Date: Wed, 6 Mar 1996 10:24:36 -0400
From: jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell)
Subject: Re: And still France falls
On 3-6-96 Dave Lippman wrote:
> ...One of the things that was striking about the Third Republic was how
>its servants were very hostile to it. Weygand was a monarchist, for
>example. Petain, Laval, Baudoin, made no secret of their dislike of the
>Republic. They identified it with Bolshevism, Socialism, high taxes, and
>Jews.
> Of course, part of the hostility came out of the WW1 and the Great
>Depression, in which European civilization was faced with the spectacle
>of Western democracy being unable to contend with two of the greatest
>upheavals in history, that shattered the social structure of what was
>still the world's ruling nations. Democracy couldn't end WW1. After it
>did, it couldn't solve the Great Depression....
Hostility to the Third Republic had much deeper roots than WW1 or the
Depression -- it goes right back to establishment of the Third Republic
itself. Monarchist v Republican v Bonapartism (or Caesarism, if you prefer
-- the man on the white horse). Bourgeous v Socialist. Traditionalist and
clerical v progressive and anti-clerical. Etc. At times, the only thing
that seemed to save the Third Republic was that its foes could not agree on
what would replace it!
The French at that time had not developed a consensus of what type of
government they should have, and the reverberations of this echoed down
into the 1930s and 40s.
Date: Wed, 6 Mar 1996 10:25:17 -0400
From: jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell)
Subject: Re: France Falls Again
On Wed, 6 Mar 1996, Mark H Danley wrote:
>
>Looks pretty good - but keep in mind De Gaulle has to actually fight to
>get all of Equatorial Africa; Chad rallies first, then Ubangi Shari. Two
>Gaullist "emissaries" go to Duala in the Cameroons (I think one is
>Leclerc), and stage what's basically a minicoup. But a Vichy general
>named Tetu (I don't remember his first name) with a wopping four
>battalions of colonial infantry resists in Gabon. After the Dakar fiasco, a
>Free French force lands at Libreville in Gabon and defeats Tetu.
Leclerc was instrumental in rallying French Equatorial Africa. The mini
civil war that occurs there probably can be ignored.
> Perhaps even after the determining the initial allegiance in the
>post-armistice turn, we could allow the Allied player in future turns to
>try an Operation Menace (the attempted forcible "rallying" of Dakar) or
>two. Success would be unlikely at this point, but possible I suppose.
Actually, it might be best in game terms to have all the French colonies
stay loyal at first and then check them for rallying to the Free French a
couple of months after the armistice goes into force. This may be a useful
compression of what seems to be a single, drawn-out event.
>Arthur Marder also wrote a book about the Dakar operation, I think called
>_Defeat at Dakar_, and he saw the loss of surprise as the main cause of
>the failure of the mission) In game turns, Menace would be Naval
>Transporting a Royal Marine Brigade, whatever Free French ground forces
>are in play, and a naval task force to a Vichy colonial holding box, and
>rolling to see if they resist at full strength, half strength, or not at
>all. Again, the first result should be the most likely.
Besides lack of surprise, lack of overwhelming force helped doom the Dakar
expedition. As I remember, using British troops (there were two Royal
Marine brigades present) was more likely to provoke resistance than quell
it, and the Free French force itself was equivalent to a rather weak
brigade -- an insufficient show of force.
Date: Wed, 6 Mar 1996 09:48:24 -0600 (CST)
From: Mark H Danley <danley@ksu.ksu.edu>
Subject: Re: France Falls Again
On Tue, 5 Mar 1996, James B. Byrne wrote:
> We know what happened to France, because it did. And we can
> project from that point. But reality is that the German Army
> underwent a considerable re-organization between the end of the
> Polish campaign and the beginning of the French. The
> motorized/light panzer divisions particularly. If France had
> pushed hard in the west while Germany's army was occupied in the
> east, what would have been the political effect on Germany?
> Would Hitler have faced the revolt of the generals in the fall
> of '39 instead of '44?
>
> I raise this issue because its seems unbalanced to so finely
> examine the options open to France while assuming that Germany
> was invunerable to the political consequences of possible
> French/Allied actions. A more dynamic French leadership,
> militarily speaking, could have possibly forced a political
> crisis in Germany equal to that suffered by France the following
> spring.
> --
Heck yeah! James is right, it works both ways: we should talk
about such possibilities. I don't know enough about twentieth-century
German history to offer an opinion with which I'd be comfortable, but
some of you guys probably have ideas. Europa fans usually tend to be
pretty well read on the whole. What James says on the surface seems
plausible though - Basil Lidell-Hart always claimed that in the early war
period Hitler's hold on power was tenuous in that the military went along
with him only as long as spectacular victories kept flowing. On the other
hand, they tolerate several years on non-spectacular-victories in the
east until they try anything. Maybe someone who knows about Germany can
tell us what it might take in 1940 to get a change in the German
government of such magnitude that it will affect Germany' status in the game.
Mark
From: Jay Steiger/Forte <Jay_Steiger/Forte.FORTE@notes.san.fhi.com>
Date: 6 Mar 96 10:28:55 PS
Subject: Dumb Yuk
A little levity for the board...
When considering the behaviour of a howitzer:
A mathematician will be able to calculate where the shell will land.
A physicist will be able to explain how the shell gets there.
An engineer will stand there and try to catch it.
Budump bump...
From: NASU002.USAP@iac.org.nz (Public Affairs Officer)
Date: Thu, 07 Mar 1996 07:57 GMT
Subject: Fascination with Frenchmen
I think the reason people are so interested in the outcome of
fighting for control of a few 1-8 French regiments is probably because
these goofy French units have a certain cachet...mountainous Senegalese
infantry... Moroccan goumiers in striped uniforms...turbaned Spahi
cavalry...Chasseurs d'Afrique...Chasseurs Marins in their pomponned
Donald Duck hats...and the white-kepied bearded Germans and Spaniards of
the legendary Legion Etrangere, a outfit wreathed in mystery and
mystique.
Folks like these have an aura that, for all its combat power, the
17th Guards Tank Corps, sometimes lacks.
David H. Lippman
Public Affairs Officer
US Naval Antarctic Support Unit
Christchurch, New Zealand
Date: Wed, 06 Mar 1996 14:28:18 -0500
From: Nicholas Forte <nforte@osf1.gmu.edu>
Subject: Re: France Falls Again
On Tue, 5 Mar 1996 20:13:35 -0400 jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell) wrote:
>For the historical outcome of the French armistice, each colonial regional
>area probably should have a 1/6 chance of going over to the Free French
>(with die roll modifiers making it impossible for French North Africa to do
>so at this level of armisitice). Historically, French Equatorial Africa
>goes over, and the French military commander in the Levant tries to get the
>Levant to go over but gets persuaded (reluctantly it seems) to stay loyal
>to Vichy.
John,
You might think about rolling for French North Africa first and having the
result of this roll modify the rolls for the other colonies. Since French North
Africa is the most important French colony, with the largest overseas French
population and the largest colonial military apparatus, its position would
likely have a strong influence on the position of the other colonies.
Nick Forte
Reston, VA
From: NASU002.USAP@iac.org.nz (Public Affairs Officer)
Date: Thu, 07 Mar 1996 08:29 GMT
Subject: The fight for Sicily
Hi, Rich.
Good points on the defense of Sicily, but your basic point was
pretty much what Hans Hube and Fridolin von Senger figured out...it
wasn't worth it to expend the 14th Panzer Korps in Sicily. The Germans
fought a masterful delaying action, and escaped from the island with
virtually all their equipment.
The big difference in game terms is that the Allied player is likely
to hurl the Mediterranean air forces en masse against Palermo, Messina,
and the other ferry links. According to Carlo d'Este's "Bitter Victory,"
the Allied air forces did a poor job at best of interfering with the Axis
evacuation.
Meanwhile, Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, who had done such a
masterful job of wrecking the Axis evacuation from Tunisia, quailed at
sending his ships into the Straits of Messina. D'Este argues that
Cunningham was frightened by a hideous ghost...that of the Dardanelles,
where the words March 18, 1915, are still engraved on the side of a
cliff, marking the day when the Royal Navy's seapower was defeated by
Turkish gun batteries.
A more aggressive Allied player might send air and naval power into
those straits and cut off a retreat...I noticed some of these posts talk
about the Allies taking a considerable amount of naval losses in various
ahistorical invasions.
Others might want to cut their losses both in materiel and victory
points and not contest such an evacuation.
It's certainly a cleft stick, fighting defense for Sicily. But one
certainly gains insight into what it must have been like for Hube and
Kesselring in those July and August days in 1943.
Best,
DHL
From: NASU002.USAP@iac.org.nz (Public Affairs Officer)
Date: Thu, 07 Mar 1996 08:44 GMT
Subject: Republique Francaise
Very true on the weaknesses of the French Third Republic, which were
immense (I am reading the last chapter of Shirer's book even as we
speak). The nation was born after a massive military defeat and the
political chaos of the Paris Commune. Almost immediately it ran into
trouble with L'Affaire Dreyfuss, which nearly tore France apart. Right
after that came the "Thy Jo" letters, alliances with Russia and Britain,
foreign policy crises over Agadir and Morocco, and then WW1. That country
never had a chance to breathe.
Best,
Dave Lippman
Public Affairs Officer
US Naval Antarctic Support Unit
Christchurch, New Zealand
Date: Wed, 6 Mar 1996 14:47:33 -0400
From: jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell)
Subject: Re: France Falls Again
> If France had
> pushed hard in the west while Germany's army was occupied in the
> east, what would have been the political effect on Germany?
> Would Hitler have faced the revolt of the generals in the fall
> of '39 instead of '44?
Sure, given a big enough shock early enough, almost any country could give
up, in some form.
Date: Wed, 6 Mar 1996 14:53:14 -0400
From: jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell)
Subject: Re: France Falls Again
>You might think about rolling for French North Africa first and having the
>result of this roll modify the rolls for the other colonies. Since French
>North
>Africa is the most important French colony, with the largest overseas French
>population and the largest colonial military apparatus, its position would
>likely have a strong influence on the position of the other colonies.
Yes, that's a good idea.
From: NASU002.USAP@iac.org.nz (Public Affairs Officer)
Date: Thu, 07 Mar 1996 09:15 GMT
Subject: Thanks from ChCh
Dear Mark:
Thanks for your kind note. I appreciate it.
I checked last night...the guys on the Massilia were greeted at the
Rabat pier by the Moroccan version of the flics and were arrested. One of
them, Mandel, was imprisoned by Vichy milice and shot in early 1944. His
main crimes were that he wanted to fight Germany and was Jewish.
Police states, historian Roger Manvell pointed out, inevitably
create a situation wherein the nation is run by the worst people in the
state, usually criminals, who proceed to execute the nation's best minds.
Keegan's comments on the French army are in Six Armies in Normandy,
which was reprinted in 1994 for the 50th anniversary of D-Day. It's an
excellent look at the Normandy campaign, with close-ups on the American,
Canadian, Scottish, English, German, Polish, and French forces that
fought in the hedgerows. It looks at what made these forces what they
were, their national and social characteristics. It's quite fascinating.
I don't think most of Europe particularly looked forward to fighting
WW2, except maybe the Germans. The memories of WW1 were too devastating.
A whole generation lay dead on the Flanders wire. The horrors of the
Somme set off a wave of pacificism and a drive for disarmament that in
turn led to appeasement. Chamberlain himself had lost several relatives
in the trenches and, in a government job during WW1, had to send more to
certain death. WW1 devastated him personally, and he was (like many other
appeasers in Europe) determined to avoid a replay. What he got instead
was something a hundred times worse.
The worst thing that can befall the world, it sometimes seems, is
when people try to do the right thing.
Dave Lippman
Public Affairs Officer
US Naval Antarctic Support Unit
Christchurch, New Zealand
Date: Wed, 6 Mar 1996 14:39:49 -0600 (CST)
From: Mark H Danley <danley@ksu.ksu.edu>
Subject: Re: France Falls Again
You know, Nick's idea about having to roll for North Africa first might
not be bad - at least we could give the other colonies a positive mod. if
North Africa rallies. I think this is good idea because all the
possibilities involving a anti-Axis French regime after the armistice
with greater credibility than DeGaulle involved North Africa. i.e.,
Boisson in Dakar would be more likely to go along with an anti-armistice
in Darlan than he was historically with DeGaulle
Mark
Date: Wed, 6 Mar 1996 14:44:10 -0600 (CST)
From: Mark H Danley <danley@ksu.ksu.edu>
Subject: Re: France Falls Again
What John said and Dave backed up about the real cause of internal
resistance to the Third Republic is also backed up by what I've read -
old professor Paxton, the historian of Vichy in _Vichy France: Old Guard
and New Order_ said that deep down inside, Vichy's leaders were really
mad at the French Revolution, and its supposedly legacy, which was
responsible for the decadence and immorality of the Third Republic - one
can even interpret Vichy as the ultimate attempt at final revenge on the
Revolution of 1789 by the hiers of the Ancien Regime.
Mark
Date: Wed, 6 Mar 1996 14:53:15 -0600 (CST)
From: Mark H Danley <danley@ksu.ksu.edu>
Subject: Re: France Falls Again
I realize you're inclined to dispense with the fighting in Gabon, and I
think one certainly could and the simulation as a whole wouldn't suffer.
(Guys I was kidding about the 18 maps for central Africa!) But FWBT
gives us the whole Portugese Empire in the form of holding boxes,
complete with some 1-6 Inf III's to inhabit it. If we've agreed that
kind of detail was desirable, why not do the same for the French Empire.
John mentioned earlier that a designer might condense all the
events of June - September 1940 regarding the French Empire into one
process for simplicity. Yeah, Grand Europa wouldn't suffer if we did.
BUT we can probably treat it in a little more detail without and undue
increase in complexity and decrease in playibility.
Historically, the real importance of Equatorial Africa rallying
(aside from rescuing DeGaulle from absolute obscurity) was that it was
geographically important as a stop-over for transfering aircraft from
British West Africa to the Middle East.
Mark
Date: Wed, 6 Mar 1996 14:49:33 -0600
From: bdbryant@mail.utexas.edu (Bobby D. Bryant)
Subject: Holding Sicily
> A more aggressive Allied player might send air and naval power into
>those straits and cut off a retreat...I noticed some of these posts talk
>about the Allies taking a considerable amount of naval losses in various
>ahistorical invasions.
Has anyone tried landings on the toe of Italy, to cut off the Axis troops
even if they *do* want to evacuate Sicily?
- Bobby.
Date: Wed, 6 Mar 1996 15:15:39 -0600 (CST)
From: Mark H Danley <danley@ksu.ksu.edu>
Subject: Re: France Falls Again
On Wed, 6 Mar 1996, John M. Astell wrote:
>
> Actually, it might be best in game terms to have all the French colonies
> stay loyal at first and then check them for rallying to the Free French a
> couple of months after the armistice goes into force. This may be a useful
> compression of what seems to be a single, drawn-out event.
>
> Besides lack of surprise, lack of overwhelming force helped doom the Dakar
> expedition. As I remember, using British troops (there were two Royal
> Marine brigades present) was more likely to provoke resistance than quell
> it, and the Free French force itself was equivalent to a rather weak
> brigade -- an insufficient show of force.
>
True but the anti-British element is a direct result of Mers-el-Kebir.
Not that the French weren't resentful of the British already for
supposedly betraying them in the Battle of France, but Mers-el-Kebir made
a GREAT many French officers who were still pretty anti-Axis turn
completely neutral. In game terms, if the British pull off a bloodless
CATAPULT than the anti-British factor is less important. By the way, the
lack of overwhelming force is important, and the mechanic used in Torch, wherein
the number of RE's of landing Allied forces as compared to Vichy forces
makes a difference might be useful if one does decide to represent Menace
directly.
Mark
Date: Wed, 6 Mar 1996 16:13:02 -0400
From: jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell)
Subject: Re: France Falls Again
>I realize you're inclined to dispense with the fighting in Gabon, and I
>think one certainly could and the simulation as a whole wouldn't suffer.
>(Guys I was kidding about the 18 maps for central Africa!) But FWBT
>gives us the whole Portugese Empire in the form of holding boxes,
>complete with some 1-6 Inf III's to inhabit it. If we've agreed that
>kind of detail was desirable, why not do the same for the French Empire.
Yes. There will be a master Africa chart with all sorts of holding boxes on
it, right down to South Africa (War in the Desert will contain not only the
North Africa forces and not only the East Africa forces, but even the South
African home defense forces -- ever heard of the 5th Mounted Commando
Division?)
> Historically, the real importance of Equatorial Africa rallying
>(aside from rescuing DeGaulle from absolute obscurity) was that it was
>geographically important as a stop-over for transfering aircraft from
>British West Africa to the Middle East.
Indeed. While troops couldn't be sent that way (no rail connections and no
good roads), aircraft could be shipped from Britain to West Africa and then
could stage across central Africa to Egypt, thereby cutting 2-3 weeks off
their transit time.
From: NASU002.USAP@iac.org.nz (Public Affairs Officer)
Date: Thu, 07 Mar 1996 11:27 GMT
Subject: Operation Right Cross
I've been weighing that very idea, a two-sided assault on the
Straits of Messina, on the theory that the best way to take a bridge is
from both ends at the same time. The terrain looks a little unnerving,
though, and it's at the edge of Allied air cover. If you commit the
carriers, it's possible, but it looks risky.
I lean towards caution, mostly because I don't want a lot of
disastrous operations and casualties thereof, but a two-sided assault on
Messina has some attraction. It would certainly require maximum use of
commando resources and airborne forces. Any ideas for Operation Right
Cross?
Dave Lippman
Public Affairs Officer
US Naval Antarctic Support Unit
Christchurch, New Zealand
From: pardue@hilda.mast.QueensU.CA (Keith Pardue)
Subject: Holding Sicily (fwd)
Date: Wed, 6 Mar 1996 17:31:08 -0500 (EST)
> > A more aggressive Allied player might send air and naval power into
> >those straits and cut off a retreat...I noticed some of these posts talk
> >about the Allies taking a considerable amount of naval losses in various
> >ahistorical invasions.
>
> Has anyone tried landings on the toe of Italy, to cut off the Axis troops
> even if they *do* want to evacuate Sicily?
>
> - Bobby.
>
>
When I played the Axis, I was very paranoid about this possibility.
This was one reason why I decided to evacuate Sicily. I had pretty reasonable
forces in every hex in the toe and was built a fortified line south of
the mountains to help contain an invasion there.
I suppose that one reason to defend Sicily more agressively is
to try to destroy some Allied naval units. If you do this enough, then
the Allies will need to get pretty cautious. They may end the game with
hundreds of Infantry RPs, but Naval RPs are more scarce. But, I think
that if the Allies are careful with their naval forces, they can still
cut off all of the forces in Sicily pretty easily.
Best Wishes,
Keith
Date: Thu, 7 Mar 1996 00:20:57 +0100
From: cloister@dircon.co.uk (Perry de Havilland)
Subject: Re: The fight for Sicily
DHL wrote
>
> Good points on the defense of Sicily, but your basic point was
>pretty much what Hans Hube and Fridolin von Senger figured out...it
>wasn't worth it to expend the 14th Panzer Korps in Sicily. The Germans
>fought a masterful delaying action, and escaped from the island with
>virtually all their equipment.
> The big difference in game terms is that the Allied player is likely
>to hurl the Mediterranean air forces en masse against Palermo, Messina,
>and the other ferry links. According to Carlo d'Este's "Bitter Victory,"
>the Allied air forces did a poor job at best of interfering with the Axis
>evacuation.
> Meanwhile, Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, who had done such a
>masterful job of wrecking the Axis evacuation from Tunisia, quailed at
>sending his ships into the Straits of Messina. D'Este argues that
>Cunningham was frightened by a hideous ghost...that of the Dardanelles,
>where the words March 18, 1915, are still engraved on the side of a
>cliff, marking the day when the Royal Navy's seapower was defeated by
>Turkish gun batteries.
> A more aggressive Allied player might send air and naval power into
>those straits and cut off a retreat...I noticed some of these posts talk
>about the Allies taking a considerable amount of naval losses in various
>ahistorical invasions.
> Others might want to cut their losses both in materiel and victory
>points and not contest such an evacuation.
>
> It's certainly a cleft stick, fighting defense for Sicily. But one
>certainly gains insight into what it must have been like for Hube and
>Kesselring in those July and August days in 1943.
>
> Best,
>
> DHL
Speaking as a player who usually plays the Brits, I rather share
Cunningham's serious reservations about sending a large chunk of the
mediterranian fleet anywhere the Luftwaffe can munch on it. These are VERY
valuable assets and whilst one must be willing to take losses to achieve
ones goals, unless the Germans have, for some bizarre reason, positively
packed Scilly with high value units, I'd be rather inclined to just do what
damage I could with the RAF/USAAF. Of course, this statement rather
depends on 'what the board looks like'. If the Luftwaffe is poorly
deployed, I might consider a fairly large sortie into the straits.
Nevertheless, my point is Cunningham's 'timid' decisions on this occasion,
whilst certainly open to interpretation, were not without merit.
Cunningham himself was a very good commander and I'm not sure he was wrong.
All the best
Perry ..._
From: Rich Velay <richv@icebox.iceonline.com>
Subject: GURU:SF Errata
Date: Wed, 6 Mar 1996 18:48:08 PST
Second Front Errata Supplement, Mar 3, 1996
John M. Astell, with Rich C. Velay
Axis OB. (clarification) Note that there is no Fuhrer HQ
garrison box in Second Front; this garrison is
included for the purposes of Grand Europa. Fuhrer
HQ garrison units do not enter SF through garrison
activation.
Axis OB. (clarification) Note that a port fortification may
be placed at Toulon during initial set up, even
though Toulon is an unimproved fortress. Note
that the -1 DRM for the unimproved fortress is
cumulative with the -1 DRM of the port
fortification.
Axis and Allied OB. (clarification) Note that the rule that
allows permanent airfields and forts to be placed
during initial deployment (by expending resouce
points) does not require the airfield or port be
placed in the same area where its resouce point can
be deployed. A fort or airfield may be placed in
any hex the player owns where such an item may be
built. For example, using a resouce point that
would deploy in mainland Italy per the deployement
instructions, the Axis player may place a fort on
Sicily -- or even in France or Germany.
Allied OB. (addition) The following OB information is
missing from the Allied OB booklet should appear
immediately before the "Sequester" portion of the
OB for Jul I 44
Jul I 1944 MTO, French:
Convert: 1x 4-3-8 Art X CEF to: 1x 3-2-8 Art X 1C
(Afr) 1x 3-2-8 Art X 2C (Col)
Convert: 1x 2-3-8 Hvy AA X CEF AA=5 to:
2x 1-2-8 Hvy AA X (AA=3) 1C, 2C
Rule 28B (correction) The sentence "A cargo naval group does
not have a combat zone." is incorrect. Replace this
sentence with "A cargo naval group has a combat
zone in the hex it occupies."
Rule 37E (addition) In addition to cities, activated
garrison units may be also be placed in any
fortress within the activated district or region,
as appropriate.
Rule 37E1 (clarification/correction) The Allied Malta
garrison uses the point city of Valetta as its
garrison activation hex.
"Airborne" vs. "Air-Droppable"
Certain rules confuse the terms "airborne units"
(per the unit identification chart, this is a
specific unit type: the airborne/parachute-infantry
symbol) and "air-droppable units" (per Rule 24,
these are all parachute, air landing/glider, and
parachute commando units). "Air-droppable is the
correct term for the following rules:
Rule 24B1 (Hex Ownership): All mentions of
"airborne unit" should be "air-roppable unit."
Rule 40B2/B3 (Axis/Allied Replacements): All
mentions of "airborne RE" should be "air-droppable
RE." (The rules here limit the number of air-
droppable REs that may be replaced).
Ignore the note referring to an Allied airborne
division requiring 9 months to be replaced. Note
that a precise reading of the uncorrected rules
would allow, for example, parachute or glider units
to be replaced without limit, with only
airborne/parachute-infantry units being limited.
The corrected rule fixes this, although for
simplicity it allows an anomaly that is addressed
in an optional rule below.
Airborne/Air-Droppable Replacements (Optional)
The correction of the "airborne" vs "air-droppable"
confusion creates an anomaly in the replacement
system: divisions with the airborne/
parachute-infantry symbol are not affected by the
limits on replacing "air-droppable" REs, even
though many of these divisions break down into
air-droppable components. This optional rule
addresses this: The divisions listed below are
affected by Rule 40B2/B3's limits on replacing
air-droppable REs:
American 14-8 Abn XX:
4 airdroppable REs are required to replace
division at full strength
3 airdroppable REs are required to rebuild
cadre to full strength
1 airdroppable RE is required to replace
division at cadre strength
American and British 11-8, 10-8, 10-6, 9-6 Abn XX:
3 airdroppable REs are required to replace
division at full strength
2 airdroppable REs are required to rebuild
cadre to full strength
1 airdroppable RE is required to replace
division at cadre strength
German 11-9-8, 9-8* Para-Inf XX:
1 airdroppable RE is required to replace
division at full strength
1 airdroppable RE is required to rebuild
cadre to full strength
0 airdroppable REs are required to replace
division at cadre strength
Italian 5-8 Para-Inf XX (184 Nm only):
1 airdroppable RE is required to replace
division at full strength
1 airdroppable RE is required to rebuild
cadre to full strength
0 airdroppable REs are required to replace
division at cadre strength
For any unit that requires more than one airdroppable
RE to replace/rebuild, the player must
replace/rebuild the unit incrementally. Each
3-month period, he may spend his airdroppable RE
replacement limit for the unit, marking the unit
with a convenient marker. Once the unit has
sufficient airdroppable REs for replacement/
rebuilding, the player may spend the appropriate
replacement points and actually replace/rebuild the
unit.
The Straits of Messina
The standard rules do not cover the Axis use of the
Straits of Messina (26:3822, 3823, 3923, where the
rail ferries are) adequately. In particular, Rule
34J, Landing Craft as Ferries, is a simplification
of the actual situation and allows the Allies to
interdict the straits far better in the game than
they did historically. The simplest solution is to
allow the Axis player (only) to treat the Straits
of Messina as narrow straits hexsides: The Axis
player may treat any rail ferry in these hexes as a
narrow straits hexside, provided he owns both hexes
of the rail ferry. For example, the Axis player may
treat the rail ferry on the 26:3822/3823 hexside as
a narrow straits hexside if he owns both 26:3822
and 26:3823. An optional, albeit more complex,
general solution to the landing craft as ferries
will be published at a later date.
RichV@Icebox.Iceonline.com
Europa, tomorrow's games about yesterday, TODAY
Date: Thu, 07 Mar 1996 01:06:52 -0500
From: Ray Kanarr <RayK@smtp4.aw.com>
Subject: Re: AREONAVAL
Rich:
You make a number of points with merit regarding Air and Naval
operations in Europa. Your points are based on your personal
preferences, which doesn't make them invalid, but doesn't make them
universal sentiments either. I think that the many hours that would
need to be spent learning and referring to the rules, and conducting
these operations [as shown by the complexity of the SF invasion turn
rules], are equally good reasons for avoiding the additional
complexity that they introduce.
However, all that this means is that there is an excellent argument
for computerizing these functions, as well as things like supply
[operational and strategic], rail, naval, and air transport, and a
number of other time-intensive operations. The arguments that used to
be valid objections against computerization of some or all of Europa,
namely storage capacity and processing speed, no longer exist.
As for taking time from other Europa-related projects to devote time
to developing strategic air or detailed naval systems, with the
statement that only one person is devoting time to development [I
would presume that person is John Astell], I stated here months ago
that more people should get involved in Europa, and there were
several VOLUNTEERS to do just that, and this is a tune that I've been
playing for years. The fact that the powers that be have not
investigated or exploited the resource of the Europa hobbyists is not
for lack of people wanting to get involved.
And if the Europa development team is not going to do anything about
things like Strategic Air; Detailed Naval; and Balkan Partisan
systems anyhow, then what is the harm in letting some of the other
people who have a love of all things Europa to have a crack at it? At
worst, they produce something which doesn't get an official stamp of
approval; at best, they produce a breakthrough that elevates the
system even more.
If this is heresy, then all I can say is "Be of good cheer, Master
Ridley, for we shall this day set a light which, by God's good grace,
shall never be put out." [Invitations to British Europa fans to
identify this misquote].
Ray the K
Date: 07 Mar 96 01:17:00 EST
From: Jim Arnold <74133.1765@compuserve.com>
Subject: RE: The Vichy armistice
The discussion on the various options for dealing with the Vichy armistice
points out one of the formidable problems with Grand Europa: If the Vichy
response to German terms is variable, shouldn't the German terms themselves be
variable, or optional? A can of worms, but difficult to ignore.
The Vichy option for neutrality would have been unthinkable if the Germans had
demanded the fleet, and/or even one of the major colonies. It's been argued on
this list that players don't and shouldn't represent the political leadership of
the powers, but political options like the content of the German terms can't be
excluded from GE without inevitable and serious distortions, since the
historical politics were grounded in the historical strategic situations. The
German treatment of France, shrewd under the circumstances, was based on
analyses that might look significantly different in the midst of a game of Grand
Europa. What if Italy is neutral? What if the USSR is active?
This sort of issue is one of the main reasons I'm convinced that GE is
unworkable without computer support to handle the maze of factors that would
have to be considered in formulating the probabilities, ramifications, and VP
costs of political events-in-context. I don't especially like computer games -
I'll always prefer the expanse of a maptable and the look and feel of an
infamous 18-10 in my hand. But some things are too important and yet too tedious
to be either ignored or done manually.
Strategic warfare, economics, and maybe a naval support module would seem to be
other aspects that would need to be computerized to make GE feasible.
Jim Arnold
Date: Thu, 7 Mar 1996 03:27:01 -0600
From: bdbryant@mail.utexas.edu (Bobby D. Bryant)
Subject: Re: GURU:SF Errata
> The standard rules do not cover the Axis use of the
> Straits of Messina (26:3822, 3823, 3923, where the
> rail ferries are) adequately. In particular, Rule
> 34J, Landing Craft as Ferries, is a simplification
> of the actual situation and allows the Allies to
> interdict the straits far better in the game than
> they did historically. The simplest solution is to
> allow the Axis player (only) to treat the Straits
> of Messina as narrow straits hexsides: The Axis
> player may treat any rail ferry in these hexes as a
> narrow straits hexside, provided he owns both hexes
> of the rail ferry. For example, the Axis player may
> treat the rail ferry on the 26:3822/3823 hexside as
> a narrow straits hexside if he owns both 26:3822
> and 26:3823. An optional, albeit more complex,
> general solution to the landing craft as ferries
> will be published at a later date.
Ooops -- there goes yesterday's easy Allied solution to Sicily!
Date: Thu, 7 Mar 1996 03:23:24 -0600
From: bdbryant@mail.utexas.edu (Bobby D. Bryant)
Subject: Re: GURU:SF Errata
>
> Second Front Errata Supplement, Mar 3, 1996
> John M. Astell, with Rich C. Velay
Give those men a medal!