Europa
forum as we are starting to enter another realm here.
Send me your Comments/Kudos/Brickbats directly, I am a big boy, I can take it !
(However, irrational flames will be ignored, as always)
Regards
Perry ...-
P.S. Perry says:
*Turning to socialism for fear of fascism is like suicide for fear of death*
From: "David H. Thornley" <thornley@cs.umn.edu>
Subject: Re: GE cont.
Date: Fri, 15 Mar 1996 21:23:11 -0600 (CST)
> >On 3/14/96, Rich Velay [speaking AS Rich Velay] stated:
> >>The main reason 1st Panzer was sent to Greece was to
> >>guard against an anticipated Allied landing, after Africa
> >>was lost. They weren't there as part of the Anti-Partisan
> >>garrison so much as a mobile reserve to protect Hitler's
> >>southern flank.
>
Well, if Greece is considered a possible invasion area, the problem
is solved. The Germans can put a panzer division there, or they can
cut the garrison to the bone and figure the Western Allies will
probably invade somewhere else. Not a problem. Heck, the whole
garrison stuff from Second Front stems from two issues: keeping
the local populace under control (which will have to be modelled
in more detail in GE), and keeping some defenses in areas where
there was a threat that the game doesn't include. Churchill was
all for attacking in places Second Front doesn't include. You can't
just let the Germans strip the place because the rules say it can't
be invaded.
> >>The hand of Dolph is never far away when looking at any
> >>German move....
>
> >While that's an accurate strategic assessment in its
> >historical context, to say that the hand of Uncle Adolf is
> >inflexible under any conditions buys more into the German
> >General Staff apologists than it does help create a
> >simulation. There are indeed certain activities that can be
> >proscribed as being out of touch with the historical
> >realities of who Hitler was [the German armed forces will
> >NOT engage in a runaway defense!], but to state that he
> >would have dictated the exact same activities by the same
> >units [or types of units] under varying conditions ignores
> >his actual, historical responses to situations that DID
> >exist.
>
> Oh, I don't know. Uncle Dolph had a pretty limited
> repetoire of reactions to events from winter 41 on. "Defend
> to the last man", "Kill him", "Never give up", "Kill them"
> seems to pretty much cover the essentials.
You're missing a couple of important ones: "OK", and "Do that!"
I'm not about to defend Hitler's ability as a strategist, but he
did listen to generals he trusted and would order the abandonment
of large territories (Western France and the Southern Balkans come
to mind) when convinced it was necessary. Generals like Model had a
pretty free hand.
Weinberg, in _A_World_At_Arms_, has a very interesting theory about
Hitler and the generals. He says that Hitler intended to win the war,
whereas after '41 and much of '42 the generals were trying to lose
gracefully. Hitler's decisions look much more rational when considering
that. He wasn't interested in giving up Stalingrad, since if he couldn't
hold it the war was likely lost. He wasn't interested in shortening the
lines, since that would free Soviet, as well as German, forces, and it
wasn't being presented as a way to regroup for an offensive. He wasn't
interested in evacuating Army Group Courland, since by holding the Baltic
coast he was preserving the Baltic as a training area for the new submarines
that might defeat the Western Allies, enabling him to concentrate on the
Soviet Union. The German generals were mostly interested in what was
militarily feasible, and their instincts and experience told them that
winning wasn't in the cards.
Hitler made obvious errors (if his idea was to win in the near future,
he had no business specifying objectives on economic, rather than military,
criteria), and it is certainly arguable that his best chance was to drag
the war on and hope to wear out the Allies, but Germany did not lose the
war because of Hitler.
David H. Thornley, known to the Wise as thornley@cs.umn.edu O-
Disclaimer: These are not the opinions of the University of Minnesota,
its Regents, faculty, staff, students, or squirrels.
Datclaimer: Well, maybe the squirrels. They're pretty smart.
Date: Fri, 15 Mar 1996 23:04:09 -36000
From: Jason Long <civguy@dusable.cps.k12.il.us>
Subject: Re: SouthEast Front and Political Police [was Re: Second Front
The deployment of 1st Panzer is an example of the Germans buying into
supposed Allied plans to invade the Balkans with units based in
Syria/Palestine/Iraq. The effects of the Allied intelligence operations
are going to be very hard to model, and modelled they must be for Grand
Europa!, and in some in some cases will straight-jacket players.
The deployment of c/m units to far-flung theaters like Norway and Greece
may well be one of these straight-jackets. Though I have no problem with
any sort of generic combat factor/RE size requirements so long as they
are sufficiently detailed to force historical garrisons in terms of
security, c/m, mountain, etc. What players should be able to do is to
override garrison requirements if and when necessary. Now all we need to
do is to write such rules that allow for the release of 1st Panzer from
Greece once, say Cyprus and Malta are Axis controlled, while keeping it
there under most conditions.
For example, Corsica was garrisoned after the Allied occupation by one
Moroccan Goum of mountain troops, as well as other units, for the entire
remainder of the war and I argued at the time that this should be reflected
in the garrison requirments, but I was overruled. In this case the
broken terrain and fractious population required the presence of a unit
that could go anywhere on the island. This despite the utility of such a
unit in the Alps or Vosges mountains. Also don't forget that the French
really preferred non-white units to stay out of mainland France if
possible as part of their blanchment process.
If I must be categorized on this issue I think I could be called a
believer in limited flexibility as nations did things during the war that
are inexplicable in the strict military terms of a wargame, but make
perfect sense if you look at them in the contexts of the time. I don't
want to factor the out right stupidity of some bureaucrat in Whitehall or
Berlin out of Europa.
Garrison rules with Teeth, that what I want!
Jason
From: m.royer3@genie.com
Date: Sat, 16 Mar 96 03:25:00 UTC 0000
Subject: Sino-Japanese Conflict
Reply: Item #0437013 from PARDUE@HILDA.MAST.QUEENSU.CA@INET#on 96/02/24 at
16:35
on 24 Feb 96 Keith Pardue wrote:
> Thanks for the amusing playtest report, Mark. So, what
> do the political rules of this game look like? Also, what
> is the map scale and how many maps are there? Is the
> naval system more detailed than the Second Front system?
Keith,
Sorry, just found this among the myriad of messages.
The Sino-Japanese Conflict (SJC) is essentially Europa in China. It uses
standard Europa (Second Front) scales and system game mechanics. 16 mile
hexes, 2 week turns, etc... The air and ground systems are virtually identical
to SF. Supply is similar to FWTBT (i.e., attack supply). Since the naval war
was secondary in China, the naval system is a pared down version of SF's
system.
Politics in SJC take the form of victory conditions, Chinese factional rules,
and guerilla rules. Essentially the game boils down to one victory condition:
cause the Nationalist government to collapse and the Japanese player wins,
otherwise the Chinese player wins. Forcing the collapse is a combination of a
number of factors such as military conquests, Chinese factional allegiance,
number of active communist guerilla bases, etc... The Nationalist government's
stability slowly erodes until it collapses.
The Chinese army is divided into a bunch of factions, each having a
cooperation level with the Nationalist government, which can change during the
game. The communists are, of course, antagonistic. The plethora of warlord
factions vary in cooperation and can even turn to Japanese puppets. Both the
Chinese and Japanese player can vie for the loyalty of these armies through the
expenditure of resource points (essentially bribes).
Moreover, the Japanese player can set up a number of provincial, regional,
and a national puppet government. These governments can raise more puppet
units and their existance further erodes the stability of the Chinese
Nationalist government.
-Mark R.
Date: Fri, 15 Mar 1996 23:31:19 -36000
From: Jason Long <civguy@dusable.cps.k12.il.us>
Subject: Re: Computers and Europa
The German OB is bad when dealing with the units belonging to the
divisions themselves. For example Panzer divisions had merged their
motorcycle and recon battalions during the early part of '42. Some panzer
divisions had 3 and others had only 1 panzer battalion, etc. Soviets ahd
a number of similar problems, but I can't fault Atomic much as Sharp had
yet to release any of his Soviet OB books when it was released. Also
problems with weapons ranges.
I know the AI is stupid. Conquering Stalingrad in 15 days was clear
evidence of that. I just have a gut feeling, based on playing
Gold-Juno-Sword and Stalingrad that there's a bias towards the offense
when dealing with individual combats.
Jason
Date: Fri, 15 Mar 1996 23:35:05 -36000
From: Jason Long <civguy@dusable.cps.k12.il.us>
Subject: Re: occupation policies (fwd)
I believe the most cited example was an area in AGC's sector where the
Germans gave the civilians quotas of food and goods to produce and
otherwise pretty much left things alone. Alexander Dallin's book on the
German rule in occupied Russia should be illuminating on the topic.
There's another, but I can't remember any details, Matthew Cooper perhaps?
Jason
From: j.broshot@genie.com
Date: Sat, 16 Mar 96 05:03:00 UTC 0000
Subject: Grand Europa etc.
Here's my $0.02 about various postings:
1. 1st Panzer Division etc.: spent its "Balkan Interlude" mainly in
Greece after refitting in France; as I recollect the Germans rotated
burned out divisions through rear areas to refit and train replacements.
I guess they figured a little combat experience in partisan warfare
would help later.
Panzer Lehr and other units went to Hungary in early 1944 to try and
keep Hungary in the Axis camp.
And speaking of the Balkans, Perry de Havilland wrote a very well reasoned
short summary of the Balkan problems during WW2, to which I would like to
note that the Germans raised, not one, but two SS divisions of Bosnia
Muslims as well as assorted units of Croats and "ethnic" Germans. I am
careful to note that most of these "volunteers" probably weren't.
2. Garrisons: don't forget that the British were forced to keep substantial
forces in Palestine during the war (usually at least a division) because of
what Churchill once termed, "the Anti-Zionist policies" of the prewar
British governments.
For Glory and Grand Europa the problem of the sizeable British garrison in
India will have to be addressed. Many of the regular infantry battalions
in India were not placed on war-footing until AFTER December 1941. Churchill
demanded that the regulars be brought home at once and be replaced by
Territorials (as was done in WW1) but that never happened (only 8 regular
infantry battalions and 2 regular cavalry battalions were returned and 4
of those infantry units went back in 1942). Perhaps the Imperial General
Staff was afraid of the influence of all those "Bolshies" in the ranks of
the Territorials?
3. "What Ifs:" kudos to our man in New Zealand for the VERY complete review
of the topic. There is also MAN IN A HIGH CASTLE by Phillip K. Dick and one
about a mixed British and American force defending England against a 1942
Sea Lion (I regret that I failed to note the author and title) where the
U. S. general in charge uses gas warfare as a final resort. There is always
Harry Turtledove's series on the alien invasion of Earth during the height
of World War 2, "Europa meets Mega-Traveller [or your favorite sci-fi
battle game]!"
One off beat what-if book for prehistoric Grand Europa postulated an
invasion of New York by the Kaiser right after the Spanish-American War
when the best U. S. troops were still overseas. The author was someone
named Conroy and it was called 1904 or something like that. A footnote in
a book about the Spanish-American War [AN ARMY FOR EMPIRE] mentions that
Germans actually formulated plans along those lines!
There is also HITLER THE VICTORY THAT NEARLY WAS by Bruce Quarrie which was
given to me but which I have never read. It starts with the 7th Flieger
Division taking out Malta in September 1941, Barbarossa starts in May 1942.
4. Gas Warfare; this will have to be addressed in Grand Europa-World
War I style and perhaps for the really far out variants in Grand Europa-
World War II. Hitler, of all people, was against it. The United States
made extensive preparation for defensive and offensive gas warfare in WW2.
Note all of those U.S. 1 x 1-8 Mortar IIs in SF. Those are 4.2inch chemical
mortar battalions originally intended to fire gas shells, and found to be
much more useful as regular artillery (and for their smoke shells and white
phosporous).
Jim Broshot, St. James MO
From: Italorican@aol.com
Date: Sat, 16 Mar 1996 00:37:11 -0500
n the political economy of the Third Reich and
of the continuities. A while back, someone mentioned GM and the Ruhr --
Income was being banked for GM German subsidiaries all throughout the war.
As for Mussolini and Italy and posturing and whatnot. John Astell's comment
concerning Graziani and the Lybian popular insurgency is very appropriate.
I would expect that europa-ists might be more sophisticated about Italy as a
belligerant -- and not echo some of the wop-bashing typifications that graced
and still grace the pages of a lot of Anglo-American and German writing about
that war. I was disabused of this kind of belittling italian soldiery long
ago, sometime in the late 70s when I read a memoir by an Italian officer --
who later fought with the partisans and ended up in charge of the italian
graves registration/repatriation commission in North Africa. Unfortunately,
I cannot give you the reference at this moment.
As for Fascism and the U.S., look at David F. Schmitz's study of "The US and
Fascist Italy, 1922-1940. Very nice study of US support for a strongman
regime, to restore normalcy. Including very large loans and direct
investment.
Antonio Lauria
From: grd1@genie.com
Date: Sat, 16 Mar 96 15:15:00 UTC 0000
Subject: Who is the player
RE: What does the player represent
Obviously the player does not represent a sinlge individual or even a single
level in the chain of command. EUROPA is not a role playing game by any
means. If anyone assumed that was what I intended they ASS-U-MEd wrong.
The players represent (in my opinion anyway) the Corps-Army-Army Group and
sometimes Theater commanders and their air counterparts [in regular EUROPA
games]. They do not represent the heads of state, or service chiefs. The
Joint or Combined Staffs were making decisions that the Theater Commanders
would have to comply with (i.e. whether or not to invade N. Africa, transfer
troops out of theater, switch production from bombers to fighters, etc).
Only in SF does the player get to make some of the higher level decisions
such as when and where to invade Italy/France.
In GE the players will need more freedom than has been allowed in the
individual (Campaign) games. The questions is how much freedom?
If we assume (a dangerous thing sometimes) that the players represent the
heads of state then ANYTHING sould resonable be allowed. With 20-20
hindsight a German player (lets call him Adolf) would want to do some or all
of the following:
1. Develop the A-bomb
2. Develop ground to air missiles
3. Speed development of the ME262
4. Change his war strategy to avoid a 2 front war: take Britain's Empire out
of the war (I assume Sea Lion to be next to immpossible) by taking
Gibralter, Malta, N. Africa and the Middle East.
5. Only after the British Empire has been reduced to a shadow of it's former
self would Russia be attacked.
Even if we remove the first three from consideration this will make an
interesting game.
Of course this ability can go against Adolf when we give it to the French.
Being the student of history that most EUROPA players are, a French player
would realize France is going to fall, and:
1. Evacuate to North Africa and England as many forces as possible. This
would include the entire French Navy and major air and ground forces.
2. Invade and take Italian N Africa.
3. Wait for help to regain France.
The advantages of this strategy are:
1. Almost 100% certainty that N Africa and England will be saved from the
axis.
2. An overwhelming allied naval superiority.
3. Lots of extra allied forces close to axis weak points.
4. Makes the axis tie down large forces in Italy/Sicily/France/Norway
guarding against a very early allied invasion.
Certainly the allies will have a huge force to land in Greece or elsewhere
and enough to hold Crete for as long as they want. (Crete is an excellent
place from which to bomb the Balkans, ie Ploesti.)
Give players the ability to make Stalin's decisions and they are going to:
1. Deploy their frontier forces in a very sensible fortified defense in
depth with their armor well protected.
2. Take all of Finland as soon as possible.
3. Bide their time until they are ready to attack.
#1 seems the very least we should allow, and that alone will make a German
invasion much less likely to succeed.
Now I must ask those people who want to give players full control of their
national economies and armed forces if the result would be anything like a
"simulation" of WWII? Or, would it be a political-military "game" using
WWII as a model.
Perhaps we will end up with both, at different stages of development. I can
get enjoyment out of either, but much prefer the simulation to the game.
Alan Tibbetts
From: grd1@genie.com
Date: Sat, 16 Mar 96 15:16:00 UTC 0000
Subject: Alternate History
Jim Broshot RE: Alternate History
One very nice alternate history was "The Red Napoleon" which postulated an
assasination of Stalin followed by a military coup. The Soviets then
marched west. A Bolshie British Admiral kept his fleet in port when the
Reds crossed the channel. Then a combined Soviet-Japanese invasion of the
Americas. After the Soviet invasion of Maine-New Brunswick the major battle
was fought along the Hudson River/Erie canal.
After a decisive US victory over the combined Brit-Italina-Russian-German-
Japanese fleet in the carribean (the US had 1000 seaplanes which helped),
and a revolt in Europe, the Soviet dictator was captured.
Also, "The Great Pacific War: A History of the American-Japanese Campaign of
1931-33" by Hector Bywater. A very accurate piece of fiction written in the
1920s. The Japanese initiate the war with a surpise attack on US Pacific
bases while negotiations are still in progress and attempt to establish an
invulnerable defensive web in the western Pacific. Yammamoto and Bywater
actual met and discussed Pacific war strategy.
Alan Tibbetts
Date: Sat, 16 Mar 1996 12:05:43 -0500
From: Nicholas Forte <nforte@osf1.gmu.edu>
Subject: Re: Grand Europa
On Fri, 15 Mar 96 01:27:00 UTC 0000 grd1@genie.com wrote:
>RE: Will France fall?
>
>
>YES, given anything but totally incompetent German play, France will fall.
>
>However, there remains much to be decided. How quickly? How much of the BEF
>got away? How many Germans died to gain the victory (how dearly did the
>French sell themselves)? Did Germany also invade the low countries? Or
>Switzerland?
>
>To find the answers the campaign does need to be fought.
>
>Alan Tibbetts
I must disagree with your position that France will fall except for totally
incompetent German play. The historical case was one of totally incompetent
French play. General Gamelin's decisions in deploying the French Army invited
the blitzkrieg that fell upon it.
The half dozen divisions guarding the Ardennes sector were the worse in the
French Army, being mostly class "B" divisions made up of older reservists and
missing about half of their artillery equipment. In addition, they were
assigned to hold frontages that were twice that called for in French doctrine.
Marshal Petain's statement about the Ardennes being impenetrable carried with a
qualifier "provided we make some special dispositions." Gamelin made NO special
dispositions, essentially ignoring the front.
At the same time, approximately 50 higher quality divisions were sitting
uselessly in the Maginot Line. The assignment of so many divisions to the
Maginot Line is all the more disgraceful when it is realized that their average
frontage was half that of the Ardennes divisions, despite being the most heavily
fortified region in Europe!
This folly of overmanning an area that should have been used for an economy of
force left Gamelin with too few divisions to properly man the rest of the front
or to establish a proper reserve. The importance of a strong reserve for French
doctrine was important since, despite the common misperception, the French never
considered the continuous front to be impenetrable. The purpose of the
continous front was to slow down any enemy attack long enough for the general
staff to rush reserves to the sector an contain any breakout. Gamelin's failure
to establish such a reserve was therefore against French doctrine. Gamelin
magnified this mistake when, at the last minute, he assigned 6 divisions from
his limited General Reserve to the 7th Army with the mission of linking up with
the Dutch Army at Breda. This despite the fact that the 7th Army needed to
march twice as far as the German 18th Army to reach Breda.
Thus, when the breakthrough (which he practically invited) at Sedan came,
Gamelin had no forces with which to contain it. The Germans were then able to
exploit this breakthrough and drive to the Channel. A more reasoned French
deployment would have made it more difficult for the Germans to cross the Meuse
and even if the crossing were accomplished, would have given the French the
troops to contain it.
Some might object that the French doctrine was ill-suited to fight a defensive
battle against an armor assault. However, the French were able to adapt fairly
quickly to fighting armor after Dunkerque when they abandoned the linear defence
and adopted the "checkerboard defense" of separated hedgehog posistions at the
Weygand Line. The downfall of the Weygand Line was not due to doctrine, but
rather the lack of troops to carry it out as the French Army had lost a third of
its forces at Dunkerque. In fact, the 'checkerboard' defense was not a new
creation of General Weygand, but already existed in French doctrine. It was to
be used, however, only when armor attacks were expected and was thus considered
an exception to the more widely used linear defense. Nonetheless, if the French
were able to slow down the Germans on the Meuse, it is almost certain that the
French Army would have had the time to recognize that armor attacks had
progressed from the tactical scale and were now a strategic instrument. This
would have lead to the 'checkerboard' to become the standard French defense, in
place of the linear defense.
It has generally be argued that even if the French Army was better deployed than
historically, it would have been ground down in an attrition battle with the
larger German Army. However, I will argue that despite the common wisdom, time
was not on the side of Germany. For one, Germany had failed to take advantage
of its industrial advantages over France. While German production was geared to
both a "guns" and "butter" economy, the French were quickly moving over to a
total wartime production. For example, between September 1939 and May 1940, the
French produced 2.5 times as many tanks as did Germany. This ratio held even
when considering the heavier tanks of the time (ie. Char B1bis and PzIV).
French wartime production plans called for the building of about twice as many
tanks in 1940 than Germany actually produced at the time. It is true that
Germany could have produced more tanks if it also fully mobilized its economy,
but such a move would have been a political defeat for the Nazi regime which had
promised the German people that it could go to war without causing economic
hardship on the homefront. Combined with the spector of a repeat of the
stagnated fronts and attrition battles of WWI, it is questionable if the Nazi
regime could have survived.
The situation in the air is no better for Germany. The combined French and
British aero industries would have outbuilt the German industry if the Battle of
France continued beyond June 1940. It is true that the French industry was
plagued with problems in the winter of 39-40, but this was due primarily from
the rapid mobilization of the industry from very low peacetime production rates
to wartime levels. By the spring of 1940, most of these problems had been
worked out and French production levels were on target, producing modern
aircraft, such as the D.520 fightes and Leo.451 bomber, which were the match to
anything the Luftwaffe could through at them. In fact, the Armee de l'Air was
larger on June 22 at the end of the campaign than it was on May 4 at the
beginning. By the fall of 1940, it is likely that the Luftwaffe would have lost
air supremacy to the Allies.
The only weakpoint in the French ability to survive a long campaign was its
manpower shortage. With half of the population of Germany, France was in no
condition to match, man-for-man, the replacements available to Germany.
However, to the French manpower pool must be added that of Britain. The British
had promised the French that 30 British divisions would be in France by the
spring of 1941. Also, it is questionable if Germany could have thrown the full
weight of it manpower advantage at the French. During the short campaign of
1940, the Germans could afford to post only a handful of division on their
eastern front to watch the Red Army. However, if the German Army got bogged
down in France, Hitler and the general staff would have to look increasingly
with concern over their shoulders to the east. Even if Stalin would not have
considered intervening in the war, Hitler could not be certain. Prudence would
have caused Germany to syphon off a considerable number of troops to guard the
eastern frontier.
In all, the fall for France was far from being pre-ordained. Some better moves
by Gamelin and a few poorer ones by the Germans could have led to a stalemate in
the West.
Nick Forte
Reston, VA
Date: Sat, 16 Mar 1996 18:38:51 +0100
From: cloister@dircon.co.uk (Perry de Havilland)
Subject: Re: The Fall of France (to be or not to be)
Nick Forte wrote re. the contention France was always doomed to fall:
>I must disagree with your position that France will fall except for totally
>incompetent German play. The historical case was one of totally incompetent
>French play. General Gamelin's decisions in deploying the French Army invited
>the blitzkrieg that fell upon it.
Hear, hear!
>The half dozen divisions guarding the Ardennes sector were the worse in the
>French Army, being mostly class "B" divisions made up of older reservists and
>missing about half of their artillery equipment. In addition, they were
>assigned to hold frontages that were twice that called for in French doctrine.
>Marshal Petain's statement about the Ardennes being impenetrable carried with a
>qualifier "provided we make some special dispositions." Gamelin made NO
>>special dispositions, essentially ignoring the front.
>
>At the same time, approximately 50 higher quality divisions were sitting
>uselessly in the Maginot Line. The assignment of so many divisions to the
>Maginot Line is all the more disgraceful when it is realized that their average
>frontage was half that of the Ardennes divisions, despite being the most
>heavily fortified region in Europe!
snip
>Thus, when the breakthrough (which he practically invited) at Sedan came,
>Gamelin had no forces with which to contain it. The Germans were then able to
>exploit this breakthrough and drive to the Channel. A more reasoned French
>deployment would have made it more difficult for the Germans to cross the Meuse
>and even if the crossing were accomplished, would have given the French the
>troops to contain it.
snip
>It has generally be argued that even if the French Army was better
>deployed >than historically, it would have been ground down in an
>attrition battle w. the
>larger German Army. However, I will argue that despite the common wisdom, time
>was not on the side of Germany. For one, Germany had failed to take advantage
>of its industrial advantages over France. While German production was geared
>to both a "guns" and "butter" economy, the French were quickly moving over to a
>total wartime production. For example, between September 1939 and May 1940,
>the French produced 2.5 x as many tanks as did Germany. This ratio held even
>when considering the heavier tanks of the time (ie. Char B1bis and PzIV).
>French wartime production plans called for the building of about twice as many
>tanks in 1940 than Germany actually produced at the time.
Yes. French automotive production was awesome!
>It is true that
>Germany could have produced more tanks if it also fully mobilized its economy,
>but such a move would have been a political defeat for the Nazi regime which
>had promised the German people that it could go to war without causing economic
>hardship on the homefront. Combined with the spector of a repeat of the
>stagnated fronts and attrition battles of WWI, it is questionable if the Nazi
>regime could have survived.
Hmm.
>
>The situation in the air is no better for Germany.
Worse. MUCH worse, in fact. In this respect, the effects of the much
higher rate of Allied air production would have made itself felt much
faster than tank or truck production. Deprived of its tactical air support
in 1941 by clouds of D.520s and Spitfires, the Luftwaffe would probably
have found itself concentrating not on supporting the Wehrmacht, but
trying to prevent the RAF/Adel'A bombing the hell out of German industry if
the front line was still pinned on the Maginot. Really, things start to
get pretty dicey for the Luftwaffe as early as Nov/Dec 1940 if France is
still in the game.
>The combined French and
>British aero industries would have outbuilt German industry if the Battle of
>France continued beyond June 1940. It is true that the French industry was
>plagued with problems in the winter of 39-40, but this was due primarily from
>the rapid mobilization of the industry from very low peacetime production rates
>to wartime levels. By the spring of 1940, most of these problems had been
>worked out and French production levels were on target, producing modern
>aircraft, such as the D.520 fightes and Leo.451 bomber, which were the match to
>anything the Luftwaffe could through at them.
Basically I agree although I do not entirely agree that the D.520 was quite
as good as a Bf-109E. It was certainly good enough that you could come up
and fight (one could say the same about the Hurricane) and it had the legs
to escort bombers to the Ruhr in 1941 (by which time a new and much tastier
generation of French fighter would has started appearing in good numbers
and have eroded any German technical edge down to nothing). Also, the
Leo.451 was a very fine bomber.
>In fact, the Armee de l'Air was
>larger on June 22 at the end of the campaign than it was on May 4 at the
>beginning. By the fall of 1940, it is likely that the Luftwaffe would
>have >lost air supremacy to the Allies.
Pretty much guaranteed to loose it, I would say. Anglo-French aero
production was simply too great for any other outcome.
>The only weakpoint in the French ability to survive a long campaign was its
>manpower shortage. With half of the population of Germany, France was in no
>condition to match, man-for-man, the replacements available to Germany.
>However, to the French manpower pool must be added that of Britain. The
>British had promised the French that 30 British divisions would be in
>France by
>the spring of 1941. Also, it is questionable if Germany could have thrown the
>full weight of it manpower advantage at the French. During the short campaign
>of 1940, the Germans could afford to post only a handful of division on their
>eastern front to watch the Red Army. However, if the German Army got bogged
>down in France, Hitler and the general staff would have to look increasingly
>with concern over their shoulders to the east. Even if Stalin would not have
>considered intervening in the war, Hitler could not be certain. Prudence would
>have caused Germany to syphon off a considerable number of troops to guard the
>eastern frontier.
>
>In all, the fall for France was far from being pre-ordained. Some better moves
>by Gamelin and a few poorer ones by the Germans could have led to a stalemate
>in the West.
>
I am less sanguine about the Nazi regime collapsing if France hangs in
there, but basically, Nick, I think you are absolutely right (but then you
knew that, didn't you). Playing FoF seems to support this (France often
survives. German player often uses the Switzerland option to break the
stalemate (a sure sign of desperation)).
Vive la France!
Perry ...-
From: Italorican@aol.com
Date: Sat, 16 Mar 1996 17:58:12 -0500
Subject: Re: Alternative history
There is a book-length study of alternative military histories and futures by
I.F. Clarke ("Voices Prophesying War: Future Wars 1763-3749", Oxford
University Press, 1992).
Antonio Lauria
From: grd1@genie.com
Date: Sat, 16 Mar 96 22:26:00 UTC 0000
Subject: Stacking
Pardon me if this return post is a little late. This is the 4th attempt to
send it to the listserver from GEnie.
RE: Stacking Limits
Have any of the people pushing higher stacking limits tried them in a
variety of EUROPA games? A 5-5-3 or 6-6-3 stacking limit is going to have
major effects on places like Leningarad, Tobruk and the entire Maginot line.
I would like to hear comments on games played with increased stacking
rules.
By solving the problem of "impossible attack stacking" in this manner we
will have created another problem of "the impossible defense".
Perhaps it is time to consider ways to use Corps markers or a limited number
of special "Breakthru" attack markers for increased stacking. For example,
allow each side to use 2 Corps markers (or Breaktrhu markers) per Theater
with 6-6-3 stacking. Unlimited use of increased stacking is going to create
more problems than it solves.
RE: The certain fall of France
Although the French should have been able to give a better account of
themselves the conventional wisdom is almost certainly correct (ie German
had a significant manpower advantage and could afford to take losses in an
attritional war of limited duration). What is even more important, in terms
of EUROPA and the 1940 campaign, is that the Germans made better use of the
resources they had. They had less tanks than the French & Brits, but used
them much more effectively. German divisions are, on the average, more
powerful, and thus they can mass more combat power in the same space (ie
hex).
Sure the Brits and French could have matched the Germans, given enough time.
But they didn't have enough time. As you point out (and I agree), they
needed until late 1940 to approach an even footing. No German player is
going sit by and wait for that to happen. Most likely, German players are
going to attack sooner than the historical campaign, even if that is in
January 1940. Dispite the weather a January attack has major advantages for
the Germans, particularly in finding the Allies in even worse shape and
providing more time to whittle down the french army.
If the Maginot line is seriously weakened to help other sections of the
front the Germans WILL be able to pierce it. As I've said before, avoiding
a declaration of war on the Low Countries has advantages for the Germans.
Although you pointed out one weak point in the French position there is
another. They have very little strategic depth (in their home country that
is). They can't afford a defense in depth, and therefore can't trade space
for time. Given that the Germans will pick the place and time of attack
this is a serious situation. Coupled with an unfavorable correlation of
forces the French are doomed.
Although I've seen the Germans get a black eye, I've never seen them lose a
game of FoF, and I've never seen them invade Switzerland.
Alan Tibbetts
Date: Sun, 17 Mar 1996 00:56:16 +0100
From: cloister@dircon.co.uk (Perry de Havilland)
Subject: Re: Stacking & France
>RE: Stacking Limits
>
>Have any of the people pushing higher stacking limits tried them in a
> variety of EUROPA games? A 5-5-3 or 6-6-3 stacking limit is going to have
> major effects on places like Leningarad, Tobruk and the entire Maginot line.
> I would like to hear comments on games played with increased stacking
> rules.
For an interesting analysis on the effects of dispersal (or lack thereof)
on casualty rates, read *Numbers, Prediction & War* by T.N. Dupuy, Hero
Books, 1985. The implications for Europa are clear: more stacking = more
combat power BUT also more casualties for the overstacked hex. It makes
sense if you think about it.
There is much merit to altering the rules re.stacking to enable historic
situations to be simulated. However, the rule must be draughted with care
or it will shoot carefully constructed scenarios out of whack. Packing
artillery in wheel to wheel means a much greater vulnerability to
counter-battery fire etc. etc.
>RE: The certain fall of France
>
>Although the French should have been able to give a better account of
>themselves the conventional wisdom is almost certainly correct (ie German
>had a significant manpower advantage and could afford to take losses in an
>attritional war of limited duration). What is even more important, in terms
>of EUROPA and the 1940 campaign, is that the Germans made better use of the
>resources they had. They had less tanks than the French & Brits, but used
>them much more effectively. German divisions are, on the average, more
>powerful, and thus they can mass more combat power in the same space (ie
>hex).
>
>Sure the Brits and French could have matched the Germans, given enough time.
>But they didn't have enough time. As you point out (and I agree), they
>needed until late 1940 to approach an even footing. No German player is
>going sit by and wait for that to happen. Most likely, German players are
>going to attack sooner than the historical campaign, even if that is in
>January 1940. Dispite the weather a January attack has major advantages for
>the Germans, particularly in finding the Allies in even worse shape and
>providing more time to whittle down the french army.
I have done this early attack strategy as the German and also defended
against this as the French/Brits. Sometimes it works and sometimes it ends
in tears. The BIG disadvantage is that it wastes the best value of the
idiot rules during poor weather, negating the really devastating blitzkrieg
effects and forcing an attritional approach that might make sense in a game
of FoF but is CRAZY in Grand Europa campaign.
>If the Maginot line is seriously weakened to help other sections of the
>front the Germans WILL be able to pierce it. As I've said before, avoiding
>a declaration of war on the Low Countries has advantages for the Germans.
If defended correctly, piercing the Maginot gets you nowhere. The French
never felt it would be impossible to break Maginot, so they devised a sound
strategy for cordoning off any attacks. Sure, you can do it, just don't
expect to got anywhere fast against a good French player.
>Although you pointed out one weak point in the French position there is
>another. They have very little strategic depth (in their home country that
>is). They can't afford a defense in depth, and therefore can't trade space
>for time. Given that the Germans will pick the place and time of attack
>this is a serious situation. Coupled with an unfavorable correlation of
>forces the French are doomed.
Yes and no. If the French do not make the mistake of being lured into
Belgium and handle the deployments better than they did historically, you
would be surprise how nasty it can get for the Germans. Even when playing
with the historical set up, if the French do not fold up pretty much
exactly according to the historical time table (a few unlucky attack rolls
for the Wehrmacht is all it takes), I have found the historical
breakthroughs just do not happen. It is a finer balance than you think.
The French are almost always played better than historic: in order to win,
therefore, the German player has very little room for mistakes.
If the German makes the mistake of not attacking Belgium, the French
position is even happier and the units that historically committed suicide
courtesy of Gamelin instead make up a nice mobile reserve of meaty units.
>Although I've seen the Germans get a black eye, I've never seen them lose a
>game of FoF, and I've never seen them invade Switzerland.
In my experience, the Huns win about 60% of the time. The fact I have
occasionally kicked the arse of *good* German players in FoF is why one of
them tried a Switzerland strategy. It worked. I had him stopped cold and
poor weather was getting nearer and nearer. So he crashed into lowland
Switzerland, using a cordon of junk units to keep the Swiss off this supply
lines, and turned my flank with a panzer corps :-(
It was very well executed and I did not see it coming. He was into France
via Switzerland (with at least one or two units) within the first turn. It
still took him a lot longer than historical but I could not re-stabilise
the front after that.
Regards
Perry ...-
From: m.royer3@genie.com
Date: Sun, 17 Mar 96 03:43:00 UTC 0000
Subject: Sino-Japanese Conflict Playtes
Oct I 37 Japanese Player Turn
Despite the onset of frost throughout northern China and Inner Mongolia, the
Japanese Kwantung army continues its persuit of retreating Chinese provincial
units by thrusting to the west into the province of Shansi. Spearheaded by the
now fully assembled Senda Mechanized Division, the Japanese strike force of
Senda, two brigades, and a multitude of supporting units, overrun several
provincial divisions in their push to the inner Great Wall.
Continuing the southward strike from northern Hopei, the Japanese Army
follows the two main rail lines. On the eastern Tsinpu Railway, advance units
strike into Shantung province using massed tankette tactics. Moving
essentially unopposed, the tankette units drive as far as the Hwang Ho (Yellow
River) where they pause to allow infantry of the 10th, 14th, and 101st
divisions to catch up. Meanwhile, onthe more western Pinghan Railway, which
runs along the north-south axis of the Hopei Province, the Japanese, led by the
5th, 6th, and 13th divisions, advance towards the partial hex city of
Shihkiachuang.
In Central China, the slugfest at Shanghai continues. In bloody street
fighting, the Japanese capture the fourth of seven city hexes. Anchored by the
3rd, 11th, 108th, and 109th divisions, the Shanghai Expeditionary Force faces
12 Chinese divisions in the city and manymore in the suburbs. Chinese
resistance is stiff and consists of the creme-de-la-creme of the Nationalists
Central Army. However, with the banks of the Whangpoo River now secure all the
way into the International Concession, the Japanese supply situation in Central
China has eased.
Following bloody air battles in the opening moves of the conflict, both air
forces have tended to shy away from direct combat, opting instead for targets
beyond the opposing fighter coverage.
Oct I 37 Chinese Player Turn
Continuing their run-away defense in Hopei Province, the Chinese retreat to
the Liaochang River and begin to set up a defensive line in the far southern
extreme of the province. Meanwhile, a strong rear guard holding force, which
includes a Central Army division and artillery, is left behind in
Shihkiachuang, in hopes of slowing the oncoming Japanese at this strategic
crossroads.
In Shantung, reinforcements are railed northward towards the provincial
capitol of Tsinan, despite objections from the uncooperative warlord-governor
Han Fu-chu. Han, long suspected of collaboration with the Japanese, is losing
grip of his own forces. Two division defect from Hans army and join Central
Army units in setting up guerilla operations in the mountains of central
Shantung.
In Shansi province, the 115th Communist division evaporates in the face of
advance elements of the Senda Mechanized division. The communistsrecede into
the foothills of the Wutai Shan mountain range and begin to setup a base of
guerilla operations. Yen Hsi-shan, warlord-governor of Shansi critizes the
Chinese united front, whereby the nationalists and communists have joined in
common cause against the Japanese, exclaiming that the Chinese Army should
never again depend on communist units to defend critical junctures. The road
from Pingsingkwan to Taiyuan, the Shansi capitol, is now free of Chinese
defenders and open to direct assault from Senda.
In Shanghai, the Chinese try to balance the best defensive posture, while
attempting to avoid huge losses of their valuable (and nearly irreplacable)
supported and self-supported units.
-Mark R.
Date: 17 Mar 96 07:15:12 EST
From: Jim Arnold <74133.1765@compuserve.com>
Subject: Re: Stacking
My proposal was 4-4-3 stacking, so I'll confine myself to that.
> the rule must be draughted with care or it will shoot carefully constructed
> scenarios out of whack.
I don't actually see that much fidelity to history in the scenarios I've played.
Have you ever seen the Germans reach the coast at Abbeville in one turn (and in
strength), even with idiot rules? Poland, France, Africa, Norway - all could
benefit from a more powerful attacker early in the war. When offensives later
become more prolonged, it's not excessive stacking but an absense of logistical
contraints that throw the balance.
Perry,
I agree that economic issues are relevent to the Europa list, insofar as they
impact the political and military models for GE. For the benefit of those who
think that GE can work without complex political mechanisms, I'd like to see a
contrast between your view and Steve's on how the political-economic
repercussions of a specific event in GE should be handled. The attitude of the
Allies toward a prospective fall of France, and their reactions, might be a
good example
For those who don't care to read about economic theory, the rest of this post
can be avoided:
> The essence of a fascist economy is state intervention to achieve various
> goals in accordance with some set of nationalist views. The essence of how
> capitalist an economy is is the extent to which market forces are allowed
> to function within a legal structure that secures several (i.e. personal)
> property rights.
What are the market forces that prevent the concentration of capital into fewer
and fewer hands? What are the market forces that prevent those who gain
significant economic power from using the state "to achieve various goals in
accordance with some set of [private if not nationalist] views"? How, in other
words, would a "free market" avoid its own destruction? Where has there ever
been a "free market", and what became of it?
Frankly, I don't find the free-market ideology to be very sophisticated. I see
it as more of a "myth" or a "spin" designed to further the interests of those
who have the upper hand in the market. I really believe that if the US continues
down the "free market" road, while the Asian nations in particular maintain
concerted efforts to protect their economies, we're going to fall so far behind
we'll never catch up.
Jim
Date: Sun, 17 Mar 1996 16:05:08 +0100
From: cloister@dircon.co.uk (Perry de Havilland)
Subject: Re: Stacking & Politics
Jim Arnold wrote re. my earlier posts:
>My proposal was 4-4-3 stacking, so I'll confine myself to that.
>
>> the rule must be draughted with care or it will shoot carefully constructed
>> scenarios out of whack.
>
>I don't actually see that much fidelity to history in the scenarios I've
>played.
>Have you ever seen the Germans reach the coast at Abbeville in one turn (and in
>strength), even with idiot rules? Poland, France, Africa, Norway - all could
>benefit from a more powerful attacker early in the war. When offensives later
>become more prolonged, it's not excessive stacking but an absense of logistical
>contraints that throw the balance.
The way to measure 'fidelity to history' is not how your particular battle
of FoF (or whatever) pans out, but rather: can you simulate what happened
in a 'lets-not-play-the-game' but rather let us recreate each turn as it
happened historically, calculate what the attacks would have been and then
look at the CRT each time and decide 'OK, it is a 2:1. The historical
result was clearly a DE, so something is wrong here'.
Of course, this is somewhat subjective (but only somewhat) and a bit
imprecise. Nevertheless, I think THAT is the only way to measure how much
'fidelity to history' a game is capable of rendering. If it fails badly,
then the rules/counter values/dispositions/whatever are wrong and need to
be looked at again. If it is pretty much on the money, then fine.
Whilst the Europa system is not perfect (and what is?), it is a bloody good
system in my opinion and it gets better every year.
That said, I completely agree with your remarks re-logistics. Stacking
level of 4-4-3? Okay, but why put that particular limit. Do you have a
historical example in mind (perhaps you do)? How about a more open ended
limit, with escalating casualty implications as dispersal diminishes. Just
an idea.
>I agree that economic issues are relevent to the Europa list, insofar as they
>impact the political and military models for GE. For the benefit of those who
>think that GE can work without complex political mechanisms, I'd like to see a
>contrast between your view and Steve's on how the political-economic
>repercussions of a specific event in GE should be handled. The attitude of the
>Allies toward a prospective fall of France, and their reactions, might be a
>good example
Sounds interesting.
>For those who don't care to read about economic theory, the rest of this post
>can be avoided:
>
>> The essence of a fascist economy is state intervention to achieve various
>> goals in accordance with some set of nationalist views. The essence of how
>> capitalist an economy is is the extent to which market forces are allowed
>> to function within a legal structure that secures several (i.e. personal)
>> property rights.
>
>What are the market forces that prevent the concentration of capital into fewer
>and fewer hands? What are the market forces that prevent those who gain
>significant economic power from using the state "to achieve various goals in
>accordance with some set of [private if not nationalist] views"? How, in other
>words, would a "free market" avoid its own destruction? Where has there ever
>been a "free market", and what became of it?
>
>Frankly, I don't find the free-market ideology to be very sophisticated. I see
>it as more of a "myth" or a "spin" designed to further the interests of those
>who have the upper hand in the market. I really believe that if the US
>continues
>down the "free market" road, while the Asian nations in particular maintain
>concerted efforts to protect their economies, we're going to fall so far behind
>we'll never catch up.
>
Not surprisingly, I disagree not only with your points (all of them, in
fact, and quite profoundly) but also on the premise on which you make them
(i.e. the point to which I was actually referring in the post to which you
are replying). However, I do not feel this particular discussion is
germane to Europa in any shape or form, so I will send you my reply to this
via a direct e-mail. No point in inflicting our political opinions on the
rest of the on-line Europa community unless it is relevant to the game in
some way.
Regards
Perry ...-