From: pardue@hilda.mast.QueensU.CA (Keith Pardue)
Subject: modular rules
Date: Tue, 12 Mar 1996 13:12:53 -0500 (EST)
Hi All,
The modular rules idea seems to be very popular. But, it is
very hard to do well. World In Flames has adopted this approach, with
all sorts of add-ons which often don't mesh. Anyone who has spent time
as a member of the WIF mailing list knows that discussion of the games
is greatly curtailed by the fact that everyone uses a different set
of rules. Also, the players (myself included) feel that ADG puts
out rules without properly playtesting them and has paid little
attention to how different collections of rules are supposed to
be used together.
The ASL binder approach seemed like a great idea when they
came out with it. But, ASL, although it is a great game and is
immensely popular, has rules that are a big mess. I suspect that
the only people who disagree with that statement learned the rules
from someone else, and not from the book.
(Boy, Rich, you should be glad that you're not answering
rules questions for ASL!)
Best Wishes,
Keith Pardue
Kingston, Ontario, Canada
Date: Tue, 12 Mar 1996 16:16:11 -0500
From: "James B. Byrne" <byrnejb@harte-lyne.ca>
Subject: Re: Sealion possibilities - LONG POST WARNING
> However remember that there is a balancing factor
> to the rest of the U-Boat war. All of the German
> light naval production has to go into landing craft
> and anything else to try to keep the army in England
> alive. Just using all the Rhine river barges for the
> invasion has a real negative economic effect on German
> production too. ...
Well, that presupposes that the Germans have to undertake a long
term campaign in GB. This is something that I seriously doubt.
The basic premise that the Germans were working on in 1940 was
that it would either be a quick blow followed by capitulation
and occupation, or withdrawal. In the event they decided not to
invade at all.
If the former then the issue of diverted naval production never
arrises and in the later the same conditions become operative.
The main issue is what the consequence of a decision to invade
will have on future operations in other theaters. We need to
assume that the intervention of the RAF and the RN in
significant numbers would be required to preven the German army
from successfully invading England. We also need to assume that
this intervention would have suffered considerable losses due to
German air activity and that the conditions of air combat would
have been less favourable for the RAF than the historic
campaign.
Given the closeness of the historic outcome of the Battle of
Britian and the advantage that the RAF enjoyed by fighting a
defensive campaign over friendly territory one could reasonably
conclude that a significant change in either or both of these
circumstances would have had a negative impact on the UK.
If the Germans lose a dozen infantry divisions in 1940, and two
or three armoured ones will that have as much impact on the
ultimate outcome of the Europenan war as the loss of 20% of the
RN and a good portion of the RAF fighter command? Bear in mind
that such German losses would not have been sufficient to
prevent Germany from maintaining control of the continent, but
it would have probably been enough to delay or prevent the
invasion of the USSR. Now, with the entire German army in the
west and no ongoing campaingn in the east along with a weakened
GB; what happens in the Atlantic in 1941/42?
> The German navy has a limited number of trained seamen
> to draw for crews also. So the U-Boast arm will be very
> limited for some time.
The only real limitation on the U-Boot arm was the yard and
machine works capacity in Germany. A U-Boot only required
aproximately 35 qualified individuals to get to sea and carry
out operational cruises out of a total crew of arround 50-60
depending on the class. Towards the end of the war the KM was
employing surplus air and ground officers to command and officer
U-Boots. With a population of between 65 and 80 million people,
Germany could certainly man more U-Boots at 60 men per than GB
(pop ~55 million) could destroyers at 200+ Men per.
We are after all, only talking of one specific turning point in
history in a multiyear war which had many such turning points.
My purpose in raising the issue isn't to impose my view of the
probable outcome. I only want to highlight that there are some
real issues inherent in GE which have to be addressed directly
and not as an afterthought.
As I see it, GE can follow three possible themes, with many
variations on each:
1. The 'historic' path wherein a player of GE is so
constrained by system rules, victory point requirements or other
artifices that they are compelled to follow the general outline
of the European War regardless of their performance as military
commanders. Victory conditions would necessarily be convoluted
as they would need to incorporate components of both relative
and absolute success of the players vs. their historic
counterparts.
2. The 'tournament' path wherein a player plays each of the
campaigns in order, accrues victory points based on relative
performance to the historic 'norm'; and starts the next campaign
without any carry forward of losses of gains from prior
campaigns. At the end of 1945 each player determines whether or
not they 'won' by comparing their individual scores. The
relative positions of the their countries are unimportant for
this purpose.
3. The 'alternate universe' path wherein the player must
make strategic decisions and will have to deal with the
consequences of those decisions throughout the rest of the war.
Victory is decided by the relative positions of the countries
involved at some predetermined time (spring/fall 1945?) or based
upon some predetermined measure of success (number of
capitals/resource centres controlled etc).
My personal preference is for some form of version 3 as this
makes the player as concerned with the conservation of his
forces as a real military commander. It will also require that
GE provide some rational for undertaking the risks and
adventures that the real participants did. It also requires
some mechanism to conceal the future from the player.
Most strategic games on WWII fail in this critical regard
because we the players know so much about the real, as opposed
to perceived, capablities of the participants. Our counterparts
could only dream about having the detailed information regarding
the capablities of the 7 Pz Div or the 1st Inf or the Dessert
Airforce or the KM etc. Given Europa's tremendous investment in
research in this area the design of GE has to provide some way
of making the actual performance of these units vary somewhat in
order that we the players be forced to make decisions based upon
approximations of enemy capability rather than certainties.
I know that this seems counter intuitive but consider the impact
on planning if you absolutly know, down to the last rifle, how
big, fast, and effective the force opposing you is. The
effect of knowing exactly where they are located and how far
that they can travel. If you remove this knowledge then the
player will have less oportunity to avoid the 'obvious' mistakes
that actually occured. Germany can invade Yugoslavia and find a
tiger waiting instead of a fractured and divided country and
army. Italy could possibly have a cake walk through Greece (as
she expected and didn't quite get). The French could weaker or
stronger or perhaps more mobile.
The point is that the attacker should not know exactly what he
is going to face. The British might have to take that invasion
threat seriously while the German player might know that it just
isn't possible.
If we don't introduce uncertainty into the game then Europa, and
particularily GE, becomes one large battle of attrition, with an
inevitiable outcome given competent play on both sides.
--
James B. Byrne mailto:byrnejb@harte-lyne.ca
Harte & Lyne Limited http://www.harte-lyne.ca
Hamilton, Ontario 905-561-1241
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 1996 00:38:23 +0100
From: cloister@dircon.co.uk (Perry de Havilland)
Subject: Re: Another monster GE rant
Steve P wrote:
>Why not take an informal vote? I don't want to see 4 types of schnee
>either. It strikes me that a great many of the ideas bandied around (like
>4 types of snow) are things that would be better developed by players
>themselves and then distributed via fora like this or the magazine.
>I cull many ideas from such sources for the various Europa games I've
>played -scenarios, rules twists, &c...that are great on their own, but GRD
>can't use every single great idea, whatever its merit, in GE.
>Should I retrench and suggest that GE perhaps be approached like Advanced
>Squad Leader (except without redesigning the entire system!!!) A pretty
>binder and basic rules that stitch the maps and counters together with an
>elegantly simple production system...then start canvassing all those great
>ideas to create modules like "Strategic Air War"?
>
>I know the volume on this topic is massive- I've hardly had time to follow
>it, but I'd imagine any lurking GRD people (Mr. Astell) are interested in
>distilling these kinds of ideas down to something they can actually use.
>
The modules I want to see are:
1. Strategic Air War (including a substantive reappraisal of the air rules
generally to take into account the importance to command and control)
2. Naval Operations
3. The Economics of Total War
Oh dear, someone give Rich a stiff drink, I think he just keeled over.
Yes, I know. These are going to be tough to do due to the extremely
complex nature of these topics. Yet somehow I suspect they ARE do-able.
Keith Pardue quite correctly warns of the danger of modules that do not
really fit very well and that is indeed a valid concern. Nevertheless,
there is a huge pool of helpful scholarship out there. It certainly is
important that each draft module be properly debugged.
Face it, one of the attractions of Europa is a significant lack of *Rules
Fascism*. Just look at the early Europa games and compare them with SF:
quite a difference. Europa games are living, breathing systems that are in
a constant state of refinement. This is merely the logical extension of
this ethos.
My ideas for a module called *The Economics of Total War* (or something
like that) are pretty much a prerequisite for the other two (Strategic Air
& Naval Operations). This is because in order to attack the enemy's
economy, you must first have an economic system to attack!
I do not support the idea of free production (a la SPI *War in Europe*),
but rather some system that requires economic points to make units
available for production according to a historical schedule. A certain
amount of flexibility is okay (such as having alternate counters appear on
certain dates cf the optional units in SF) in order to deal with a
particular GE game that may have seriously diverged from the historical one
(an Allied Balkan strategy, an Axis Turkey strategy, France still around in
1941 etc, etc.).
This list need not be exhaustive. There is no need to attempt to cater for
every conceivable contingency and that in fact is not really desirable. As
long as long as the *essential* character of the historic combatant
militaries is preserved, a little tinkering is not going to be too hard. A
few more/less mountain units or a few ships that were partially built but
historically cancelled (i.e. the German aircraft carrier) is not going to
cause major distortions but will go a long way to making happy, smiley
players.
Once we have a system that simulates the national economies, we can busy
ourselves figuring ways to blow it all up in a historically satisfying
matter.
Regards
Perry
...-
Date: Tue, 12 Mar 1996 21:26:07 -0500
From: Ray Kanarr <RayK@smtp4.aw.com>
Subject: Re: Another monster GE rant -Reply
On 3/12/96, Perry eloquently stated:
>The modules I want to see are:
>1. Strategic Air War (including a substantive reappraisal of
>the air rules generally to take into account the importance
>to command and control)
>2. Naval Operations
>3. The Economics of Total War
-snip-
>These are going to be tough to do due to the extremely
>complex nature of these topics. Yet somehow I suspect
>they ARE do-able.
-snip-
>there is a huge pool of helpful scholarship out there. It
>certainly is important that each draft module be properly
>debugged.
-snip-
>Europa games are living, breathing systems that are in a
>constant state of refinement. This is merely the logical
>extension of this ethos.
>My ideas for a module called *The Economics of Total
>War* (or something like that) are pretty much a
>prerequisite for the other two (Strategic Air
>& Naval Operations). This is because in order to attack
>the enemy's economy, you must first have an economic
>system to attack!
>I do not support the idea of free production (a la SPI *War
>in Europe*), but rather some system that requires
>economic points to make units available for production
>according to a historical schedule. A certain amount of
>flexibility is okay (such as having alternate counters
>appear on certain dates cf the optional units in SF) in order
>to deal with a particular GE game that may have seriously
>diverged from the historical one (an Allied Balkan strategy,
>an Axis Turkey strategy, France still around in 1941, etc.).
>This list need not be exhaustive. There is no need to
>attempt to cater for every conceivable contingency and that
>in fact is not really desirable. As long as the *essential*
>character of the historic combatant militaries is preserved,
>a little tinkering is not going to be too hard. A few more/
>less mountain units or a few ships that were partially built
>but historically cancelled (i.e., the German aircraft carrier)
>are not going to cause major distortions but will go a long
>way to making happy, smiley players.
>Once we have a system that simulates the national
>economies, we can busy ourselves figuring ways to blow it
>all up in a historically satisfying matter.
>Regards
>Perry
Thanks, Perry, for saving me the time to post exactly this. This
should be a framework within which both the "Landsers" and the
"Combined Arms" groups can coexist. All that remains is getting
together and getting it done.
Ray
From: grd1@genie.com
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 96 01:47:00 UTC 0000
Subject: Re: GE politics
Helo EUROPANS,
Let me introduce myself briefly as Rick Gayler's replacement on GEnie as a
representative of GRD. If you haven't heard, Rick has asked for some time
off from his official duties as GEnie Rep, Ultimate Rules Judge and TEM
editor.
A little news from Grinnell. Winston says the production work and assembly
of WitD should take about a month. With that said, no one can promise the
game will be out in a month, but it does look like we can see the light at
the end of the tunnel.
RE: GE Politics - my personal views, not necessarily those of GRD
What level of command do the players represent? IMO, the players of the
individual EUROPA games represent the Army Group/Theater commanders of the
major powers (ie Germany, USSR, USA); and Service Chiefs of the minor powers
(ie Greece).
In GE the players will represent the Military Service Chiefs (Germany) or
Theater Commanders (Allies). The players will not have the authorities
found at the National Command Level (Hitler, Stalin, Churchill or
FDR/Marshall).
What political decisions will be left to the players? Will the players have
some level of influence over political decisions? These questions remain
unaswered at this time.
A few questions without answers:
Should Britain & France be allowed to invade Norway in 1940 as they planned?
If so, does Norway accept German intervention the way she accepted allied
intervention? Hum, an axis Norway?
Should Germany be allowed to invade Spain? If so, under what circumstances
and with what restrictions?
Should Germany be allowed to invade France rather than Poland in September
1939? If so what will Poland do about it? And what will Uncle Joe Stalin
do about it?
Can Germany chose NOT to invade the low countries when she attacks France?
Most of all, what level of control/influence should players have on these
decisions?
Alan Tibbetts
GRD GEnie Rep
Date: Tue, 12 Mar 1996 20:07:21 -0600 (CST)
From: Mark H Danley <danley@ksu.ksu.edu>
Subject: Re: GE politics
On Tue, 12 Mar 1996, Steve wrote:
I'm only 29 and I keep hearing about how the wargame hobby is fading
> away because "kids these days are a bunch of idiots that don't understand
> history"
> That's untrue. What's happened is, none of us can find jobs that pay
> enough money to be able to justify paying $125 for a board game. I mean
> think about it.
YOU SAID IT. I'm only a scawling brat of 26, but I played my first
Europa game (no, it wasn't DNO, it was _Marita Merkur_) at 14. And,
frankly, I enjoy studying history as well, (or I wouldn't be pounding my
brains out in grad school)!
Mark
From: NASU002.USAP@iac.org.nz (Public Affairs Officer)
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 1996 15:12 GMT
Subject: Campaign for North Africa
Dear Jason:
You know a couple of guys who played all of CNA? Holy cow.
Every now and then my brother and I broke that game out, stared at
the counter sheets, flipped through the rules, and put the game back in
its box. We never believed anyone could play that game.
I gotta admit, it's a heck of an Order of Battle, though. And the
intention: that the game be used by groups and clubs, with players as
various corps and division commanders, is not that bad an idea,
especially for Grand Europa, where players can be theater commanders,
then army group commanders, down to army commanders. Corps commanders
might be pushing it.
Best,
DHL
From: NASU002.USAP@iac.org.nz (Public Affairs Officer)
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 1996 15:55 GMT
Subject: Re: GE politics
Dear Alan:
Nice load of questions, good to hear WitD is enroute.
Bigger question: When can we expect snappy new SF counters to
replace the two-toned US Army and splotched British?
Keep up the fight. GRD is doing good.
Best,
Dave Lippman
Public Affairs Officer
US Naval Antarctic Support Unit
Christchurch, New Zealand
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 1996 09:21:58 +0100
From: o-noreli@jmk.su.se (Elias Nordling)
Subject: Re: GE politics
> I'm only 29 and I keep hearing about how the wargame hobby is fading
>> away because "kids these days are a bunch of idiots that don't understand
>> history"
>> That's untrue. What's happened is, none of us can find jobs that pay
>> enough money to be able to justify paying $125 for a board game. I mean
>> think about it.
>
>YOU SAID IT. I'm only a scawling brat of 26, but I played my first
>Europa game (no, it wasn't DNO, it was _Marita Merkur_) at 14. And,
>frankly, I enjoy studying history as well, (or I wouldn't be pounding my
>brains out in grad school)!
I'll second (well, third) that. I'm another one in the brat-pack (23, also
played Marita-Merkur at 14.) In addition, I would say that the situation is
a lot different outside of the States. Here in Sweden, I would say that
most wargamers are under 30.
Mvh Elias Nordling
o-noreli@jmk.su.se
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 1996 09:33:05 +0100
From: o-noreli@jmk.su.se (Elias Nordling)
Subject: Re: Airdrop rules (fwd)
>> What really bothers me with the rules for airdrop is this:
>> When a transport is hit by FLAK (R or A), it returns to the base with the
>> cargo. Since most airborne units require two transports to drop, there's a
>> MAJOR chance this will happen, even with just 1 or 2 points of AA.
>>
>> My question is: has this ever happened? Is there ANY occasion in the
>> history of the parachute when the transports return to base without letting
>> the soldiers jump because of flak? I think not.
>
> According to the UK official history, "The Mediterranean and the
>Middle East", Volume 5, this happened in Sicily. In fact there were so many
>problems with missdrops, flak from both sides, and planes returning with
>their cargo that plans were eventually changed to cancel further air drops.
Well, OK, then. It DID happen. But I doubt it happened as often as with the
current rules. If there are even a few points of flak, you will have about
1/3 chance of being returned with the cargo.
The big problem is that if ANY of the two air units are afflicted, the
airborne unit is too. A battallion has a much greater chance of dropping
successfully. I don't think this was intended when the AA rules were
written.
Mvh Elias Nordling
o-noreli@jmk.su.se
From: Rich Velay <richv@icebox.iceonline.com>
Subject: GURU:SF
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 1996 04:27:25 PST
Hi All.
Looks like some more SF is coming your way...
>Yeah, I have another one about the naval rules (they really ARE messy!)
>If units start a turn loaded on transports in port at the start of a turn,
>are they in supply?
>This is significant, because if the answer is yes, then allied troops can
>start the game loaded in transports (allowed per TEM#??) for a turn 1
>invasion of southern France (the extra 30 NMPs are needed.)
Units embarked upon ships trace supply as per normal rules, so if they
are in a port t and the NT/LC is *in* port (NOT at sea in the hex) then yes
they are in supply.
Note also that for your first turn invasion, the units and NT/LCs they
are embarked upon could be set up in the N.Afr. Holding box at start, they
needn't be deployed at separate ports on the map.
Also note that since they are already embarked, port capacity is not
an issue; ALL of your NT/LCs, along with anyone they are transporting, could
be placed, for example, at Bougie during the initial phase and carry out their
invasion from there. The fact that Bougie is only a minor port is immaterial.
Note also that any units embarked upon NT/LC could remain in the
N.Afr. Holding Box, or any on map port, and remain in supply from turn to
turn, indefinitly.
late/R
RichV@Icebox.Iceonline.com
Europa, tomorrow's games about yesterday, TODAY
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 96 15:36:58 +0100
From: peterlj@smab.se (Peter Ljungberg)
Subject: Re: Airdrop rules
>>> What really bothers me with the rules for airdrop is this:
>>> When a transport is hit by FLAK (R or A), it returns to the base with the
>>> cargo. Since most airborne units require two transports to drop, there's a
>>> MAJOR chance this will happen, even with just 1 or 2 points of AA.
>>>
>>> My question is: has this ever happened? Is there ANY occasion in the
.>>> history of the parachute when the transports return to base without letting
>>> the soldiers jump because of flak? I think not.
>>
>> According to the UK official history, "The Mediterranean and the
>>Middle East", Volume 5, this happened in Sicily. In fact there were so many
>>problems with missdrops, flak from both sides, and planes returning with
>>their cargo that plans were eventually changed to cancel further air drops.
>Well, OK, then. It DID happen. But I doubt it happened as often as with the
>current rules. If there are even a few points of flak, you will have about
>1/3 chance of being returned with the cargo.
>The big problem is that if ANY of the two air units are afflicted, the
>airborne unit is too. A battallion has a much greater chance of dropping
>successfully. I don't think this was intended when the AA rules were
>written.
>
>Mvh Elias Nordling
>o-noreli@jmk.su.se
The house rule I ususally use to mitigate this is not to assign individual planes to specific airborne units, but instead treat them as groups, like I would do with Naval transport. So if some transports are turned back/aborted I turn back airborne units corresponding only to the capacity of the turned back planes. This will at least increase the probability of getting some of several airborne units through. Doesn`t help when dropping only one unit though.
The rules suggestions regarding dedicated air missions presented way back in TEM are also a way of solving this - if you`re prepared to accept losses in planes you can improve the chances of your paratroopers landing and not being scared away.
Peter Ljungberg
From: Dave Humphreys <davehum@uniserve.com>
Subject: Re: GE politics
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 1996 09:37:59 -0800
At 01:47 AM 13/3/96, you wrote:
>In GE the players will represent the Military Service Chiefs (Germany) or
>Theater Commanders (Allies). The players will not have the authorities
>found at the National Command Level (Hitler, Stalin, Churchill or
>FDR/Marshall).
>
>What political decisions will be left to the players? Will the players have
>some level of influence over political decisions? These questions remain
>unaswered at this time.
>
>A few questions without answers:
>Should Britain & France be allowed to invade Norway in 1940 as they planned?
> If so, does Norway accept German intervention the way she accepted allied
>intervention? Hum, an axis Norway?
In my opinion, of course the Allies should be able to invade Norway, but there
must be some clear benefit to them doing so. It should not be mandated one way
or the other, or else the Germans can sit back, wait for the Allied invasion
and,
if the Norwegians resist, they'll find themselves an easy ally in Norway (and
possibly Sweden). It's much easier than invading, themselves.
However, political rules will have to be worked out so that the Allies will
only invade if there is a good possibility of quick success, or of the
Norwegians rolling
over a la Greece in the Great War. Unfortunately, within the context of
alternating
player turns in Europa, we will never be treated to the spectacle of a
simultaneous
Allied/Axis invasion!
>Should Germany be allowed to invade Spain? If so, under what circumstances
>and with what restrictions?
Again, it would be nice if the Axis had the option of invading Spain, but I
think
GE will have to give the Axis an objective timetable (so many Soviet cities
by Date X)
in order to make this feasible, This would give the Axis player(s) some free
hand, but
still restrict them somewhat. If they think they can grab Gibraltar and
still invade
the Soviet Union on schedule, maybe they should go for it. Meanwhile, if
they don't
invade the USSR by a certain date, maybe Uncle Joe can roll for a chance to
pull off
Groza and/or reorganize the army ahead of schedule.
>Should Germany be allowed to invade France rather than Poland in September
>1939? If so what will Poland do about it? And what will Uncle Joe Stalin
>do about it?
I think that this should be in France's hands more than Germany's. I think
Hitler was content to let the West sit on its hands while he took apart Poland
as a step toward his ultimate goal of the destruction of Russia. Indeed, he was
almost counting on the paralyzation of the western democracies to give him free
rein in the East, as it had in Czechoslovakia.
>Can Germany chose NOT to invade the low countries when she attacks France?
Why not? However, a cursory glance at the maps shows that the best route into
France is through Belgium and the best route into Belgium is through the
Netherlands.
We once had a game of FoF where the Axis made their initial thrust through
Switzerland. Then, when the bulk of the French army was responding to this
move and a break over the southern Rhine, a spearhead led by by six Panzer
divisions withdrawn from the Swiss front (Where'd they come from?? - Weygand)
smashed through Belgium and Holland, leaving the French commander's head
spinning.
>Most of all, what level of control/influence should players have on these
>decisions?
Mutual agreement by players (it may not be true Europa, but if that's how
they want
to play it...), die rolls, political tables, random events (an ugly spectre,
but
my favourite ugly spectre), etc etc.
Dave Humphreys
Vancouver, BC
From: Dave Humphreys <davehum@uniserve.com>
Subject: Re: GE politics
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 1996 09:58:15 -0800
At 09:21 AM 13/3/96 +0100, it was written, seconded and thirded that:
>> I'm only 29 and I keep hearing about how the wargame hobby is fading
>>> away because "kids these days are a bunch of idiots that don't understand
>>> history"
>>> That's untrue. What's happened is, none of us can find jobs that pay
>>> enough money to be able to justify paying $125 for a board game. I mean
>>> think about it.
I'm 34 and got into wargaming at 24 (3R, FoF). I agree that wargames are very
expensive. My friends and I had to pool close to CA$300.00 to but FiTE\SE\TU
but, we have played these games, usually with 4-5 players, for a total playing
time of about 600 hrs EACH! That's about 10-12 cents per hour. Can you rent
movies that cheap? Can you party that cheap? Can you even surf the net that
cheap?
I think that there's a dearth of wargaming clubs (that would buy the games
through
dues, etc) and veterans who want to actually take the time to find new blood and
cultivate it. (Actually, the thought of cultivating blood is quite strange.
Maybe
I should switch to Science Fiction games.) Anyway, the so-called death of our
hobby is being attributed in part to the Trading-Card game phenomena. I submit,
however, that people who will spend $100 on a singel card are not the type
likely
to be interested in our hobby in the first place.
Now, I hope we're nto going to hear any more negativity on this subject
(especially
from those closely affiliated with the company, you-know-who-I-mean). Onwards
and upwards into the 21st Century (Jan 1, 2001)
Dave Humphreys
Vancouver, BC
From: Jay Steiger/Forte <Jay_Steiger/Forte.FORTE@notes.san.fhi.com>
Date: 13 Mar 96 11:05:07 PS
Subject: Not Gen X
I would like to add my 4th voice to that of Mark, Steve, and Elias in that not
all of those under 20 have no interest in history. I am a 28 year old grad
student in history and many of those in my grad classes are also under 30
(however, they don't wargame). I will agree with part of Winston's commentary
in the latest TEM. Many of those under 20 seem to demonstrate even less
appreciateion or comprehension of history than previous generations, however I
don't think they are all incabable of understanding game rules. I do think
that many of the brighter ones would be able to comprehend Europa rules, but
they lack the motivation and interest to do so. I run into a lot of "History
graduate school? Uggg, why would you want that?" I'm not sure what the answer
is, but I know I plan to keep studying it and keep gaming as well. A question
to those Europa players under 30. My expericence has been that most of the
gamers of our age group are more interested in role playing or "simple history"
like Axis and Allies. Commentary?
P.S. Question to Elias: What is the level of interest in history among the
under 30 set in Sweden?
Sincerely
Jay Steiger
steigerj@notes.san.fhi.com
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 1996 17:00:52 -0500
From: Ray Kanarr <RayK@smtp4.aw.com>
Subject: Re:Not Gen X
On 3/13/96, Jay Steiger gave a shout:
>I would like to add my 4th voice to that of Mark, Steve, and >Elias
in that not all of those under 20 have no interest in >history. I
am a 28 year old grad student in history
-snip-
YES!
As happens with gratifying regularity in history, perhaps we are
witnessing right here the beginnings of a 'Young Turk' revolution to
revitalize Europa!
As we said in the '60s, when we were young Turks, and not old farts,
YIPPIE!
Ray [just another solidified old codger] the K
From: NASU002.USAP@iac.org.nz (Public Affairs Officer)
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 1996 10:18 GMT
Subject: History still matters
I'm always astounded at how people trash history as being
unimportant. How can you know where you're going if you don't know where
you've been. I get tired of people who whinge at me about "Oh, it's just
a bunch of dead dates and places."
If you look at the "Revenge of the Nerds" movies, they're all
computer and math guys who know how to build a supercomputer, but are
unable to shower properly (or for one character, get his eyes checked).
None of them are history majors. I actually find that quite offensive.
I know this has nothing to do with Europa, but I felt a need to say
it.
Dave Lippman
Public Affairs Officer
US Naval Antarctic Support Unit
Christchurch, New Zealand
From: grd1@genie.com
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 96 23:32:00 UTC 0000
Subject: Re: GE politics
Dave Humphreys,
Some reasons why Germany might not want to invade France vis Belgium and
Holland:
1. Try bombing Germany from England without going thru Belgian/Dutch
airspace.
2. The major allied armies will be in the north to prevent just such a move.
3. If the campaign starts earlier in the "Phoney War" period the Germans
will still have plenty of time to grind down the French army.
As for Spain:
Why wait until 1941 when you can invade in 1940? No need to upset your
timetable in Russia. While your at it, why not invade the Balkans in 1940?
Alan Tibbetts
From: Rich Velay <richv@icebox.iceonline.com>
Subject: GURU:SF
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 1996 16:20:35 PST
Hi <ALL>
SF Naval rears its ugly head again. 8^)
> I am under the impression that NO C/M units can ever
>land on beaches, friendly or otherwise. Per Rule 31B:
>Non-amphibious units with heavy equipment may not embark or
>disembark at beaches." And 27B6 clearly spells out that
>C/M units cannot be made amphibious by use of an LC. So
>how do they land at beaches?
The SF Naval rules as they pertain to amphibious
invasions and transport have been extensively re-worked.
Anyone who hasn't seen the "Official Amphibious Recap"
should request one from GR/D. Send a note asking for
this, along with a SASE, to :
GR/D PO Box 591, Grinnell, IA, USA, 50112.
(note also that this Recap appeared in TEM # 40.)
To answer your question, *anything* can land at a
beach, as long as it is transported solely by LCs.
Note the amended version of Rule 31B below:
"Any amphibious unit (as defined in Rule 27B6) may land
at a beach. A non-amphibious unit may aslo land at a
beach, if it is solely on board LCs at the time of its
landing. (Note: A non-amphibious unit on board NTs or
NTs in combination with LCs may not land at a beach.) A
naval unit may not embark or disembark cargo at a beach
during stormy sea conditions."
Also, delete the following sentence from Rule 30B:
"However, cargo that has HE may not embark/disembark at
a beach unless it is amphibious (per Rule 27B6)."
Note that this allows C/M and other units with HE to get
to a friendly owned beach, via naval transport while on
LCs. Note that it doesn't affect movement to an enemy
owned beach, ie an invasion, since while non-amphibious
CM units and/or units with heavy equipment can disembark
at a friendly owned beach, they are still considered
non-amphibious and may not participate in amphibious
invasions, per Rule 32.
I heartily recomwend that any one who doesn't have the
Amphibious Recap get a copy from GR/D.
late/R
RichV@Icebox.Iceonline.com
Europa, tomorrow's games about yesterday, TODAY
From: bradbury@travel1.travel-net.com
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 1996 19:54:21 -0500
Subject: Europa and Computers
To add to Peter Morris' and Carl Rugenstein's recent comments on the
Stalingrad computer game, I too am someone who plays and enjoys both Europa
and the World at War (Stalingrad) and its predecessor V for Victory series.
The WAW and V4V games have excellent maps and counters and have the stengths
that one would expect of computer games (admin duties such as tracking
movement and supply, ease of setup and storage, and PBEM capability). The
main disadvantages are bugs (I think the average Europaphile would find this
extremely irritating) and the lack of capability of having house/chrome
rules (again, an advantage of board games that many Europa players appear to
value highly).
I have purchased the Aide-de-Camp software and the SF module and have found
it disappointing in terms of the maps and counters. This likely reflects
being spoiled by the quality of the maps and counters in Europa and WAW/V4V,
but it means that I likely wouldn't purchase any additional modules.
As to the future, as a customer I would be extremely interested if the
Europa games were available either on disk/CD-ROM or a WWW site with the
quality of maps and counters that are available in the board games. The
sheer logistics of trying to play Clash of Titans or GE in terms of map
space and time I think are daunting to the average player (to say nothing of
what would happen if one was months/years into a GE game and have your
dog/cat/kids/??? wreck the setup in a matter of seconds). Having the game
on PC solves these problems plus might permit other refinements such as a
revised CRT (grinding down the Hitler Jugend bit by bit in front of Caen
sounds like fun) and new supply system. AI is probably not worth the hassle
(the one in WAW/V4V is not very good).
The above is simply a wish list - whether it is a viable business
proposition is another question. Atomic Games, the developers of WAW/V4V,
have basically quit supporting the games (in terms of issuing new patches,
etc) and have indicated that they want to appeal, not only to hardcore
gamers, but also to the broader strategy gaming market. This seems quite
consistent with the message given by Winston Hamilton in TEM 45 regarding
the level of demand for military history games. I know that I would buy
such a product - I only hope that there are enough other people out there
that would do the same.
Nigel Bradbury
Ottawa, Ontario
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 1996 20:26:35 -0600
From: bdbryant@mail.utexas.edu (Bobby D. Bryant)
Subject: Re: GE politics
>What level of command do the players represent? IMO, the players of the
>individual EUROPA games represent the Army Group/Theater commanders of the
>major powers (ie Germany, USSR, USA); and Service Chiefs of the minor powers
>(ie Greece).
>
>In GE the players will represent the Military Service Chiefs (Germany) or
>Theater Commanders (Allies). The players will not have the authorities
>found at the National Command Level (Hitler, Stalin, Churchill or
>FDR/Marshall).
This response is not addressed to Alan per se; I just take this opportunity
because he is the most recent of a number of persons to touch on the notion
of "role playing" in wargames. A number of people have refered to it with
more or less explicitness over the last couple of weeks, and a few have
based their arguments on it.
I think the notion's greatest proponent -- probably its inventor -- was
GDW's Frank Chadwick. He was very explicit about it in reference to to some
of his game designs starting sometime in the mid(?) 80's (the _Assault_
series comes to mind). But though I admire Frank for bringing a gaming
theory to his corpus of excellent designs, I simply don't think the idea is
applicable to Europa, even in the campaign-level games. Notice in particular
that the notion of role-playing *drove* the design of a number of Frank's
later games, but that the notion did not even exist -- so far as I can tell
-- until many years after the basic assumptions of the Europa games were
laid down.
SF gives a great example of the implausibility of the notion of Europa
players representing individuals: what individual or body had the ability to
decide when and where the Allies returned to the continent, but also had the
responsibility of deciding which fighter groups should escort which air raid
along the Rhine or of ensuring sufficient anti-tank assets (and which ones)
were "stacked with" individual divisions on the Italian front?
If Europa casts us in the role of politicians, we hardly need the maps and
counters to play our roles. If upper-echelon generals, we need only corps
and army markers. If lower-echelon generals, we need only a handful of
counters to play our assigned role in the scheme of things. And for *any*
sort of generals, most of the political and some of the strategic decisions
will be dictated to us. Europa, even the individual titles released thus
far, simply was not designed to cast players in any sort of historical role.
It glories in the fact that it lets players make decisions an a broad range
of scales. So I think we must give up the idea that Europa will cast us in
the role of individuals, whether politicians or generals: let the debate on
the implementation of politics continue, but do not base conclusions on the
notion of role-playing.
(Granted, my entire argument is less relevant with regard to Hitler, who
apparently issued orders for positioning individual antitank guns at
Stalingrad, as well as directing national policy. But many of the nations
did not offer any such role, historically.)
- Bobby.
p.s. -- The recent suggestion of a division of labor among a team according
to interests has much to merit it, and since Europa will virtually require
team play, such an arrangement will probably turn out to be the de facto
solution. But how much of this should be specified in the actual rules? Will
we need separate schedules of VPs for politicians and generals as they
pursue their divergent notions of success? Rules for sacking general-players
who fail to meet the politicians' unrealistic expectations? I hope not! I
would rather have some decision on the scope of Europa, and let players work
out among themselves how to divide responsibilities.
From: NASU002.USAP@iac.org.nz (Public Affairs Officer)
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 1996 16:04 GMT
Subject: Italy
Sorry I haven't added my two cents to the discussion on Italy, but
I've been dealing with a medevac flight to and from Antarctica for a sick
Sailor, that did not come off.
The whole problem with Italy is that her war effort was completely
bound up with her war leader, who was in turn one of the most inept
generalissimos in recorded history.
Benito Mussolini has received shorter and shorter shrift from
historians as the decades wear by, and his influence on the world becomes
smaller and smaller. Like Adolf Hitler, he was a man of little education
and less vision. But while Hitler had a fascination for detail and a
digest of information that could silence or bore his interlocutors,
Mussolini's main characteristic was a bombastic concern for his own ego,
which was fed by his advisors, most notably Achille Starace (who required
all correspondence, official or unofficial to end in the salutation "Viva
Il Duce," an excess that was too much even for Mussolini).
Mussolini wasted a great deal of official time on working his image,
as did his whole administration. Young children were issued textbooks in
which Mussolini solved simple arithmetic problems ("If Il Duce has five
apples, and picks seven more, how many does he have?"). Mussolini was the
subject of a personality cult as great as that of Kim Il Sung. He would
soon solve the Rosetta Stone, it was said. He worked nightly until
midnight in his office on the Piazza Venezia, even when it was known he
was dancing with one of his many mistresses. He wasted officical time
studying the previous day's newspapers from all over the world, to see
how he appeared, and spent even more time with Fascist editors and
writers, determining rules for Italian news coverage and front pages of
Italian newspapers. As Australian media critic said, "He was superman,
and he turned his nation into a multi-million dollar movie, with himself
as the director and star, and the population as extras."
Domestically, he strutted, but did little. He boasted of "8 million
bayonets" and "Book and Musket, the Perfect Fascist," but neither meant
anything. He waged the "Battle of the Wheat," churning out his share
religiously, adding more corn to an already glutted market. He heightened
Italian arms production, then sold the newest guns and planes to foreign
clients, while his troops marched in cardboard shoes, and manned ancient
artillery from the 19th century.
This drive to be the Caesar of the new Roman Empire, to gain a seat
at the peace table (and territory thereof) for only a few thousand dead,
to show up his ally and rival, Hitler, led Mussolini down the path of
destruction.
His armies avenged their 1894 humiliation at the battle of Adowa in
Ethiopia by conquering the primitive country. His forces chased King Zog
of Albania and his wife out of their bed 48 hours after she gave birth to
their child, a feat made easy by the fact that Albania was under Italian
"protection" anyway. He provoked a war of aggression against Greece that
left thousands of Italian corpses strewn across the Albanian mountains.
He sent ill-equipped divisions across the Alps against French
fortifications, and was soundly defeated by a country itself about to
collapse. Italian arms disgraced themselves at Bardia, Benghazi, and
Tobruk, yielding 150,000 PoWs to 30,000 Britons, an image that would
become the inescapable (and laughable) face of Italian war efforts.
Knowing that a German invasion of the Soviet Union was a suicidal
act, Mussolini sent an army of cavalrymen, mountain troops, and infantry
to plod across the Ukrainian steppe, only to be swallowed up in the
hegira at Stalingrad.
Even after the collapse of Rommel in North Africa, as German troops
retreated from Stalingrad, Mussolini busied himself with trivia, arguing
with his Grand Council over the date Roman policemen should change to
summer uniforms.
When the Allies invaded Sicily, even the Grand Council had enough.
They were ready to vote Mussolini out, but gave Il Duce one last chance
on July 25, 1943. Fighting for his political life (and perhaps his
personal skin), Mussolini, the once-powerful orator, botched it, claiming
that the Allied drive across Sicily was walking into a trap, and that the
British attack at El Alamein the year before had been deliberately timed
for the 20th anniversary of his "March on Rome."
This irrelevancy was not lost on the Grand Council. To them it was
clear that Mussolini had to go, Italy had to leave the war. The Council
accomplished both, voting Mussolini out of office, replacing him with
Pietro Badoglio, and King Vittorio Emmanuelle supported the council,
telling Mussolini the people were sick of war and Il Duce.
The deflated Duce left the Palazzo Quirinale, seeking his car, and
was instead led to an ambulance manned by Carabinieri, who in turn took
Mussolini into captivity.
That was quickly followed by Italy's surrender, and by the daring
glider raid by Otto Skorzeny and his SS commandos, who swiped Mussolini
and bundled him off to Germany.
At that point, Mussolini was an exhausted man. He'd made a feeble
attempt at suicide while in captivity. He realized that his work had come
to naught, and his life was a farce. He wanted to retire from active
life, but Hitler had other plans. Mussolini was named president of the
puppet Italian Social Republic, and a pathetic band of Germanophiles
banded around this unlikely standard. Heading the RSI's army was Marshal
Rodolfo Graziani, whose main contribution to this war so far was to lose
his 10th Army to the British at Beda Fomm in 1940. Graziani combined a
hatred of Britain and Badoglio with a ferocity used against Libyan
tribesmen in the late 1930s.
While Graziani built up the RSI's army, Hitler ordered Mussolini to
execute the "traitors of July 25th," who included Mussolini's own
son-in-law, Galeazzo Ciano, the former foreign minister. Mussolini, the
good vassal, obeyed his new lord, and Ciano and other "plotters" were
shot to death in Verona after a mock trial.
The RSI accomplished little beyond that. It raised a small army of
questionable value, and pleaded uselessly with the German occupiers for
relief and assistance. To little avail. The Germans treated Italy as an
occupied territory, stripping it of industry and agriculture, annexing
two provinces, and using disarmed Italian soldiers as laborers. The SS
fanned out across northern Italy to maintain Nazi racial policies.
Italian Jews were shipped to Auschwitz. The reaction was
inevitable...ferocious partisan warfare that turned the last three years
of WW2 in Italy into a bloody civil war.
Through it all, Mussolini did little. He puttered at his memoirs,
fretted over his ulcer and nervous stomach, greeted callers by passing
the decisions to his ministers, and toyed with restoring his old
Socialist values to the RSI. As the Axis cause waned, he flirted at
negotiations with Catholic archbishops to in turn negotiate his way with
the Allies to a surrender or accommodation.
But history had passed Il Duce by. SS General Karl Wolff surrendered
Italy without reference to Mussolini. He fled Salo in April, 1945, trying
to get either to Switzerland or Germany, and was caught by his own
countrymen, partisans of the Garibaldi Brigade.
Many accounts exist, but the results of what happened next are the
same. Mussolini was shot, and hung upside down next to his mistress
Claretta Petacci in an unfinished gas station in Milan's Piazzale Loreto,
his corpse torn and shredded by furious Milanese crowds. Some resented
that Claretta was wearing nylons.
The brutal murder drew many reactions. Winston Churchill was angry
that Petacci had been gunned down. Dwight D. Eisenhower gasped, "God,
what an ignoble end!" On the scene were two horrified observers, former
New York Gov. Charles Poletti, of the Allied military government, and New
York Times reporter Milton Bracker. The latter wrote a story on "The Day
Caesar Hung Upside Down." The former sought to remove Caesar from his
incongruous perch, but found no undertaker willing to accept Il Duce's
body.
However, Poletti found the city potter's field ready to take care of
the remains.
"That's fine," Poletti said. "It's all over now. Let no more harm
come to that man. Let no more harm come to that man at all."
So whatever shape Italy takes in Europa (I find it hard to see as an
independent player, but it could be done), it will have to reflect on the
personality of this sawdust Caesar, this strutting pretender, whose image
remains that of Mussolini's shaven skull, head flung back, jaw pointed
up, as he delivers yet another bellicose and bombastic speech to his army
of claques, forever thrusting out a flabby, insubstantial aggression
towards the world.
Dave Lippman
Public Affairs Officer
US Naval Antarctic Support Unit
Christchurch, New Zealand
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 1996 23:21:56 -0500
From: Ray Kanarr <RayK@smtp4.aw.com>
Subject: Re:Europa and Computers
On 3/13/96, Nigel Bradbury sent in this good post:
-snip-
>The WAW and V4V games have excellent maps and
>counters and have the stengths that one would expect of
>computer games (admin duties such as tracking
>movement and supply, ease of setup and storage, and
>PBEM capability). The main disadvantages are bugs (I
>think the average Europaphile would find this extremely
>irritating)
-snip-
I gave up on V4V/WAW for just this reason: the bugs were
unreasonable, and Atomic was more interested in going on to their
next game rather than cleaning up their existing offerings [contrast
this with Scott Hamilton, who produced ADC, and has continually and
in a timely fashion responded to gamers bug reports, as well as doing
EXTENSIVE beta testing, which I do not believe is one of Atomic's
hallmarks].
Sure, I loved their maps and counters, too, and wish that Europa can
evolve into this one day, for all the reasons Nigel states. But give
me a game that works over a pretty face any day of the week. By the
way [and this may be old news], Atomic and Avalon Hill had a falling
out, and the last time I heard about this were wrangling over the
designs done for AH. And yes, Computerized Europa would allow more
and faster playtesting for chrome and 'official' variants [one week
turns; step or percentage reductions, automating replacements, etc.],
at the very least because playtests should be done with the least
number of time-consuming variables, such as historic vs. 'free'
set-ups.
>The above is simply a wish list - whether it is a viable
>business proposition is another question. Atomic Games,
>the developers of WAW/V4V, have basically quit
>supporting the games (in terms of issuing new patches,
>etc) and have indicated that they want to appeal, not only
>to hardcore gamers, but also to the broader strategy
>gaming market.
Well, that is where the money is...as shown by GAMES like Panzer
General, Perfect [or whatever its called] General, etc. But these are
GAMES, not simulations. Europa is never going to have broad,
mass-market appeal. Winston is acting perfectly appropriately to try
to increase his customer base by producing WW I and Pacific Theatre
game systems based on Europa, which is a proven system with a loyal
customer following. But I doubt that Winston believes that he's going
to get rich off of Europa, and I don't think that the original GDW
crew did either. If they'd wanted just to do that, they'd have
created WiF, or 3R, or some other GAME instead.
I think that the major issue for Computerized Europa is: Where are
the thousands [or even, perhaps, tens of thousands] of person hours
going to come from to create, lay out, and program the sucker so that
it is true to the original? And, will it be available for the Mac as
well as the PC. After all, before they got bit by the big bucks bug,
the Atomic guys were doing the Mac 4V4 before the PC versions.
Sorry to ramble on so, and possibly step on an already excellent
post.
Ray
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 1996 23:32:14 -36000
From: Jason Long <civguy@dusable.cps.k12.il.us>
Subject: Re: Second Front end game
The SE theater should be available for play for those who want to test
Churchill's idea out, but the rest of us should be able to ignore it. My
rules in CoT were an approximation of what I would like to see although I
simplified things significantly due to counter and time constraints.
Not that much from Greece and Yugoslavia really reaches areas north of
the Sava(?, the one bordering yugoslavia and Hungary) River and they
could be released based on a timetable after defection/conquest of
Romania and Bulgaria. Everything else should remain in Yugoslavia
fighting off Tito's partisans and the Bulgars and the odd soviet units.
Jason
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 1996 23:38:57 -36000
From: Jason Long <civguy@dusable.cps.k12.il.us>
Subject: Re: Second Front end game
Ray,
I concur wholeheartedly that the SE theater OB needs to be finished
completely up to Europa standards, but I think that we don't necessarily
need to allow people to loot the place of all the good stuff. The Germans
did keep 1st panzer there for around a year until the Kiev offensive.
A really strict garrison rule would do alot to keep things within the
realsm of probable conduct given some of the wierdness that player will
commit.
As an aside I refuse to use that Axis political police rule as I think it
exagerates the units' real effects.
Jason
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 1996 23:44:40 -36000
From: Jason Long <civguy@dusable.cps.k12.il.us>
Subject: Re: Computers and Europa
I've played Stalingrad as well and it offers some tastes of what Computer
Europa could be like. However the game is badly researched and I have
serious qualms about the system as the offense seems too powerful in all
the scenarios I've played.
Jason
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 1996 23:44:40 -36000
From: Jason Long <civguy@dusable.cps.k12.il.us>
Subject: Re: Computers and Europa
I've played Stalingrad as well and it offers some tastes of what Computer
Europa could be like. However the game is badly researched and I have
serious qualms about the system as the offense seems too powerful in all
the scenarios I've played.
Jason
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 1996 23:50:18 -36000
From: Jason Long <civguy@dusable.cps.k12.il.us>
Subject: Re: Second Front end game
The poor quality of the German pilots is addressed in one sense in that
the Germans no longer get one counter per 40 aircraft, but one per 50
from early '44 on. also the late period withdrawls were increased beyond
the norm to account for the declining quality of the pilots. I thought
about a DRM a la SE, but decided it was rather redudant given the Allied
margin of numbers over the Nazis.
Jason
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 1996 23:54:01 -36000
From: Jason Long <civguy@dusable.cps.k12.il.us>
Subject: Re: Airdrop rules
I kinda like your idea as I can't think of any airdrop aborted by flak.
Granted that flak wasn't much of a factor at most airdrops in the West,
with the possible exceptions of Crete and Arnhem, but still...
I don't know anything about the Soviet airdrops in the East as I haven't
read Glantz's opus on the subject.
Jason
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 1996 00:16:58 -36000
From: Jason Long <civguy@dusable.cps.k12.il.us>
Subject: Re: occupation policies
Steve,
>From some of the stuff I've read it seems that some areas in Russia where
the residents were well treated by the Germans that little partisan activity
occured. This doesn't appear to be the case in Yugoslavia.
The difference seems to be that the ethnic groups in Russia were
resentful of the Soviets while the Serbs were resentful of the invaders.
I'm not greatly worried about the SE theater as it required far less of a
garrison than did russia.
Jason
From: j.broshot@genie.com
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 96 04:48:00 UTC 0000
Subject: Sea Lion, The Balkans, etc.
I regret that I don't have the computer skills and/or software to
reprint all of the things that I am responding to (being one of
the old geezers, I bought my first Europa game in the summer of
1975, "Narvik"):
1. Re Sea Lion: C.S.Forester's assumption was that the British
could rebuild their air forces quicker than the Germans. A
reasonable given the resources and manpower available from
overseas. He also assumes that all of the existing U-Boats are
thrown into and decimated in the invasion. Also, don't forget that
the officers and manpower for the U-Boat arm was conscripted off
of the surface fleet. If your surface fleet is at the bottom of the
English Channel....
2. Re The Balkans: the only "what-if" story I ever saw was an
obscure novel by John Master THE FIELD MARSHAL'S MEMOIRS. A
hypothetical Allied invasion of the Balkans followed by a major
defeat of the Germans was the background (the old field marshal
was going to publish his memoirs about the battle 30 years after
the event and tell things that his government did not want
revealed). I have a copy and check out details if anyone is
interested.
3. Re France 1940: according to Field Marshal Alanbrooke's memoirs,
the German invasion was originally scheduled for 12 Nov 1939 but
was cancelled because of bad weather. Another point can the Germans
use the Manstein plan or do they have to use the original OKH plan
(which incidentally omitted Holland). Which leads into another
point:
4. Re Weather: does GE use the historic weather patterns. I know
that weather is rolled randomly but allowances are made for
historic bad weather. Again according to Alanbrooke, the winter of
1939-1940 was "coldest...for years." Another reason for the
cancellation of the German plans (and don't forget that copies of
the original plan were captured when two staff officers took the
wrong flight).
5. Re Gen-X: I am glad to see the interest of the younger
generation. Its good for the hobby as a whole and Europa in
particular. After seeing some of the garbage my son had to learn
in elementary school that was supposed to be history (we home-
school now) I was worried. Especially after an incident some
years ago. I saw a model of a Junkers Ju188 [four types represented
in SF] on sale at a discount in a hobby shop in St. Louis and not
having had been able to get one when I was a kid I bought it. The
young guy at the counter looks at the picture on the box (a bomber
plastered with black crosses) and says, "what war was this plane
in?" Sigh.
History is valuable, I forget the exact quote, but "those who
ignore history are condemned to repeat it." I have a BA with honors
in history to go with my J.D. and sometimes I wished that I had
stayed in history. I submit that many of the leaders of the world
have never read, studied or even know of what has happened in the
Balkans before now. There is an important reason for all of those
German and Italian divisions sitting in that off-map box in SF.
I really enjoy the postings here.
Jim Broshot, St. James MO